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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

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For the current school year, Kansas State students have borrowed upward of a million dollars through university and university-administered funds to assist them in meeting educational expenses. One of every seven or eight students has borrowed a major sum through one of these funds. The bulk of the loans—more than two-thirds of the total—have been made through the National Defense Education Act program.

"One of the principal purposes of the National Defense Education Act program is to encourage top quality students to go on to college," explains Harold Kennedy, director of the office of aids and awards at Kansas State University. The National Defense Education Act program is making it possible for many more capable young people to get a college education. "It is the only loan program we have from which we can make loans to entering students."

But unique features of the National Defense Education Act loan program create collection problems not present in conventional loans. For instance, the loans do not begin to earn interest (at 3 percent) until the student has been out of school a full year. And his initial payment, of approximately a tenth of the sum borrowed, is not due until 3 years after he has left school. If, in the meantime, the borrower resumes his schooling or enters the armed services, his obligation is deferred further. And if he teaches, his yearly repayments may be forgiven, up to 8 years.

In selecting National Defense Education Act loan applicants, Kennedy says such factors as financial need, character, scholastic records and scores on entrance tests are considered carefully. Cosigners are required for minors.

Relatively elaborate procedures have been worked out at Kansas State to apprise each out-going student of his obligations concerning National Defense Education Act and other loans, and a series of written notifications and reminders follow as payment on the loan become due or past due. If the student becomes delinquent, and he makes no effort to pay or arrange a satisfactory schedule for payments, his account is turned over to the State attorney general's office for collection. So far records of seven Kansas State National Defense Education Act borrowers have been turned over to the attorney general and three have been collected.

CONGRESSIONAL REFORM AND THE MINORITY NO. 2

(Mr. CLEVELAND (at the request of Mr. REND of New York) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, as Chairman of the Republican Task Force on Congressional Reform and Minority Staffing, I shall be introducing material into the Record from time to time illustrating the need for the task force and presenting the work we are doing. I am now offering No. 2 in this series, the first having appeared in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of March 30, page 6117.

The power of a majority, especially when it is also in control of the White House, is well nigh irresistible, unless the minority party enjoys certain protections which it does not now have. The following column by Charles Bartlett, which appeared in the April 1 edition of the Washington Evening Star, discusses out one aspect of

in this country and representative government as we have known it.

As a Republican, I naturally regard the portents of the Bartlett column with greater foreboding, perhaps, than the majority side of this House. It is fair to suggest however that the destruction of the Republican Party, which Mr. Bartlett reports to be the goal of the President, could well mean the destruction of effective minority protection in the United States.

The article follows:

JOHNSON AIMS AT EXTINCTION OF GOP

(By Charles Bartlett)

While Lyndon B. Johnson works as President to bury partisanship in a spirit of consensus, he is working as a Democrat toward the extinction of the Republic Party in the congressional elections of 1966.

The crucial aspect of these contests to the GOP is marked by a spreading reference to them as the last stand. Key Republican strategists recognize that the party's failure to demonstrate a residual vigor in 1966 will be a long step toward oblivion.

The President's interest in these contests goes beyond an anxiety to protect his margins in Congress. He instinctively eyes the record set in 1964 when Franklin Roosevelt bucked precedent to augment his party's congressional majorities. No President, before or since, has matched this feat in an off-year election. Even Roosevelt went on, after his great personal victory in 1936, to lose 71 House seats in 1938.

The Democrats' retention of their 295 seats in 1966 would be a striking tour de force. About 19 of these seats were won by less than 5,000 votes in the anti-Goldwater sweep and more than 20 of them had previously gone to the Republicans by over 55 percent of the vote. The Republicans now say they cannot claim victory in 1966 unless they recapture at least 40 districts.

Johnson is meeting this challenge with a resourceful effort to help the 68 freshman Democrats sow themselves into their seats. The talents of the Democratic National Committee are being mobilized to work with these freshmen to win popular recognition at home. If these new Members wish to make a radio broadcast, mail a newsletter or deliver a speech, they can summon public relations specialists from the national committee. They can even seek funds to soften the expense of visits home.

This is estimable assistance to the funeral director from Syracuse, the accountant from Erie, the machinist from Oshkosh, and the others who rode into office on the Johnson wave. Their surprise compounded by their confusion at being in Washington normally would delay a swift start at the big task of getting reelected. Now they can lean on experts as they wrap themselves in the cloak of the Great Society.

The Democrats have other factors working for them in the 1966 elections. A new Republican splinter group, the American Conservative Union, already has opened offices in Washington with the aim of fielding congressional candidates in 1968. The strenuous exertions by Republican leaders to fabricate issues against the Johnson program are somewhat muffled by the Republican Senate leader EVERETT DIRksen, who occasionally seems to prize his standing with the White House more than the chance to make party points.

One overlooked factor is that the 1964 election left only three States (Idaho, Kansas, and South Dakota) in which the Governor and both branches of the State legislature are Republican. Under the congressional reapportioning proposal now before Congress, about 130 districts would become subject to alteration by State action. Since changes in the boundaries of these districts will affect

contiguous districts, the predominantly Democratic States governments may draw new lines for more than 150 congressional districts.

The Republicans are undertaking to meet the challenge of 1966 by raising \$2 million that will be spent in 100 critical districts. They are seeking this money in special meetings of large contributors around the country and in mail appeals that ask, "Is this the beginning of the end of our two-party government?"

The response to this special drive has not yet revealed any fervent determination to save the GOP in the 1966 elections. About 60 rich St. Louis Republicans, all past donors of \$1,000 or more to party campaigns, gathered at one of these special meetings last week and pledged \$12,000, or slightly less than \$200 each.

The Republican field men do find promising signs that impressive candidates will be available, especially in the districts that were staunchly Republican before Goldwater. To the extent that his defeat cleaned out weak incumbents in 1964 and created openings for abler Republicans in 1966, Goldwater may yet be counted a blessing by his party.

The potential of the South, where 41 districts were uncontested by Republicans in 1964, is obscured by the racial smoke. Some insight into the party's 1966 outlook in that region will be gained from the June 15 by election in South Carolina. The Republican have noted that the new Democratic House Members from the South frequently oppose the administration in their votes.

But the Northern Democratic freshmen are playing it extremely close of Johnson and his program. Their political careers and the President's chance of matching Roosevelt's feat will hang heavily upon the issue in November 1966 of the national administration.

(Mr. CLEVELAND (at the request of Mr. REND of New York) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

(Mr. CLEVELAND'S remarks will appear hereafter in the Appendix.)

WAR TURNING OUR WAY: BEECH

(Mr. PUCINSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, last Thursday in the Chicago Daily News, Keyes Beech of the Daily News Foreign Service wrote a very important report from Saigon—actually, the dateline is Hong Kong—for the Chicago Daily News headlined, "War Turning Our Way: Beech."

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Keyes Beech is one of the most highly respected foreign journalists in this world, respected not only in all quarters of America but in international circles.

Mr. Speaker, it is more than significant in my judgment that this report should come at this time. It is particularly significant that so highly respected, reputable and competent international observer should note that the war is turning our way.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Keyes Beech says in his report as follows:

HONG KONG.—The war for South Vietnam, which was going so nicely for the Commun-

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ists only a few months ago, has gone sour and nobody in the enemy camp seems to know what to do about it.

Of the three parties most vitally concerned—Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow—Hanoi is most unhappy of all. North Vietnam's big brothers, Red China and the Soviet Union, are locked in a bitter quarrel over how and what to do about rescuing their little brother from continuing U.S. air attacks.

Both, despite a great deal of tough talk, have been careful to hedge their commitments. Talk about Russian "volunteers" fighting side by side with their Vietcong brothers in the jungles of Southeast Asia draws nothing more than derisive hoots of laughter from Hong Kong-based experts.

China has threatened to send "selected individuals" and keep up the flow of arms and ammunition. This sounds like more of the same. And it's a far cry from the Korea-type war Peking was threatening a few months ago.

Meanwhile, it's North Vietnam that's being bombed almost daily with increasing intensity. Its coastal shipping is screened by U.S. 7th Fleet vessels for southbound arms shipments. Its ports are under constant scrutiny and subject to attack any time. And the signs are multiplying that the long war in the South has become a real drain on the limited resources of the Hanoi regime.

Watchers here find it hard to believe reports from Moscow that Peking has barred overland passage of Soviet military supplies to Hanoi. Yet they concede the Chinese are quite capable of doing just that.

After all, the Chinese are the people who a few years ago tossed bales of anti-Soviet propaganda off Russian trains at every station—until Moscow put a stop to it.

The Chinese Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, denied Thursday that Peking is obstructing Soviet efforts to send aid to North Vietnam overland through China, the Associated Press reported.

Red China's hatred of Moscow almost matches its hatred of the United States. In some respects it's more virulent because Peking considers the Soviet leaders traitors to the Communist cause.

The reason is not hard to find. With Soviet air power and nuclear weapons, Peking could deal with the American imperialist aggressors on more than equal terms. Without them the Chinese Communist leaders are reduced to raging impotence.

Quite possibly the Chinese are blocking Soviet supplies from reaching Hanoi in a desperate bid to force Moscow into a united front against the United States.

There's good reason to believe the Chinese Reds are confused and uncertain as a result of U.S. determination to carry the war to North Vietnam. The U.S. bombings introduced a totally new and upsetting element into the war.

According to Mao Tse-tung's reckoning, the United States was really a paper tiger because when the crunch came the Americans would never use the power at their disposal.

Ironically the Chinese leaders were counting on world opinion, for which they personally have complete contempt, to stay the American hand.

But Americans seized upon the Communist attack on Pleiku February 7 as a reason to go ahead and do what they thought best. More and more Pleiku looks like the turning point of the war.

Peking and Hanoi apparently are still betting they can force a political decision in South Vietnam by military means before North Vietnam is seriously hurt by American air raids.

A Communist military offensive in South Vietnam may be in the offing. If so, it doubtless will be accompanied by a three major sub-division: (1) The development of lower

Mr. Speaker, it would be my hope that those who have been trying to force President Johnson into negotiations at this time when we are making progress in Vietnam, will take a look and carefully read Mr. Beech's very timely report.

Mr. Speaker, there is no question in my mind but what President Johnson's decision to strike back at the Communists in Vietnam will go down in history as a monument to his good judgment and indeed is going to secure that land for the freedom and democracy that the people of South Vietnam so urgently want.

FIRST NUCLEAR REACTOR IN SPACE

(Mr. HOLIFIELD asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute; to revise and extend his remarks and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, within the past 48 hours our Nation accomplished another first in its competition with the Soviet Union for the exploration and conquest of space. On Saturday, April 3, from Vandenberg Air Base, the United States launched the first nuclear power reactor for space application—the SNAP-10A 500-watt nuclear reactor. On April 3, at approximately 3:05 p.m., eastern standard time, after it successfully had been placed in orbit, a signal was transmitted to the nuclear powerplant approximately 700 miles out in space to bring the reactor into operation—the first time a nuclear reactor has been operated in space.

As chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, I want to congratulate all the personnel of Atomic International, the Lockheed Corp., the Air Force, and the Atomic Energy Commission, who worked on this project and who successfully brought it to fruition. They have justified the faith the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Congress placed in them.

Let it be forgotten, this project would have been canceled and the flight test would not have taken place had it not been for the actions of the Joint Committee and the Congress. One year ago at this time the executive branch of the Government, because it did not have an immediate requirement for the SNAP-10A project, had canceled its planned flight. The joint committee successfully convinced the executive branch to reinstate the flight test by authorizing the cost to be funded by the AEC in lieu of the Air Force. Subsequently, in September of last year we, for the first time, ascertained that the U.S.S.R. was working on an almost identical project, the Romashka.

Had it not been for the actions of the legislative branch, the United States would have been deprived of another first in its competition with the Soviets but, more important, we would not be able to obtain needed factual data on the actual operation of atomic reactors in space.

Any nation that seriously intends to

We have taken the initial step in the attainment of this leadership.

To my colleagues in the Congress I cite the SNAP-10A as one more project to be added to that list of nuclear developments which would have been delayed or doomed to cancellation had it not been for the active influence and prodding by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. These former projects included:

First. The nuclear submarine program;

Second. The hydrogen bomb;

Third. The food irradiation program; and

Fourth. In 1961, the first launch of a nuclear isotope powered navigation satellite. This satellite isotopic power device is still operating and producing electricity today.

There are those who decry what they believe to be an inability of the legislative branch to effectively and positively influence policy decisions in this country. The decision to flight-test the SNAP-10A nuclear powerplant was made and directed through the influence of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Congress. It is not the first time we have been responsible for a major policy decision, nor will it be the last.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to place in the Record at this point in my remarks the following materials:

First. Excerpts from Senate Report No. 987 and House Report No. 1332, submitted by Senator JOHN O. PASTORE and myself from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, April 1964, in which the joint committee recommended to the Congress that it override the executive branch decision to cancel SNAP-10A and to authorize its flight test during the coming year.

Second. Background information and description of the SNAP-10A project.

Third. Congratulatory telegrams to Dr. Chauncey Starr, of Atomic International, and Mr. Reginald Kearton, of the Lockheed Corp., from Congressman CHRIS HOLIFIELD, chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and Senator JOHN O. PASTORE, vice chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Fourth. SNAP-10A launch and test statistics prepared by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Excerpts from Senate Report No. 987 and House Report No. 1332, submitted by Senator JOHN O. PASTORE and myself from the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, April 1964, in which the joint committee recommended to the Congress that it override the executive branch decision to cancel SNAP-10A and to authorize its flight test during the coming year:

(9) SATELLITE AND SMALL POWER SOURCES

A. AEC request

The Atomic Energy Commission requested \$78 million for the satellite and small power sources (SNAP) program for fiscal year 1965. This amount is \$4.5 million less than the level of funding for fiscal year 1964.

The SNAP program involves the development and testing of long-lived, lightweight, compact nuclear-electric power sources for space vehicles and other specialized applications.

Three major sub-divisions: (1) The development of lower

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so as to exempt the county from provisions of the proposed voting rights law.

Fact is, far less than one-third, much less one-half, the qualified voters within the bounds of Cumberland County voted in last November's general election.

The reason is another matter.

A close look strongly indicates that Attorney General Katzenbach did Cumberland County an injustice when he "indiscriminately" lumped 34 eastern North Carolina counties with Mississippi in a statement on registration procedures, and said "snow did not keep them away from the polls."

The implication was there that is racial discrimination.

The study shows there is none.

Unless the discrimination is much subtler than a cynical reporter can detect, none exists in the Cumberland County elections office against Negroes registering to vote.

From what can be learned, registrars go further than they might to help a Negro get registered, becoming at times almost paternal.

The figures support the conclusion.

And so do Negroes themselves.

REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS

A Negro, when he goes to register, must prove only that he can read and write, as must everyone.

It is widely known that the test for proving that can be so manipulated as to bar almost anyone from registering. That is the problem in Alabama and Mississippi. There, the charge is, Negroes are given a much harder reading and writing test than whites.

Negroes and whites in Cumberland County have to do only two things, and all have to do it, regardless of race. They are required to read aloud the elections oath, and sign their names.

Whoever can do that can register and vote.

Further proof of the county's position on registration is the fact that Fayetteville's only precinct which is made up predominantly of Negro voters has a prominent Negro man as registrar.

He has the full backing of Elections Board Chairman G. E. Edgerton to register whomsoever he finds to have met qualifications.

He is Dr. Henry M. Eldridge, professor at Fayetteville State College, prominent member of the community and registrar in the 13th precinct.

Asked if he knew of any racial discrimination, direct or implied, in Cumberland's registration policies, Eldridge said he did not.

"I have found that anyone who wanted to register had an opportunity to do so," he told the Observer.

He confirmed the fact that the same simple test for registration is given Negroes and whites.

The length to which registrars sometimes go to help a Negro get on the registration rolls was shown recently when a man came to the elections office and asked to be registered.

The registrar filled out his form, and asked that he read the oath.

She learned by questioning him that he was going to night school. But his reading was quite elementary.

The registrar coaxed, helping him get through the oath. Finally, it appeared he could not do it.

She offered to give him another chance when his reading proficiency improved through his night study.

Another man came recently to Eldridge. He could read, but could not see well enough to read the oath. Eldridge went to great lengths, even trying to obtain the oath in braille, to determine that he could read. He was eventually registered.

REGISTRATION BREAKDOWN

Cumberland County at the moment has 31,176 voters registered. Of the total, 24,595 are white, 6,581 Negro.

Chairman Edgerton said that, although he did not have exact figures, within the past year his office registered a larger percentage of Negroes than whites. (Percentage based on the number registered to population.)

A year ago, the total registrations were 31,638. That total was cut by a recent purge of the books, cutting the total back to its present level.

The purge cut white registrants from 25,798 then to 24,595 now. Despite the purge, the Negro registration total has increased—from 5,840 a year ago to 6,581.

The fact remains that Cumberland is among 34 North Carolina counties that would qualify for Federal registrars under the voting rights bill. The bill would allow Federal registrars to go into a county in which less than 50 percent of the population over 21 years of age in the 1960 census voted in the last general election.

About 23,000 persons voted in Cumberland County in last November's election. There are about 86,000 people in the county over 21. That means less than one-third of the eligible people voted.

FORT BRAGG PERSONNEL

Why is this true?

The biggest reason, most observers believe, is the presence of Fort Bragg. Thousands of military personnel choose not to declare North Carolina their home State, and therefore vote elsewhere by absentee.

That creates a big population total and depresses the percentage of people voting. It creates the illusion of discrimination, or some other artificial voting controls.

Discrimination, of course, is the assumption in the voting rights bill in picking counties with less than 50 percent voting.

The Government might send Federal registrars here, but chances are they will be an inactive group.

[From the Washington Star, Mar. 24, 1965]

QUESTION LINGERS ON VOTING BILL

(By Richard Wilson)

The question that the advocates of the new voting rights bill have as yet failed to answer adequately is this: Why should literacy test as a qualification for voting be perfectly all right in 45 of the 50 States but invalid in the other 5?

If a voter in Alabama who cannot read or write is qualified to vote in a Federal or any other election, why should not an illiterate New Yorker have the same right? The right to vote certainly has no connection with the number of people who vote, and it is manifestly unjust to bar an illiterate from voting in a State where less than 50 percent of the qualified voters cast their ballot, but to permit him to vote in a State where more than 50 percent of the voters go to the polls.

This, nevertheless, would be the effect in 606 counties in 10 States of the passage of the voter rights bill sent to Congress by President Johnson.

The only justification offered for this anomaly is that it is the only way to force election officials in those 10 States to register Negroes to vote. Otherwise, they will enforce prohibitive regulations that prevent Negroes from voting, but not enforce the same regulations on whites who could not meet the qualifications.

This is another example of the devious legislative tactics in the Johnson administration to achieve results by legal circumlocution. Another outstanding example is the aid to education bill that attempts to get around the church-state issue.

From the President's recent statements it can be concluded that what he really desires is the removal of virtually all restrictions on voting for persons 18 years old, and over, if they are sane, and in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court would have to reverse itself in finding that the imposition of reasonable qualifications is valid.

It must be admitted that literacy tests as a qualification for voting are honored in the breach in the North. Thirty States have no such requirements. States that do have literacy requirements often do not enforce them, or the enforcement is so cursory as to be meaningless.

New York requires proof of an eighth-grade education or demonstration of the ability to read as a requirement for voters. This excludes a great many people, including recently arrived Puerto Ricans, from voting and is being challenged in the courts. Previous Federal legislation proposals would have required a sixth-grade education as proof of literacy.

Residency requirements are universal. In short, people are not born in this country with an inherent right to vote at any time or any place. This is a right for which they must qualify by tests that vary from State to State, and which was affirmed by a 1959 Supreme Court decision. The layman would think that the Constitution is quite clear on this point in its 1st article and in the 17th amendment, to say nothing of the 1959 decision of the Supreme Court.

Furthermore, the Johnson voting rights bill recognizes this principle by providing that a voter shall be stricken from the rolls if he fails to vote at least once in 3 consecutive years. Thus the Federal law would impose restrictions Congress regards as reasonable while outlawing other restrictions imposed by the States.

Why is not the issue confronted squarely? Why is Congress not asked to abolish literacy requirements in all States altogether?

The answer to that is clear. It is because literacy requirements have validity both in reason and in law. It makes sense that a voter should have at least an elementary ability to read and write the language of the country in which he resides. It makes sense that States should have the power to set reasonable minimum standards for voters, and the proposed law recognizes that by itself setting some standards. It hardly needs to be argued, also, that a Federal law should apply equally to the citizens of all States.

The strange, awkward, and unequal nature of this new legislation shows how wrong it is to try to legislate on such complicated matters in an atmosphere of violence—provoking public demonstrations.

The Johnson administration was rushed into the presentation of a law that has so many obvious flaws that it can immediately be challenged in the courts. Elaborate and tricky formulas provide no answer for a more basic question: Why in a nation with compulsory, universal public education are so many people, Negro and white, illiterate? And why should there be a premium on illiteracy in some States and not in others?

[From the Wall Street Journal, Mar. 25, 1965]

INCONGRUITIES IN THE DRAMA

The civil rights struggle, focusing this week on the march to Montgomery, is customarily described in terms of high drama, and certainly there has been no lack of violent incidents. Yet great drama, whether in real life or reflected on the stage, must have the ring of truth, and it seems to us that too often, on all sides, this one does not have that ring.

To say that is not to disparage the justice of the voter registration drive, condone the extreme southern segregationists or question the depth of concern in the White House. On the contrary, the sympathy of the majority of Americans is for the Negro cause, especially in so fundamental a field as voting, and not for a bullying sheriff or a recalcitrant Governor.

It is, rather, to say that all the protagonists are pursuing particular, highly political, interests which do not always add up to the Nation's best interest but which do produce

incongruities and rob the drama of some of its reality.

Consider the frequently made comparison between the American demonstrations and the Indian resistance movement of Mahatma Gandhi. It is a little incongruous, to begin with, to equate the well equipped Montgomery marchers, moving under the full panoply of U.S. Government military protection, with the Indian leader's wretched hordes.

Therein lies the major weakness of the analogy: Gandhi was protesting the foreign rule of his entire nation, not some local abuse. In the United States today the whole Federal Establishment, as well as most public opinion, is arrayed on the side of the Negro. We may be thankful it is so, but the present point is that against that awesome power the intransigent local politician can prevail only for a time. Ultimately the contest is unequal.

Such confrontations intensify the politics and the bitterness. Not only is it right that the Negro should have access to the polls equally with other citizens in his State; the extent of his success in reinforcing the right can also powerfully affect local politics. On a national scale, long before the present efforts, the Negro vote was showing its considerable influence in elections.

While there can be no quarrel with this development as such, it helps explain the bitter-end opposition of some of the southern politicians in municipal, county, or State office. In the Deep South especially they can play on, as well as mirror, white fears that some local political structures may eventually be taken over by Negroes through sheer force of numbers. It is remarkable that in all the long period of strife few outside the South appear to have recognized that this potential revolution actually is a problem requiring consideration and accommodation.

At the same time the high political content of the issue is causing the national administration, for its part, to stray from the paths of reality and constitutionality. The Government's attempts to redress wrongs also have obvious political advantages. It can hope to cement, for the time being anyway, the Negro vote without alienating the majority of the electorate. Last November demonstrated how feebly resentment, either South or North, could affect the outcome.

So it is that less than a year after passage of the Civil Rights Act, a couple of whose sections are open to constitutional question, we have a proposed voting law which is inherently inconsistent and seems flatly to contravene the Constitution. It is expected in Washington that the momentum of the administration's efforts to reassure the civil rights leaders will accelerate.

Beyond any proposed legislation, reality also tends to be submerged in some general attitudes. If the diehard segregationists err in supposing they can reverse the movement, so do the civil rights leaders and supporters err in thinking that endless disruption of the civil order spells the automatic fulfillment of their aspirations; it may delay them through exasperating the patience of the public.

Specific goals may indeed be won; more important is what is done with equal treatment or full citizenship. Too little attention has been paid to the Negro's own responsibility in the development of the society. The reality is that the society, with the best will in the world, cannot do everything for him or any other citizen.

That the various political interests play a large part in the issue is inevitable, since practically all national decisions are reached through the interaction of political interests. But those who lead groups or nations must, like other mortals, find time for cooling off and reflection lest they propel the drama to

lengths that are not only incongruous but injurious.

[From the Greensboro (N.C.) Daily News, Mar. 23, 1965]

SPECIAL LAWS AND BLANKET INDICTMENTS

In the present tense situation in Alabama Federal officials—and indeed everyone connected with the civil rights controversy—should check carefully on facts and figures before sounding off in public.

Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach failed to do this in remarks made before a House committee last Friday. The substance of his testimony was sound—much of the civil rights story in the South had been one of "intimidation, discouragement, and delay" in the struggle to win full citizenship rights for Negroes.

But the Attorney General barked up the wrong tree when he dragged 34 eastern North Carolina counties into the picture and linked them with Alabama. The reference was to the projected abolition of literacy tests in counties where less than 50 percent of eligible citizens turned out to vote—and they included Aroostook County in Maine as well as most of the 4 Southern States, parts of Alaska, and Arizona, and 34 counties in North Carolina.

"They may have had a snowstorm in Aroostook County," the Attorney General told the committee, "but they didn't have a snowstorm in 34 counties of North Carolina, and they didn't have a snowstorm in Mississippi."

No, there was no snowstorm down here last November. But as far as North Carolina is concerned neither was there specific "intimidation, discouragement, or delay" in registration or voting for Negro citizens. The only protests about registration delays in North Carolina in recent years have been confined to one county, Halifax—and that situation has now been cleared.

Let it be understood by Mr. Katzenbach and others, including President Johnson and Rev. Martin Luther King, that North Carolina cannot be tarred with the brush of Alabama or Mississippi. Negro citizens have had the right to register to vote here just as other citizens have. They have been subjected to the same kind of literacy tests which apply for all other would-be voters—except in several very rare situations in Halifax County.

To equate conditions in North Carolina with those in Dallas County simply because less than 50 percent of the eligible voters went to the polls last November is presumptuous and inaccurate. It indicts the thinking behind the President's new Federal voting legislation.

There are far, far more reasons than racial discrimination behind some of the voting apathy in North Carolina, Mississippi, or New York. As we noted the other day, the Guilford County Elections Board has tried to cooperate in getting more registrants on the books; a study of its recent efforts reveals that even voters signed up by an intensive campaign have stayed away from the general election in droves.

It is grossly unfair to infer that simply because 50 percent of the eligible voters failed to go to the polls, racial discrimination is the reason.

The more we study the President's Federal voting legislation, the more we are convinced that the 50-percent figure is ill advised. Indeed, the whole idea of setting up special laws to cover certain statistical situations may not work fairly. The Federal Government's duty is to see that all citizens are allowed to register and vote if they desire to do so. It is not to create special rules for some citizens which do not apply to all citizens. And that quite clearly would be done if literacy tests and other voter qual-

ifications are abolished in certain areas but allowed to flourish in others.

Basic constitutional principles are involved on both sides of this controversy over suffrage rights. One principle ought not to receive higher priority than another, closer home, and the attorney general should watch his blanket indictments based on fuzzy statistics.

USE IN VIETNAM OF U.S. AIR POWER

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, The Reporter magazine, in its issue dated March 25, presents us with a lucid report, from Saigon, by Denis Warner.

The article recounts the military situation which has led to the utilization of American air power against North Vietnam and in support of government troops in South Vietnam. It makes the point that Ho Chi Minh and his followers remain unwilling to negotiate the Vietnamese situation on any terms less than a U.S. capitulation, and remain convinced that they can win that nasty war. But consistent, effective use of American air power can be used, Mr. Warner points out, to disabuse the Hanoi regime and its allies in Peiping of this notion.

I ask unanimous consent that the Reporter article on Vietnam be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Reporter, Mar. 25, 1965]

VIETNAM

(By Denis Warner)

SAIGON.—By the beginning of February the restricted war in South Vietnam, with its inhibitions on the use of American power and its privileged sanctuaries for the Communist Vietcong, was all but lost. Lost: not merely in the sense that a weak government in Saigon would one day want to negotiate a fictitious neutrality, but in the total sense of the word. Instead of the diplomatic niceties and face-saving protocol of the conference table conjured up by some Congressmen and editorial writers on the basis of unrealistic and ill-informed accounts of the situation, what lay ahead for South Vietnam—and the United States—was bitter and disastrous defeat.

"The National Liberation Front counts on clear-cut victory over whatever United States-Saigon régime is in power at the time," wrote the Australian Communist journalist Wilfred Burchett from the National Liberation Front's headquarters in the jungle north and west of Saigon. "Pax Americana is unacceptable to the Vietcong."

Hanoi confirmed this hard line. In conversations with International Control Commission officials, the North Vietnamese leaders expressed no interest in the resumption of the Geneva Conference, or in any negotiations that did not include the prior exclusion of all American military advisers and equipment from South Vietnam.

Opinions differed in Saigon on how long final disaster might be averted. Some qualified observers spoke of a couple of months. The resilience of the Vietnamese people and the country's capacity to muddle along without effective government, or any government at all, convinced the more optimistic that things might just go on getting worse for a much longer time. But few, if any, doubted the inevitability of defeat if the war continued to be fought by Vietcong ground rules. Not all of the troubles were due to the Vietcong, of course. The generals had

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abandoned the battlefield for politics. In the interplay between military and government, the South Vietnamese administration, never very strong, simply withered away.

On the military front, there were, as always, some gains with the losses. In the southern regions of the populous Mekong Delta, along the region most heavily infested by the Vietcong, the government reported successes. Villages once securely in Vietcong control had passed more or less into government hands. But even here there was scarcely reason for jubilation. Of the 6 million inhabitants of the 15 provinces in the southern corner of Vietnam, not more than a million could be regarded as on our side, and only 1,700 of the 4,000 hamlets were anything like secure. Meanwhile in central Vietnam, which had been drained of its government forces to reinforce the delta, the deterioration had been shattering.

In February 1964 the hard core of the Vietcong forces numbered, by official American estimate, about 22,000 men. Despite heavy combat losses, by the beginning of February of this year their regular forces had grown to an estimated 35,000. These men are organized under 5 regimental headquarters (3 others are in the process of formation), and are deployed in some 50 battalions, 139 independent companies, and 29 independent platoons.

With the active military assistance of perhaps a hundred thousand part-time guerrillas and regional forces and the cooperation of some half a million members or supporters of the National Liberation Front, the Vietcong now had a substantially larger mobile attacking force than the 600,000 military and paramilitary troops of the Government. With their responsibility for keeping roads, railways, rivers, and canals open, and for insuring that crops reached the markets, by far the larger portion of the Government's forces were tied down.

Tactically, helicopters had added a new element of mobility and surprise to the Government's family of weapons. With this new strength, however, there were also weaknesses. While the helicopters often contributed to the success of Government sorties against the Vietcong, they also tended to give them the character of hunting parties, thus helping the Communists to identify themselves more closely with the peasants. The lesson has been slowly and painfully learned that there is no substitute for effective administration on the ground.

THE MEANING OF PLEIKU

By December some inkling of the grave new turn in the war had become apparent when substantial Vietcong forces grouped to seize An Lao in central Vietnam. In itself, the fall of An Lao was of little consequence. What did matter, however, was the capability implicit in the Vietcong action. Under the patient leadership of Maj. Gen. Nguyen Don, who established his headquarters in the mountains of Kontum Province 5 years ago, the Vietcong had accumulated sufficient forces to attempt what the American Military Assistance Command had once believed impossible: to cut South Vietnam in two.

The attacks against the American installations at Pleiku and Qui Nhon, which led to the retaliatory raids north of the 17th parallel, were part of this plan. For weeks the Vietcong rehearsed the Pleiku attack. Few armies have ever given such attention to the planning of the most minute detail of comparatively small actions. From sand tables the Vietcong moved to full-scale mockups, leaving little to chance or luck—although by miscalculation or inexperience, many of their rounds of mortar fire at Pleiku fell short. But for this, the U.S. casualties would have been much heavier.

The real significance of the Pleiku and Qui Nhon actions was less the calculated selec-

tion of American targets than the fait accompli of partition. As government forces quickly discovered, the Vietcong had seized control of the Qui Nhon-Pleiku road, the strategic highway supplying the Second Corps headquarters and all of the northern part of the high plateau. Under the rules by which the war had been fought, Pleiku, Kontum, Dak To, and other government positions in this part of the high plateau were now untenable. It was a defeat as potentially disastrous for Saigon as the loss of the Thai country of Tonkin had been for the French 11 years before. The war, it was clear, was entering its final phase.

The days when the Vietcong depended on slingshots, homemade rifles, and even captured American equipment had long since passed. Hard-core units were receiving their own new Communist-bloc equipment. And tucked away in the middle of a long war communique was the news that the Vietcong had used artillery for the first time.

It was this change, and not just the question of retaliation against North Vietnam, that was the real challenge President Johnson faced on February 7. If ever there was to be a last chance to amend the rules of the war so as to fight back to a position where peace might one day be won at the conference table, this was it.

Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor brought with him to Vietnam the realization inspired by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 that if only the United States could convince Hanoi and Peiping that it was in deadly earnest, that southeast Asia was really worth the risk of a major war, then a way could be found to terminate North Vietnamese aid and to bring the Vietcong insurgency to an end. For the plan to work, there could not be an ounce of bluff.

Until February, however, the one deadly aspect of the whole scheme was Washington's indecision. The Tonkin Gulf affair last summer appears in retrospect as anything but a bold warning of the shape of things to come. Instead of drawing in its horns, Hanoi responded with a vastly increased volume of materiel and other aid to the Vietcong. Yet attempts by planes of the 7th Fleet to close off the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the general region of Tchepone in Laos were low-key, irresolute, and unsuccessful. To the Vietcong, they were more of an irritant, and perhaps even a stimulant, than a hazard. As Hanoi and Peiping evaluated the situation, the United States had bluffed in the Gulf of Tonkin, and its bluff had been effectively called. Nor were the Communists alone in this estimate. In other parts of southeast Asia, friends, foes, and neutrals alike wondered whether Washington really meant business.

Here in Saigon, Washington's resolution is no longer seriously questioned. Whatever doubts remained were quickly taken care of by the introduction of American jet fighters in direct support of Vietnamese ground forces. The sensation of each new development now is truly that of being carried upwards on a rapidly moving escalator.

The message does not yet appear to have reached North Vietnam, however. As one senior U.S. official commented: "The great debate in the United States about whether we should cut and run, and the generals' three-ring political circus in Saigon, haven't helped to get the message across. Hanoi still thinks it's got it made down here." This opinion is confirmed by International Control Commission reports from Hanoi. The Commission's observers have found nothing to indicate a willingness on the part of Ho Chi Minh and his followers to negotiate on terms that would require anything less than a U.S. capitulation.

UPPING THE ANTE

American officials advance three reasons for the bombing attacks on the North: to per-

suaude Hanoi to stop interfering in the South; to inspire some feeling among the South Vietnamese that there is real hope of winning the war; and, though graded a long way below the other reasons, to interrupt the southward flow of men and materials.

If the impact is not ultimately to be negative, bombing above the 17th parallel, and also direct American jet support in the South, must be continuous and effective. As part of a cautious phased program designed to test world reaction rather than to hurt North Vietnam, the first attacks against Dong Hoi and Vinh Linh no doubt served their purpose: but the destruction of 30 barracks and the sprinkling of some fields with a particularly nasty antipersonnel bomb known as the Lazy Dog, which showers razor-sharp pieces of steel in its target area, were not enough to promote radical changes in Hanoi. Elsewhere, the raids provoked predictable expressions of hostility and some reassuring support, not all of it expected. But they lacked the conviction of deadly earnestness that the United States must communicate if the new exercise is not to prove a failure.

North Vietnam has reconstructed its railway lines to China, and built its steel center at Thai Nguyen, and cement mill at Haiphong, only by great economic sacrifices at a time when it has the lowest living standards in southeast Asia. It must be made to understand that the price for continuing the war in the South will be the destruction not merely of barracks and bridges but what it has labored to achieve industrially.

In terms of the Peiping-Hanoi concept of wars of national liberation and their impact on the United States, the stakes are so high that Ho Chi Minh may elect to suffer even this sort of disaster while he still has hopes of victory in South Vietnam. Those who know him best believe that he will want to avoid at all costs a situation in which Chinese Communist forces (as distinct from specialists) may come to his aid. But the doubt persists, and will continue to persist, unless and until it can also be shown that direct American air support in South Vietnam and any other measures the United States may decide on are successful. Failure will breed failure, and this is true on all the complex political, diplomatic, and military fronts that are involved in this crisis.

For this reason, the battle slowly unfolding in central Vietnam for the Qui Nhon-Pleiku road is without doubt the most important of the war. This is the proving ground for American air support of South Vietnamese forces pitted against a mobile Vietcong force that not only controls the jungle, and therefore has the initiative, but may well also prove to be numerically superior. Early combined actions along the highway, the scene of the bloodiest Vietminh ambush of the entire Indochina war, proved highly successful, as jet fighters drove off entrenched ambush forces. A government prisoner who escaped from the Vietcong during the bombing reported that he saw a hundred dead being carted off. It would be excessively optimistic, however, to expect this sort of casualty rate to continue. Targets will be more difficult to locate as the Vietcong becomes aware of the even greater need for camouflage and concealment, and experienced air officers are reluctant to predict the outcome.

What is at stake here is not merely a highway, or the security of the Second Corps Headquarters at Pleiku, or even the control of the High Plateau, damaging though its loss would be: what is of absolutely critical importance is that the Vietcong be denied the opportunity to move into the Maoist phase of mobile warfare. If by the use of American air power they can be forced back to a lower level of guerrilla activity—which, though dangerous enough, lacks the means of delivering the massive blows on which

their hopes for a purely military victory depend—then Hanoi may realize the futility of continuing an interminable war in which the rewards for continued struggle are the ashes of its own destruction.

MORE OF LIPPMANN ON VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, in a foreign-policy debate which has been characterized by rigidity, the voice of Walter Lippmann has added a much-needed creativity. In two recent articles, Mr. Lippmann has exposed some of the fallacies which seem to underline much of the current thinking on the subject of Vietnam.

In his article which appeared in the April 1 issue of the Washington Post, Mr. Lippmann agrees with the tenets of Senator COOPER's closely reasoned March 25 speech on Vietnam. Both Senator COOPER and Mr. Lippmann warn of the danger of prescribing conditions to negotiations which are clearly unacceptable. I ask unanimous consent that two of Mr. Lippmann's recent articles—entitled "On the Way to the Brink" and "The Basis of Negotiation"—be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TODAY AND TOMORROW—ON THE WAY TO THE BRINK

(By Walter Lippmann)

The war in Vietnam has reached the point where the President is wrestling with momentous and fateful decisions. For what has happened is that the official theory of the war, as propounded by Gen. Maxwell Taylor to President Kennedy and by Secretary McNamara to President Johnson, has proved to be unworkable. The government in Saigon has not been able to pacify South Vietnam even with the help of American munitions, money, and 25,000 military advisers. The crucial fact today is that for all practical purposes the Saigon government has lost control of the countryside, and its followers are increasingly holed up in the cities.

The roads and the railroads connecting the cities have been cut by the Vietcong. The cities now have to be supplied in great measure by air and by sea. This condition of affairs has been well reported by Mr. Richard Dudman in a series of reports to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and his findings are confirmed in all essentials, though not yet publicly, in the well-informed quarters in Washington.

The surest evidence that Mr. Dudman's reports are substantially correct is that in the Pentagon and the State Department there is mounting pressure for the commitment to southeast Asia of American infantry. The current estimate is that the President should be prepared to send 350,000 American soldiers, even though this would compel him to order a mobilization of reservists and draftees.

This call for American ground forces is the logical and inevitable consequence of the virtual collapse of the Saigon government in the villages. Having lost the countryside Saigon has lost the sources of military manpower. This deprives it of the means for winning the war. The official estimates today are that the Saigon government commands forces superior to the Vietcong by a ratio of not quite 5 to 1. Experience shows that no guerrilla war has ever been subdued with such a low ratio of superiority. It is estimated that in Malaya, the British and the Malaysians, who were fighting the indigenous Chinese guerrillas reached a

superiority of 50 to 1. In Cyprus, which they gave up, the British had overwhelming force. In Algeria, though the French Army had unmistakable superiority, the country became untenable. It is the deficiency in South Vietnamese military manpower which explains why the pressure is now on to put in Americans to fill it.

After 2 months of bombing North Vietnam, it has become manifest also that the bombing has not changed the course of the war. As a result of this disappointment, the President is now under pressure to extend the bombing to the populated centers around Hanoi and Haiphong.

There is no doubt that American airpower can devastate North Vietnam and, if China intervened, could do great damage in China. But if we had an American army of 350,000 men in South Vietnam, and extended the war in the air, we would have on our hands an interminable war without the prospect of a solution. To talk about freedom and national independence amidst such violence and chaos would be to talk nonsense.

In order to rationalize, that is to sell, the wider war, we are being told by Secretary McNamara and others that this war is a decisive test for the future. It will decide the future of "wars of liberation." This is a profoundly and dangerously false notion, and it shows a lamentable lack of knowledge and understanding of the revolutionary upheavals of the epoch in which we live. It assumes that revolutionary uprisings against established authority are manufactured in Peking or in Moscow, and that they would not happen if they were not instigated, supported, and directed from one of the capitals of communism. If this were true, the revolutionary movements could be suppressed once and for all by knocking out Peking or Moscow. They little know the hydra who think that the hydra has only one head and that it can be cut off.

Experience shows that there is no single central source of the revolutionary upheavals of our epoch. What is there that is common to the Irish rebellion, to the Jewish uprising in Palestine, to the civil war in Cuba, to the Arab rebellion in Algeria, to the Huk revolt in the Philippines? What is common to them all is violent discontent with the established order and a willingness of a minority of the discontented to die in the attempt to overthrow it.

What has confused many well-meaning Americans is that in some of these rebellions, though not by any means in all of them, Communists have become the leaders of the rebellion. But that does not mean that they owned the rebellion. The resistance to the Nazis in France and Italy contained a high proportion of Communists among the active partisans. But 20 years later it is General de Gaulle who presides over France.

It would be well to abandon the half-baked notion that the war in southeast Asia will be decisive for the future of revolutionary upheavals in the world. Revolution is a home-grown product, and it could not be stamped out decisively and once for all—supposing we had such delusions of grandeur—by stamping out Red China. In southeast Asia we have entangled ourselves in one of the many upheavals against the old regime, and we shall not make things any better by thrashing around with ascending violence.

TODAY AND TOMORROW—THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATION

(By Walter Lippmann)

The cardinal defect of the administration's conduct of the war in Indochina has been pointed out by a Republican Senator, JOHN SHERMAN COOPER, of Kentucky. In a statement last week (March 25), Senator COOPER said that the U.S. Government, like

its adversaries in Peking and Hanoi, is "prescribing conditions as a prerequisite to negotiations which will not be accepted." The Communists are making it a condition of a negotiation that the United States must withdraw from Vietnam; we are making it a condition of a negotiation that North Vietnam must withdraw from South Vietnam. This is, said Senator COOPER, "a kind of demand from both sides for unconditional surrender."

It is, therefore, highly important that the administration put itself in a position where negotiation is possible, granting that even if it did so, Hanoi and Peking may gamble on winning the war in order to overrun South Vietnam and inflict a smashing defeat on the United States. But regardless of what they do, we must come into court with clean hands. The administration needs to clarify its own position—in order to set in motion a movement for negotiation and, failing that, to put the onus of prolonging and widening the war unmistakably on our adversaries.

There is a mistaken impression in this country that we are ready and willing to negotiate but that the other side is imposing intolerable conditions; namely, that we should withdraw our forces before the negotiation begins. Senator COOPER rejects the Communist condition, as do all of us who have been actively interested in this question. We cannot withdraw our forces until there has been a political settlement in Indochina, a settlement which promises to last because it serves the primary interests of all concerned.

But what, as a matter of fact, is our position? It is that before negotiations can take place, the North must demonstrate its readiness "to leave its neighbors alone." Secretary Rusk has avoided a precise definition of that phrase. We know that "illegal infiltration of military personnel and arms" is considered to violate that condition. That "leaving your neighbors alone" means also withdrawal of infiltrators who are already there has at times been suggested but never formally stated.

Senator COOPER says of this position: "I think it unlikely that the Communists will agree to this condition for negotiations, as we will not agree to their condition that the United States withdraw."

What Senator COOPER is asking the administration to do is what was done in the Korean war: "No such conditions were imposed by either side prior to negotiations, but a cease-fire was sought." Until the administration comes around to this position, its diplomacy will be confused.

Last week (March 25) the President issued a statement that "we have said many things—to all who are interested in our principles for honorable negotiation—that we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954—a reliable arrangement to guarantee the independence and security of all in southeast Asia."

This is rather puzzling. The agreements of 1954 were reached at Geneva in a conference in which there participated not only the Indochinese states but also Russia, Red China, Britain, France, and the United States. The agreements ended the fighting between the French Union forces and the Vietminh in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These states were to become independent countries, with Vietnam partitioned at the 17th parallel into two zones pending general free elections to be held by January 20, 1956.

The cease-fire agreement was signed by the military commanders. But in addition, the Geneva Conference issued a final declaration, dated July 21. This declaration contained the following principles of settlement. One of the principles was that the cease-fire prohibited the "introduction into Vietnam of foreign troops and military personnel as well as of all kinds of arms and munitions." The Geneva Declaration went on to say that

"the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." Furthermore, the declaration said that "general elections shall be held in July 1956 under the supervision of an international commission * * *."

The United States did not sign the final declaration. But the Under Secretary of State, Gen. Bedell Smith, made a unilateral declaration which said that the United States supported the agreements and that "in connection with the statement in the declaration concerning free elections in Vietnam, my Government wishes to make clear its position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on June 29, 1954, as follows: 'in the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly.'"

The United States encouraged the Diem government in Saigon to refuse to hold the elections of 1956, almost certainly for the quite practical reason that they would have been won by the Communists.

Considering the essentials of the 1954 agreements, it is not easy to understand what it means to say now that "we seek no more than a return to the essentials of the agreements of 1954." I am afraid it means that in the diplomatic conduct of the war in Vietnam, the diplomats have not been doing their homework.

ON BREAKING THE DIPLOMATIC DEADLINE IN VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, on Sunday, March 28, the New York Times published an excellent editorial on the dilemma which confronts us in Vietnam. The editorial is entitled "Something More Than Bombs." As this editorial cogently emphasized:

Military pressure alone—which implies a demand for unconditional surrender—is unlikely to swing the balance in the Hanoi leadership toward a negotiated settlement. Positive American proposals, which suggest a viable future for North Vietnam are the essential complement.

In an article which was published in the New York Times on March 29, Robert Kleiman, a member of the editorial board of the Times, who has just returned from an extensive tour of the Far East, pointed out:

And it is even possible that persuasive proposals might find a response in the Communist world. Clearly, before any further stepup in the American air offensive in North Vietnam, the time has come to devise and set in motion a political strategy that, for the first time will take priority over military tactics.

I ask unanimous consent that these two excellent excerpts from the New York Times be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial and the article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Mar. 28, 1965]

SOMETHING MORE THAN BOMBS

The limited American air war against North Vietnam is now entering its eighth week. It is not too soon to ask what it has accomplished—and why it has not accomplished more.

The aim of the continuing air offensive, accompanied by threats of further escalation, was to persuade the North Vietnamese Communists to halt their armed infiltration into

South Vietnam. When it was undertaken, one of President Johnson's highest advisers predicted that the Communists' will to fight would be weakened in two months. So far, there is no indication that he was right; on the contrary, there clearly has been a stiffening of Communist positions as Secretary Rusk has admitted.

The Soviet Union has announced that arms aid is on its way to North Vietnam. More important, a direct Soviet-American confrontation in southeast Asia through the use of Soviet "volunteers" in North Vietnam has been publicly threatened by the top Soviet leader, Communist Party First Secretary Brezhnev.

The Vietnamese and Chinese Communists have stiffened their positions even more. Hanoi, which a few weeks ago privately indicated agreement to French and United Nations proposals of negotiations—while refusing a cease-fire—now rejects such proposals. Backed by Moscow, the North Vietnamese insist that there can be no talks while American bombing continues. Peiping has taken the most extreme position of all. It insists there can be no negotiations before the "complete, unconditional" withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam. The Vietcong, which shows some signs of independence from Hanoi, has enthusiastically adopted the Peiping line.

Meanwhile, the American bombing—not to mention use of nonlethal gas—has significantly alienated world opinion. Concern about the danger of a major war is widespread. Equally important, there is profound puzzlement about Washington's objectives and tactics.

The trouble is that President Johnson, a master of domestic politics, had until last week seemed to forget that war is politics too, even if pursued by "other means." He launched a military offensive, but neglected his diplomatic offensive.

Now the President has promised American aid for "wider and bolder programs" of regional economic development benefiting all of southeast Asia, including North Vietnam. Despite its vague terms, this promise indicates that Washington is beginning to face up to the need to offer its opponents in southeast Asia a diplomatic, political, and economic exit from the military cul-de-sac in which we as well as they are now entrapped.

Persuasive peace proposals can be a political weapon not only toward world opinion, at a time when Americans are bombing Asians, but in presenting moderate Communists with an alternative they can support within the Communist camp. That camp is divided, not only along national lines but within each national capital. And nowhere are the divisions more critical than in Hanoi.

Neither the Vietcong nor the Chinese Communists can be swayed by the bombing of North Vietnam, which causes them no direct pain. They are pressing to intensify the war. The Vietcong, particularly, has made major military gains in recent months and sees every successive Saigon coup as another nail in the coffin of its enemies. It will not be easy for Hanoi, in these circumstances, to shift course and seek a negotiated settlement, even with Soviet backing.

Military pressure alone—which implies a demand for unconditional surrender—is unlikely to swing the balance in the Hanoi leadership toward a negotiated settlement. Positive American proposals, which suggest a way out and a viable future for North Vietnam, are the essential complement.

President Johnson's statement last week could be the precursor of proposals offering Hanoi, once peace is restored, access to the rice of South Vietnam, trade with the West, an end of the embargo and diplomatic boycott that Washington and Saigon have im-

posed since 1954, and entry to international development assistance. Area-development schemes covering the entire Mekong Valley could be pushed. These, linked with concrete proposals for negotiations and firm offers of a phased American withdrawal from South Vietnam in accordance with the Geneva agreements, could not fail to influence events.

An immediate Communist response might not be forthcoming. But the words would be heard both within the Communist regimes and outside. World opinion would be rallied. That support will be needed, especially if the war in Vietnam is about to enter a new and more virulent phase.

[From the New York Times, Mar. 29, 1965]

VIETNAM: THE INEXPLICABLE STRATEGY

(By Robert Kleiman)

PARTS.—Washington's policy of bombing North Vietnam while avoiding negotiations is sowing confusion among America's friends. To cross east Asia, India and the Soviet Union to this NATO capital in Europe is to hear repeated questioning of the purposes and tactics of American policy.

There is worry about Soviet or Chinese intervention that would escalate the conflict into a major war. There is concern that the bombing will bring about a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. There is disquiet that Soviet-American and other East-West talks leading toward a détente are grinding to a halt. And there is skepticism everywhere that the bombing by itself will force Hanoi to halt its infiltration—the stated American objective—or persuade the Vietcong to give up their winning battle in South Vietnam.

OBSCURE U.S. GOALS

But what most disturbs the Allies and friendly neutrals—especially the British and Indians, who would like to mediate—is the lack of definition of American objectives. Even full explanations delivered privately by special envoys from Washington seem to leave American intentions so opaque that there is little of interest to communicate to Moscow, Peiping of Hanoi, where London and New Delhi both maintain diplomatic missions.

The lucid chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council, Walt Rostow, spent several days recently explaining Washington's thinking to high foreign office officials of a dozen NATO countries. These conversations, on the sidelines of the semi-annual seminar of the Atlantic Policy Advisory Group in Reinhardtshausen, West Germany, overshadowed the European issues on the regular agenda. But, when it was all over, the European policy planners felt little more enlightened than before. The consensus was that the United States urgently needed to clarify its purposes, both privately and publicly. Mr. Rostow was urged to carry this message back to Washington.

HARRIMAN IN INDIA

An even less successful encounter occurred earlier this month in New Delhi. Roving Ambassador Avrell Harriman spent many hours skillfully explaining American policy on Vietnam. He received a sympathetic if noncommittal hearing from Prime Minister Shastri. But he clashed with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, who urged negotiations and a new Geneva Conference, as did other high Indian officials.

The incident shows that even Washington's most prestigious Ambassador has difficulty obtaining support abroad for a policy that resists negotiations while bombing North Vietnam. The Indians are clear that their interests parallel those of the United States in trying to prevent domination of southeast Asia by Communist China, but they do not agree with all the tactics Washington is employing for this purpose.

The Indians were told that the United States would welcome their help in exploring Communist intentions and in explaining American views, particularly during Shastri's forthcoming visit to Moscow. The key point was to make it clear that the United States was not going to negotiate until Hanoi had stopped its aggression. The Indians were urged to stand with Washington in opposing the Franco-Soviet proposal for a conference without preconditions. The United States, Mr. Harriman emphasized, could not agree to a conference without adequate conditions.

What, asked the Indians, are the American conditions? At that point President Johnson's special envoy—his hands obviously tied by his White House instructions, or lack of them—had to reply that it was premature to explain this, but that Washington wanted India's support for the principle that there must be conditions.

The Indians said they had been informed of Soviet plans to provide North Vietnam with surface-to-air missiles, technicians, and fighter aircraft manned by Soviet personnel. And they warned that Moscow would not pursue bilateral negotiations for a detente while American bombing continued.

The Indians believe there is a serious threat of war stemming from the possibility that Russia may take over the air defense of North Vietnam. In using negotiations they argue that, once the conference date is set, a cease-fire effective before the talks begin will be more easily obtainable.

As the major power in Asia threatened by Communist Chinese aggression, the Indians believe that the United States should take the initiative in proposing a conference, stating its conditions and objectives clearly. Some suggest that Washington take the dramatic step of announcing that it would stop bombing North Vietnam for 2 or 3 weeks pending a Communist reply and cessation of major Communist military operations. This would expose whether Hanoi and Moscow were serious in stating that the main obstacle to negotiation was the bombing of North Vietnam.

PEACE OFFENSIVE NEEDED

Undoubtedly, there are other ingenious formulas that would permit the United States to open a long-neglected peace offensive. Proposals for an "honorable negotiation," now evoked by President Johnson as an objective, would help refute the image the United States has been acquiring in Asia as "the white aggressor on colored soil." In Europe, it would reply to such charges as that of the New Statesman that Washington "has now forfeited all right to British sympathy over Vietnam" because of a "savage intensification of the war" * * * accompanied by an apparent refusal to contemplate negotiations in any form."

And it is even possible that persuasive proposals might find a response in the Communist world. Clearly, before any further step-up in the American air offensive in North Vietnam, the time has come to devise and set in motion a political strategy that, for the first time, will take priority over military tactics.

THE THREAT TO AMERICA'S SOIL CONSERVATION PROGRAMS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. Nelson], I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD a statement which he has prepared on the subject "The Threat to America's Soil Conservation Programs."

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

STATEMENT BY SENATOR NELSON—THE THREAT TO AMERICA'S SOIL CONSERVATION PROGRAMS

I am deeply concerned over the Budget Bureau's proposals to sharply reduce Federal support for soil and water conservation practices in rural areas. This is shortsighted budgetmaking.

It would result in a serious cutback in the important work of the 3,000 soil and water conservation districts in this country. And it would reduce support for individual farmers participating in cost-sharing soil and water saving practices.

Ironically the proposed reduction comes at a time when the President is eloquently pleading for the preservation of America's natural resources—its water, soil, forests, open spaces, wilderness, and scenic beauty.

No other program in American history has made such an important contribution to the husbanding of the land. No other program strikes more directly to the heart of resource management. We ought now to be expanding the program, not contracting it.

The soil and water conservation districts, which all are locally managed, have provided outstanding leadership for soil and water conservation in rural America since the 1930's. They are the stewards of soil and water resources on the 70 percent of our Nation's land that is privately owned.

The conservation record of the soil and water conservation districts in my State is among the finest in the Nation. We in Wisconsin were particularly gratified a few weeks ago when Secretary Freeman signed an agreement with a new district encompassing Menominee County. That agreement for technical, credit, costsharing, research, and educational assistance brought the last of Wisconsin's 36,150,000 acres into a soil and water conservation district.

I have been disturbed in recent months by the suggestions of some of our budget-makers that conservation is responsible for some of the overflowing granaries that result from the high productivity of our land. Good conservation practices do make land more productive. But that is hardly a valid criticism. Efficient crop production is only one of the soil and water conservation objectives stated by the 1964 Yearbook of Agriculture:

"To control soil erosion at all times and prevent soil damage in the future.

"To use the better soils, wherever crops can be grown efficiently, for greater net gain per acre. The aim is to help the farmer reach a level of income and standard of living closer to that of managers in industrial enterprises.

"To convert land least suitable for cultivation to pastures, forestry, recreation, and wildlife and other uses in which the soil is not disturbed.

"To protect and hold in reserve soils not needed but potentially suited to cultivation until there is a demand for farm commodities from them or until they may be needed for the balancing of efficient farm units."

This same publication shows that the acreage converted by soil conservation district cooperators to less intensive long-term uses exceeded 21,500,000 acres in this country in the 10-year period ending in 1961. The cost to the taxpayers has been extremely small in contrast to the sums required to retire or divert land under other programs.

I am concerned, too, by the proposal to cut conservation cost-sharing funds by \$100 million at a time when we should be accelerating conservation and resource development program on privately owned land. This cost-sharing helps pay for terraces, surface waterways, stripcropping, and other soil- and water-saving practices.

This cut is in appropriations recommended for the Agricultural Stabilization and Con-

servation Service for cost-sharing, under the agricultural conservation program. This cost sharing, also a locally administered program, gives farmers the added incentive needed to push ahead with the work of conserving our natural resources.

But it is the proposal to cut by \$20 million the Federal funds available to the Soil Conservation Service, and to have this agency raise this same amount by charges to farmers, that I find most objectionable. This proposal to charge for this technical assistance and put the proceeds into a revolving fund would be a serious blow to a very valuable conservation program. The Government should not charge farmers for help in designing, laying out, and adopting soil and water conservation practices on the land. This is an investment in preserving one of this Nation's most valuable capital assets, its soil.

Since this revolving fund idea was proposed I have received reports from every one of the 72 soil and water conservation districts in my State. I have received petitions from a large number of county boards. And I have had a flood of letters from private citizens, both rural and urban.

All of these reports, petitions, and letters oppose the revolving fund proposal. They reflect a feeling of concern that the Federal Government's commitment to this long-time conservation activity is being downgraded. They express fear that a longtime conservation policy is being reversed.

Under present law the Soil Conservation Service provides technical assistance to these districts through a memorandum of understanding with the Secretary of Agriculture. This technical assistance is provided without cost to eligible farmers and landowners, who are called "cooperators." Except for these services, the districts obtain their support from State, local, or private sources.

Approval of the revolving fund idea would cut the Federal Government's contribution to soil and water conservation in Wisconsin by \$314,249 in the coming fiscal year. It would eliminate Federal support for 44 of the 88 Soil Conservation Service technicians now available to advise and assist the 72 districts in my State.

I submit at this point the breakdown in terms of both man-years and dollars that this proposed cutback would mean for the next fiscal year in Wisconsin's 72 soil and water conservation districts:

County	Man-years	Dollars
1st District:		
Kenosha.....	0.5	3,574
Racine.....	.4	2,536
Rock.....	.5	3,738
Walworth.....	.6	4,454
2d District:		
Columbia.....	.8	5,484
Dane.....	1.1	7,674
Dodge.....	.7	5,081
Green.....	1.0	7,538
Jefferson.....	1.0	6,889
3d District:		
Buffalo.....	1.1	8,214
Crawford.....	.8	5,776
Grant.....	1.2	8,263
Iowa.....	1.1	8,204
Jackson.....	.8	5,407
Juneau.....	.7	4,730
La Crosse.....	.6	4,412
Lafayette.....	.9	6,662
Monroe.....	.9	6,540
Pepin.....	.7	4,666
Pierce.....	1.1	8,271
Richland.....	.7	4,956
Sauk.....	1.0	6,904
Trempealeau.....	.7	4,803
Vernon.....	1.2	8,468
4th District:		
Calumet.....	.6	4,171
Fond du Lac.....	.8	5,688
Green Lake.....	.2	1,675
Ozaukee.....	.3	2,140
Shebogan.....	.4	2,704
Washington.....	.6	4,051
Winnebago.....	.6	4,309

A Woman Legislator's View on Consumer Protection

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. MELVIN R. LAIRD

OF WISCONSIN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 5, 1965

Mr. LAIRD. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman from Washington, CATHERINE MAY, recently delivered a notable address to the 38th annual convention of the Soap & Detergent Association. The speech, entitled "A Woman Legislator's View on Consumer Protection," is a forthright expression by an eminently forthright person and contains all of the elements that make the gentlewoman from Washington [Mrs. MAY] an effective and articulate legislator—humor, candid analysis, and good, common-sense.

I commend the address by the gentlewoman from Washington [Mrs. MAY], delivered on January 28, 1965, to the attention of all my colleagues and under unanimous consent include it in the Record at this point.

The speech referred to follows:

A WOMAN LEGISLATOR'S VIEW ON CONSUMER PROTECTION

(By Hon. CATHERINE MAY)

I have been asked to speak to you today as a congressional housewife on the subject of the consumer versus Congress. I do so in the full realization that the main problem on your mind today concerning the American housewife is how in the dickens to keep her from wondering where the suds went. But that's your problem and Madison Avenue's.

I feel I have a few problems of my own in speaking to this group today. I have come here with a mild suspicion that you good people may have asked me to speak in the belief that my views on public affairs correspond in some degree with your own. My speech will concern itself with a theme that I have been reiterating over and over this past year before groups similar to your own and I suspect some of you in the audience have already suffered through one or two versions of it. In any case, I am assuming that most of you have divined my political and economic orientation from those speeches of the past year.

But I must remind you that, since I last spoke in your interest area, a rather violent political upheaval has shaken our country from coast to coast. As a result of that political upheaval I stand before you today as a member of the "Whooping Crane Society," i.e., a survivor Republican. And, as such, I feel compelled to admit honestly that there are growing indications that the Republican Party may not be as dominant today in the Nation's affairs as it was in the heyday of Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, and Dwight D. Eisenhower.

This last year we made a major blunder. We transgressed a political axiom: Never ask a question in public unless you know in advance what the answer will be.

We Republicans asked our countrymen, "Why not victory?"

The answer came roaring back, "You're short 16 million votes, that's why not victory."

Maybe we should have stood in bed.

So, let there be no mistake about it—I stand before you today minus a union card in the Great Society. In addition, I humbly confess I may never qualify for membership because I am having so much difficulty un-

derstanding some of the messages that are being sent up to us on Capitol Hill by major spokesmen for the Great Society. As I am sure you know, they are telling us that America is a paradise lost, to be federally regained. Within the context of one public statement we are told that American people are poverty ridden, ignorant, pressed into slums, our water poisoned, our air polluted, our food contaminated, and our cosmetics defiled. But, at the same time, thank goodness, in only 4 enlightened years we have become the richest, strongest, best educated, and healthiest people in all the world. Obviously, this means we must embark upon a realistic and businesslike program—in short, frugally extravagant and cautiously bold—for only through liberal conservatism can we ever achieve chronic deficits that are fiscally sound.

In addition to being very busy trying to understand the "blueprint for the grand design," I have, since the calamitous day of November 3, also been much involved with the "sage of good fellowship" that has been going on in the Republican Party as we immediately began, in traditional Republican style, to close our ranks and build party unity. You know, those fellows who say the Republican Party is dead and gone just haven't been reading the newspapers. We Republicans haven't had such fun since the cadets at The Citadel, in Charleston, lofted the first shells into Fort Sumter 103 years ago.

The sport we have been having among ourselves makes the uncertain probings of Secretary McNamara in Vietnam look like a friendly, dynastic game of touch football.

Never before has so small a party so greatly bled.

Clearly we Republicans are vital and strong—so much so, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, we are drenching the tree of liberty with the blood of our own patriots.

Considering all this, if I seem a bit edgy on your platform today, put yourself in my position: A fellow Republican might be in the hall.

And now, quickly before you think I am trying to make a partisan speech here today, I am going to bring in mention of the Democrats. Maybe we Republicans do have a little family spat now and then. Maybe we do dote on party slack fill and on fractional political weight. But, really, this is as nothing as compared to our political competitors who wear the brand L.B.J. The Democratic Party is having great troubles with truth in packaging. And, furthermore, the Democrats are detecting a little fratricide in their own party. With Lyndon to the right of them, HUBERT to the left of them, into the valley of 68 will charge BOBBY and TEDDY.

As I said when I began my remarks, a significant political upheaval has occurred since I began stressing the theme and philosophy that I have been asked to repeat here today. I feel, therefore, that in order to preclude any possibility of misunderstanding, I owe it to you to make this very clear:

If you think I shall go on resisting Federal intrusion into areas constitutionally and traditionally reserved to the States, the communities and individual citizens; if you have asked me here on the supposition that I shall continue to oppose Federal harassment of private enterprise; if you count me among those pledged to fight the cult of consumeritis and politics in the pantry—and determined also to defend the intelligence of American housewives and uphold their freedom of choice; if you expect me, in these remarks today, to decry paternalistic government and the baleful doctrine of bureaucratic infallibility—then, my friends, I must in all candor tell you this: Relax, your expectations, will be relaxed.

And, in this context I will now make some

comments as a Member of Congress concerning the shape of things in your industry's areas of immediate concern.

To begin with (though, admittedly, my congressional crystal ball is often clouded) I think you are home free on water pollution. Though, naturally, Congress will want representatives of your industry to retestify on the progress you have made.

This victory you have fashioned yourselves, by your own aggressive and foresighted effort, through the creation of the new biodegradable detergents. I warmly congratulate you of the soap and detergent industry on this achievement valuable to our Nation and important to yourselves. The best way anyone has ever devised to forfend Federal intervention is to remove the excuse by forehanded action.

And, this brings me to the heart of my speech (no pun intended). Or, rather, the speech I have been giving so often about the virulent outbreak of consumeritis in Congress over the past few years. To recap I shall quote myself in placing before you some of the viewpoints I have been stressing.

I have been saying that I am opposed to further extension of Federal regulation into the marketplace. I have been expressing my alarm that since coming to Congress I have noted that the voices of the self-appointed champions of the consumer have become evermore vocal and militant in their demands for investigations and hearings and new Government authority to set up rules and regulations in the field of the free market. These apostles of regimentation of the marketplace have been out in full cry for 3 years. In spite of the overwhelmingly ample Government safeguards that already exist certain people in Government, aided by specially set up organizations, keep insisting that Mrs. American housewife and her consumer husband are wandering, baffled, uncomprehending, and empty headed through dangerous clip joints, i.e., better known as supermarkets, being constantly robbed by Simon Legree, the storekeeper. Bills have been introduced in Congress that cannot help but imply that manufacturers of food and fiber products are taking every possible advantage of the consumer through deception in sizes and weights of packages and with misleading label information printed on them. Another Government agency, charged with consumer protection, has been urging housewives, through many means of communications plus public meetings, to submit their complaints to the Government concerning things that displease them at the buying counter.

A National Commission on Food Marketing was created in the last Congress. I am a member of this Commission. I am proud to have been appointed to it. But, I have not been proud of some of the irresponsible statements that have been made concerning its purposes. This Commission is barely beginning its study in the very important field of learning more about how our modern marketing system works to get food from farm to table. Yet, these statements imply that conclusions have already been reached and these conclusions, of course, assume that there will be a scandalous exposé of dishonest practices by the manufacturers and the middleman. This Commission could provide our country with one of the most important and helpful studies ever made by a congressional commission. But, only if it is allowed to work in an atmosphere of openminded and honest inquiry without prejudgment.

This type of governmental and political activity, over such a long period, has resulted in creating many misleading impressions and it is no wonder that a lot of good people are being fooled into joining the hue and cry for legislative action in Congress. Because of my concern, about a year ago, I set myself the task of trying to do what I could to balance propaganda with perspec-

tive. To try and get through to the American public, particularly women, with the warning that they should always take a good look at what the government may be doing to them while it says it is doing something for them.

I have been using the famous truth-in-packaging bill as introduced in the Senate last year as one example. This bill, as you know, would give the Federal Government the right to dictate weights and other standards for product containers. Here is a bill that has been recommended by the President's Consumer Advisory Council and one which is being supported by the Assistant Secretary of Labor, Mrs. Esther Peterson, in her position as Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs. And, don't ever mistake it, at first glance it has tremendous appeal for any American shopper. Why shouldn't a woman be entitled to adequate information printed on the label which would help her decide on one can of beans over another can of beans, or one package of detergent over another package of detergent? She should have good labeling but I just happen to think that the company that produces that product should provide the labeling information for his package, and I also think that the American housewife is entitled to something more flexible and something more informative than a Federal yardstick used in Washington, D.C. Just as I think that the product manufacturer should have the flexibility to package his own product in the way that will make it most competitive in the market place when Mrs. Housewife comes in to select. Of course, this gives him the freedom to mislead his prospective customer if he wishes to do so. But, heaven help him if he does. To quote myself again:

All the Government officials and all the government laws in the world are as nothing compared to the impact Mrs. America has on Mr. Manufacturer and on Mr. Storekeeper when she makes up her mind to buy one brand over another. And when she makes that decision, no power on earth can save the businessman or the producer of the product who made the mistake of displeasing her. She has done and is doing a wonderful job in needling, inspiring and in regulating American business enterprise.

And, to reward her, I want to protect her. Not with more government regulations and laws—I want to protect her freedom of choice."

Now I know that you in this group today are on my side in this battle. The big question is how are we doing as we face the 89th Congress in the year 1965? It ain't good.

Our legislative difficulty is not concerned with the truth or the cogency of our shared views. Frankly, I think the American people, once they had the facts, would be with us in overwhelming majority. But, we are hampered by the disproportionate publicity of the opposing views (and, if I weren't trying to be a diplomatic lady, I would say at this point—where were some of you guys these last 3 years?) combined with the disproportionate political division in Congress. In both Houses of Congress every Republican is now flanked by two Democrats. Each one of the 20 House committees and nearly all Senate committees are 2-to-1 Democrat. Add this to these facts: The Democratic platform promised enactment of the packaging and labeling bill—last year the President demanded its enactment—labor has made this item a legislative "must"—four Members of the House have already reintroduced last year's Senate bill—and the report from the Senate side is that this year Senator HARR will try to have his bill sent to the Senate Commerce Committee where it is presumed that it has a greater chance for favorable action.

It would seem indeed that the consumeritis virus has a very fertile congressional field in which to work these days.

So, where do we go from here? Well, I would like to end this message today by sharing a few thoughts on this and with your permission, offer some advice.

First, I repeat that the best defense against Federal skulduggery is for you yourselves to clean up any known trouble areas which can be seized upon to justify the use of the Federal shillelagh.

Deceit of any kind in the marketplace, even in isolated instances, is indefensible. I know you have patiently stated time and time again that you feel exactly the same way. I know we are agreed also that marketplace chicanery is not the rule but the exception. But where you can—wherever you can—if you of industry will yourselves root out these problems, correct them and prevent their recurrence, you will have done the best possible thing to keep your enterprises free of public criticism and restraint.

Second, you cannot imagine how disheartening and confusing it is to your friends in public life when industry, with its cherished anarchy, comes to us with a label of conflicting voices. Believe me, labor unions march up Capitol Hill lockstep and in unbreachable phalanx on every issue of real importance. As one who in private life has known the problems of business firsthand, I understand how difficult it is to achieve harmony on any issue that cuts across the great complex of individual companies—but again, where and when you can, you should strive for unity on the overriding issues. For only then can your views become clearly comprehended by people in Government; only then can your combined power and influence be brought fully to bear; only then can you develop an effective counterpoise to the relentless forward march of the disciplined collectivistic forces arrayed against you.

As for specific legislation—such as the Hart bill—I have never seen a legislative fight lost until the vote has been counted. In other words, if you will move tirelessly and vigorously and in concert with industries allied with you on this issue, you have no reason to be defeatist about it. Here, I must, of course, enter this reservation: all bets are off if the President, who is virtually enthroned politically, moves this legislation front and center. He has, with this Congress, a whim of steel.

Third, you of industry should unify your position on this legislation to the maximum possible degree and then advance that position in the proper places with all the persistence and energy you can command.

Fourth, you should move in many media, and continuously, to bring the pitfalls of this legislation home to the American people and thereby counteract the claims of its proponents.

Finally, I very earnestly repeat this suggestion: Do your best—your very, very best—all of the time, to pinpoint the areas that invite criticism, and then move with the kind of boldness and decisiveness you have so commendably demonstrated in the pollution area to purge yourselves of error.

It would overtax your patience if I attempted now to cover the many other areas that give you concern—antitrust probabilities for example, and taxation, restraints on advertising, and enlarged regulatory powers for such agencies as the FTC and FDA.

But all of it can be lumped into this one generalization: In Congress, due to the 1964 election, all systems are "go." Restraint in the National Government at this point is the restraint the President is disposed to exercise. Our system of checks and balances has become a blank check with an unlimited balance. That part of business leadership which in the last campaign helped to saddle America with unbridled executive power might well burn a few candles before the altar of making L.B.J. stand for "let's be judicious." I wish them luck.

And, my friends, for all of you I wish much

more than luck. I wish you continuing prosperity in an environment of freedom kept hospitable to vigorous and healthy competition. Those of us in public life who have pledged ourselves to the preservation of a system of free enterprise will, I assure you, stand firm in the frontline of the battle to save our system. May it be your disposition, now and in the future to do no less. May S O S become your battle cry as well as our own.

Now I must ask you, please, to excuse me. I just glimpsed a Republican. If I don't stop right now, he may get away.

Thank you for your courteous attention.

U.S. Language School Readies Servicemen for Oversea Posts—Monterey Center Gives Short Vietnamese Course; Student Tries Albanian on "Dentist"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. BURT L. TALCOTT

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 5, 1965

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, our most important and everlasting military victories will be won with "words" more than guns. Today we send troops abroad inferiorly "armed" if they cannot communicate with our allies and enemies. To speak another language is to be "twice armed."

No school anywhere teaches oral communication better than the Army Language School.

A recent article by Glynn Mapes, of the Wall Street Journal, tells some of the story of the Defense Language Institute, Monterey branch. All Members should know this extraordinary school well.

U.S. LANGUAGE SCHOOL READIES SERVICEMEN FOR OVERSEA POSTS—MONTEREY CENTER GIVES SHORT VIETNAMESE COURSE; STUDENT TRIES ALBANIAN ON "DENTIST"

(By Glynn Mapes)

MONTEREY, CALIF.—Seated in a dental chair, a U.S. Army private hesitantly asks: "A eshto e nevojshtme te m'a hignl dhemb-in?" That's Albanian for "Must you pull my tooth?"

Back comes the answer in Albanian: "Me duket se po," which means, in plain English: "I'm afraid so."

Fortunately, the soldier's toothache is no more real than his dentist, a Navy seaman equipped with a pair of dental pliers. This visit to the dentist is just a training exercise at the Defense Language Institute (DLI) school here, where the soldier, the sailor, and thousands of other American servicemen are being taught languages they will use on overseas assignments.

The make-believe dentist's office is part of Realita City, several buildings at the DLI school with rooms fixed up to resemble bars, shops and restaurants. While an instructor stands by watchfully, students act out various roles in these settings, ad libbing in the foreign tongue they are studying. "In this way we allow the students to actually apply their language skills in realistic surroundings," says Yukata Munakata, a member of the faculty.

THIRTY-THREE LANGUAGES

The Realita City exercises are designed to supplement classroom instruction at the

steadily expanding Monterey school. Founded in 1941 to teach Japanese to Army intelligence agents, the school now offers instruction in 33 languages and dialects spoken by more than 75 percent of the world's population. This year its 500 civilian teachers will train about 3,700 servicemen, up from 2,400 in 1960.

The DLI, which is run by the Army for all the services, is headquartered at Anacostia, District of Columbia. A branch there trains about 200 students a year and several thousand other students are farmed out on a contract basis to Syracuse, Yale, and Indiana Universities and to commercial language schools. But DLI's biggest single facility is at Monterey.

The number of servicemen studying a particular language at Monterey tends to reflect U.S. involvements overseas, so now the school is getting a good many students assigned to learn Vietnamese. About 1,000 servicemen will get training in Vietnamese this year, five times more than the number 5 years ago.

To handle this heavier load, school officials have set up a 12-week subfluency course aimed at building a primarily military vocabulary in the southern, or Saigon, dialect. This condensed program glosses over the Hanoi dialect of the north and the nuances of Vietnamese culture which are normally covered in the standard year-long course.

STRATEGIC SWAHILI

There's also a considerable buildup in the number of students studying Swahili, a common tongue for nearly 40 million East Africans. "Swahili is not just another peculiar, exotic tongue," says Milan G. P. de Lany, chairman of the Swahili department. "It's now among the top 10 languages of the world in strategic importance." Most graduates of the Swahili course are assigned to U.S. embassies and consulates in East Africa where they work with their African counterparts, or serve as interpreters.

In its classrooms, DLI gives precedence to speaking and understanding a language rather than to reading and writing skills. "Whether he likes it or not, a student must first memorize phrases and learn the sounds of the language," says Shigeya Kihara, director of DLI's research and development program.

From the first day of class students are encouraged to speak the new language constantly; as their vocabulary grows, they encounter written forms. The time lag between speaking and writing might run a few weeks for Spanish or French but stretches to several months for some Oriental languages whose calligraphy—the writing of the thousands of symbols—is an art in itself.

No one who hasn't finished high school can get into a DLI course and nearly 85 percent of the students have been to college. There are no draftees at DLI; most students selected to attend have volunteered for a type of duty which requires foreign language ability.

Enlisted graduates often wind up with one of the Defense Department's intelligence organizations. There, many of them translate foreign military documents.

Some officer graduates go on to universities to study the political and social climate of the country whose language they've learned. Then they are assigned to that country as "foreign area specialists." But most officer graduates are sent immediately to one of the nearly 50 countries where U.S. Armed Forces are stationed for service as attachés or as staff members of military advisory groups.

Instructors say that some of DLI's poorest students have turned into outstanding graduates. "In these few cases," says research director Kihara, "we must wait until the men put their training to work in the field before we can see the proof of our teaching methods."

He cites Maj. Joseph Hennigan who was

assigned to the Korean Armistice Commission after completing a DLI course in Korean last year. "He was an extremely poor student here, but now he speaks Korean like crazy and rebuts the North Koreans in their own language," Mr. Kihara says proudly.

As the Monterey student body grows, DLI has been having trouble finding enough qualified instructors. Both the Vietnamese and Swahili department now are seriously undermanned. The institute hopes to solve this problem by an intensified recruitment drive among the large foreign student population in the United States.

Once hired, a new instructor is required, as part of his training, to study a language that is as foreign to him as the language he teaches will be to his students. With future Russian teachers studying Burmese and Turkish recruits taking Serbo-Croatian, school officials believe all concerned will get a student's eye view of linguistics.

Use of Gas in Combat Remains Clouded Issue

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. F. BRADFORD MORSE

OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 5, 1965

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the Washington Post published an article by Howard Margolis which represents, in my judgment, one of the most thoughtful analyses of the implications of the use of gas by United States or South Vietnamese forces that I have seen.

It appears from Mr. Margolis' researches that there is conflict within the administration as to the possible effect of our use of even nonlethal gas. As he points out an argument can be made that "any use of gas in combat necessarily involves a serious risk of escalation."

I commend this article to the attention of my colleagues:

USE OF GAS IN COMBAT REMAINS CLOUDED ISSUE

(By Howard Margolis)

U.S. endorsement of the use of riot-control gases in Vietnam is being interpreted by many subordinate military and civilian officials as a step toward the general approval of the use of nonlethal gas warfare.

Whether this was the intent of recent statements by the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense is not clear.

Their statements were much more narrowly worded, stressing that only commercially available riot-control gases were used, and then primarily in situations where appropriate to save civilian lives, not for general combat.

From what was said, officials opposed to promotion of nonlethal gas see the administration as backing away from a position it had stumbled into.

But officials favoring the promotion of the gases appear to view these same statements as a diplomatic retreat in the face of the sharp public reaction around the world, but nevertheless a step toward the adoption of a progas position.

The central issue is the risk that promotion of the use of nonlethal gas might break down inhibitions against general gas warfare.

No one could be found in the administration who seems to favor the use of lethal gas.

Equally, almost no one seems opposed to bringing down political inhibitions against the use of nonlethal gases, provided there could be assurance that there would be no escalation to poison gas.

What the opponents of such a policy question is how a reliable line is to be enforced against the use of poison gas once the general idea of gas warfare has been accepted.

Those favoring the use of the gases see them as a substitute for bullets and bombs and napalm and hence a step toward more humane means of warfare.

Those opposed doubt that use of such gases would, on net, make warfare much more humane. More important, they fear it would have the contrary effect by eroding inhibitions on the use of poison gases, which are a singularly indiscriminating and cheap means for mass slaughter.

None of the officials interviewed who were knowledgeable about the subject appeared to believe that the lines presently laid down by the administration were very likely to hold.

Several of those favoring the use of gas stated that the real line lay between gases that are known to be nonlethal and experimental gases about which there is still doubt. In their view, nominally nonlethal secret gases are not yet classed with "riot control agents" simply because there is not yet sufficient proof they are nonlethal.

In this view, the line delineated by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara between civilian and military gases seemed at best unenforceable and at worst meaningless.

According to a military riot-control manual, for example, the vomiting gas included by Rusk and McNamara in the tear gas family will make its victims violently sick, with a splitting headache, for periods of up to 24 hours.

So it can readily be argued that secret military gases that merely put people to sleep for 24 hours are more humane than vomiting gas, and that the real distinction is that there is not yet adequate evidence that all those put to sleep will wake up.

To officials favoring the use of gas, the essential problem is to overcome irrational public distaste for the idea of gas warfare by educating the public to understand that the gases that would be used, unlike those of World War I, would not kill or impose permanent injury.

A general who was interviewed stated that he believed there was no chance at all that use of nonlethal gas would lead to the use of lethal gas.

A higher ranking civilian official was less emphatic. But he felt there was no question but that a clear line could be drawn today between permissible and nonpermissible gases—nonlethal and lethal—and that if, in the future, this line were blurred it would be possible to go back to the no-gas position.

Officials opposed to the encouragement of gas doubted that any such line could confidently be expected to hold.

The problem, in this view, is the pressure that would exist on combatants to use the strongest gases they thought they could get away with, as the Vietnamese chose to use vomiting gas rather than ordinary tear gas. The pressure would presumably be much stronger when both sides are using gas. Thus, an argument can be made that any use of gas in combat necessarily involves a serious risk of escalation first to gases that occasionally cause lasting injury, or occasional death to victims exposed to unusually heavy concentrations, and then to outright killing gases.

Although the likelihood of such escalation cannot be determined, opponents of a progas policy judge the risks sufficiently severe to outweigh any realistic military or humane advantage of promoting the use of gas.

April 5, 1965

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CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — APPENDIX

A1649

Debauchery in Selma-Montgomery March

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

HON. JAMES D. MARTIN

OF ALABAMA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 5, 1965

Mr. MARTIN of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, eyewitness accounts continue to come in attesting to the debauchery and immorality which was a part of the Selma-to-Montgomery march. The incidents which were so much a part of the march have disgraced the entire country and put a label of shame upon those who would tolerate indecencies for whatever reason.

I hope the clergymen who were present and clergymen throughout America will rise up to condemn the activities which took place and the kind of people who were responsible for the activities as well as those who excuse them.

The following news story from the Huntsville News, Huntsville, Ala., tells the story of the march as seen by one of the State troopers who was there:

TROOPER TELLS OF MARCHERS' DEBAUCHERY
(By Hollice Smith)

State Trooper Capt. Lionel Freeman, who returned here this week after being in Selma and Montgomery for 3 weeks, said he saw "a little bit of everything" while assigned there.

Activity carried on at night was "something scandalous," stated Captain Freeman, head of the Huntsville district of State troopers.

Sex acts between Negroes and whites occurred on the ground in Selma every night for about two and a half weeks prior to the march to Montgomery, the veteran State trooper said.

Captain Freeman said he witnessed some of this activity and heard numerous reports from news reporters and photographers.

Some of the reporters from northern papers were among the observers. "We asked them if they wrote about the immoral activities that went on. Some said they did, but that it was cut out before it got in their papers."

While assigned to keep the Negroes in a certain area in Selma with the "Berlin rope," Captain Freeman said he witnessed one sexual relationship where a priest stopped a couple and made them "come up to the front line by the rope." The couple had been about 30 rows behind the rope.

Asked if it seemed to bother the priest, Captain Freeman said "not too much."

The trooper said he could not do anything about the act because he, as well as other officers, were there only to retain and keep the demonstrators from going up town.

He described a majority of the white persons participating in the marches as filthy, dirty, and beatniks.

The marchers "purposely mixed," the trooper related. "They absolutely tried to get us to harm them. One tried to get officers to knock the devil out of him by saying he was going to sleep with a white woman that night" and by making other similar statements.

The marchers knew the troopers and other officers were there to restrain them from running wild, Captain Freeman explained, and many of them seemed to take advantage of that. They didn't seem to try to hide their immoral activities, he added.

About 2 hours before the Reverend James Reeb of Boston was beaten, Captain Freeman said he and a large group of other persons saw two white men dressed as priests walk across U.S. Highway 80, each holding hands

with two Negro girls—about 14 to 16 years of age. This sort of stuff may have triggered the beatings, the officer said.

He continued that he did not think half of those dressed as priests were actually priests. Captain Freeman reported that 34 persons dressed as priests went upon a sidewalk in front of the capitol building steps in Montgomery about 10 o'clock one night and said they wanted to pray. They were retained on the sidewalk—and kept off the capitol steps. They stayed until about 3 a.m. "Some of them used some of the most vile language I have ever heard," the trooper captain stated. "If they were priests, they need to go back to schools."

Some of the white beatniks in the group told officers they were being paid \$10 a day, being fed three meals a day, and allowed to sleep with a female companion.

Captain Freeman said, "Some of our investigators knew some of the marchers to be card-carrying Communists."

He was in Montgomery when Mrs. Liuzzo, of Detroit, was killed about 20 miles west of the capitol while shuttling marchers from Montgomery to Selma.

There were 35 troopers from the Huntsville district assigned to the Montgomery and Selma area. Twelve of that number were from Madison County. Only Cpl. C. H. Lowery and Trooper H. P. Sexton were left to carry on duties of troopers in Madison County.

"Dear Uncle Sam"

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. RALPH J. SCOTT

OF NORTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 5, 1965

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks, I would like to include in the RECORD two letters, one addressed to me and another to "Uncle Sam," by one of my young constituents, concerning the tragic death of her brother, Owen Lawson, in the service of our country in South Vietnam. The closing sentence of her letter to "Uncle Sam," I have found, expresses the feelings of a substantial number of my constituents:

WOODSDALE, N.C., March 31, 1965.

HON. RALPH J. SCOTT,
Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SIR: My family wishes to thank you for your kind expression of sympathy occasioned by the loss of our son and brother in Vietnam.

Please accept the enclosure which expresses just how I feel about the crisis in Vietnam and our loss.

Yours truly,

VICKIE LAWSON.

AN OPEN LETTER TO UNCLE SAM

WOODSDALE, N.C., March, 1965.

DEAR UNCLE SAM: I am 14 years old and in my second year in high school. Today, I returned to school after attending the funeral of my brother on yesterday. I am not able to concentrate on my lesson because my heart is so heavy with grief. Only 4 years ago he was at the same place preparing for his future. He had achieved his goal of becoming an aircraft mechanic, but he only had a chance to enjoy it for a short length of time.

He was killed on February 10, in a hotel blast at Qui Nhon, South Vietnam, as a result of a sneak attack by the Communist

forces. Uncle Sam, I cannot tell you how sad this incident has made my family and me even though he did die a hero's death. As time passes we know that God will lighten our hearts, but if this situation is allowed to go on at the pace it is going now, there will be many more families throughout the United States whose hearts will be heavy, because they have lost a son or a brother in Vietnam. Uncle Sam, is it worth the price that these young boys are paying? How many more young men will be cut short of their goals because of Vietnam? How many more young ladies like my sister-in-law will be made widows in their late teens and early twenties by this war? How many children will not remember or know their fathers because they have been taken away from them by this war?

How many more families will receive the dreaded telegram that we received? It was even worse for us because we had seen the debris of the hotel in the news even before we were notified and every time there was a knock at the door, we hated to open it because we thought it was a message from you that he was among the casualties at Qui Nhon. Finally, we did receive the unwanted message.

Uncle Sam, I'm very young, and I don't understand all the diplomatic treaties that control our relations with other countries. But what I would like to know is what happened on that fatal day, February 10, when the hotel was bombed? How did the Vietcong get past the guards and the protective fence to plant this bomb? Was it a lack of troops or were we depending on the South Vietnamese to stand guard for us?

Although I am young, I believe my country can prevent the spread of communism in South Vietnam in a much better way than it is doing. As I see it now, five or six young men are sent over in the disguise of "advisers," killed and replaced by five or six more only to be killed. Uncle Sam, I have read in the paper and seen in the news where Russia is sending ground-to-air missiles to North Vietnam. I believe that the United States is the strongest Nation in the world militarily-wise, and that it can protect its interest in South Vietnam in the same way that the Russians are now doing.

Uncle Sam, if we are going to remain in South Vietnam, please send enough troops and equipment over there so that we can fight on the level with the Communists.

When the first issue of our paper came out, my heart swelled with pride when I read the alumni news, "Former Student Assigned Vietnam Duty." This headline had referred to Owen, my 21-year-old brother. Imagine my feeling as we are editing this issue's alumni news, "Former Student Killed in Vietnam Duty." Just a few short days between the issues.

I should like to close, Uncle Sam, by saying, please fight like the Nation we are, if we must fight, or bring our loved ones home.

A grief-stricken young girl.

VICKIE LAWSON.

House Un-American Activities Committee and the Klan

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. WILLIAM F. RYAN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 5, 1965

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Speaker, the House Un-American Activities Committee's announced intention to investigate the Ku Klux Klan has raised many ques-

April 5, 1965

tions as to whether this committee is the proper one to carry on such an investigation. On March 31, the New York Post published an editorial concerning this proposed investigation which I urge all my colleagues to read and consider. The editorial follows:

HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE AND THE KLAN

The decision of the House Un-American Activities Committee to launch a "searching investigation" of the activities of the Ku Klux Klan warrants no capricious cheers.

The House Un-American Activities Committee has traditionally been unable to distinguish between opinion and act, between unorthodox ideas and incitements to terror and violence. It has operated on the crude theory that radical ideas and protests were a product of an international Communist conspiracy. Its files and inquiries have, in fact, been used to bolster the wild KKK contention that the civil rights movement is a Communist plot.

That the committee now turns its attention to the KKK is hardly reassuring.

Dangerous as Klan violence is, detestable as are its doctrines, any moves to combat the organization must accord fullest protection of due process to Klan witnesses and scrupulously refrain from infringing upon the rights of free speech and association.

The House Un-American Activities Committee, as the record has shown, is incapable of conducting such an inquiry.

Legislation is needed to combat Klan-inspired violence. But it is essential to distinguish between stamping out KKK terrorism and outlawing the Klan.

Any effort to do the latter will inevitably revive the problems encountered in enforcing the Smith Act, where it has proven virtually impossible to root out a political organization without infringing upon the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. There is the additional practical problem: the Klan can circumvent efforts to outlaw it by simply setting up business under a new name at a new address, or enlisting under the banner of the Birch Society.

The target is not private prejudice but overt, systematic terror—the murders, whippings, vandalism and harassments to which civil rights workers, supporters and sympathizers have been rejected.

There is everything to be said for the administration plan to increase the penalties and broaden the scope of the 1870 statute. This prohibits efforts to violate the civil rights of any person. Putting new and sharper teeth into this statute is a meaningful proposal which should be urgently considered by a congressional committee.

But the House Un-American Activities Committee is not the group to undertake this serious business. There are far more responsible congressional bodies to which the mission can be entrusted.

Voting Rights

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. SPARK M. MATSUNAGA

OF HAWAII

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 5, 1965

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Speaker, in our fair State of Hawaii people of different races take pride in the fact that they have proven that racial prejudices can be overcome. Whenever intolerance rears its ugly head anywhere the people of

Hawaii rise to protest. So it was that the Maui Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution denouncing the violent action taken by governmental authorities against the civil rights marchers in Selma, Ala.

The resolution follows:

Whereas civil rights demonstrators in Selma, Ala., who have been trying to organize an orderly and peaceful march from Selma to Montgomery for the purpose of obtaining voting rights have been harassed, intimidated, coerced, brutally beaten, and even shot at by Alabama police officers; and

Whereas the rest of the people of the United States, and people throughout the world, have been appalled by the vicious and cruel conduct of the government authorities in Alabama in their treatment of the civil rights demonstrators; and

Whereas said civil rights demonstrators are only asking that they be given the same right to vote as other free Americans; and

Whereas President Lyndon B. Johnson has requested Congress for the swift passage of new voting rights legislation to assure Negroes and other minority the right to vote: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Board of Supervisors of the County of Maui, That it does hereby go on record denouncing the violence used by Alabama governmental authorities against the civil rights demonstrators; and be it further

Resolved, That the members of Hawaii's congressional delegation be urged to vote for the swift passage of new voting rights legislation; and be it further

Resolved, That certified copies of this resolution be transmitted to Senator HIRAM L. FONG, Senator DANIEL K. INOUE, Representative SPARK M. MATSUNAGA, and Representative PATSY T. MINK, Washington, D.C.

South Africa: A Bright Spot on a Dark Continent

EXTENSION OF REMARKS
OF

HON. J. ARTHUR YOUNGER

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, April 5, 1965

Mr. YOUNGER. Mr. Speaker, on March 5 of this year, South African Ambassador, H. L. T. Taswell, addressed the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on the subject "South Africa: A Bright Spot on a Dark Continent."

I am sure all of the Members of the House and those who read the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD will be particularly interested in the comments which Ambassador Taswell made:

SOUTH AFRICA: A BRIGHT SPOT ON A DARK CONTINENT

During the last few months, the American flag has been torn to pieces and defiled in certain countries in Africa and Asia. There have been violent demonstrations against American embassies, and abuse has been hurled at the American Government.

I am sure you will have noted that none of these violent anti-American demonstrations have taken place in my country, the Republic of South Africa. We in South Africa remain friendly and well disposed toward the United States of America, and anxious to strengthen the natural bonds of friendship we have with you.

Many of those who have been hurling abuse at America are the very ones who have been so rigorously maligning and criticizing us in recent years.

DEVELOPMENTS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES CAUSE CONCERN

I have entitled my talk today, "South Africa: A Bright Spot on a Dark Continent."

Let us take a look at some of the things which have been happening in certain other parts of Africa during the past year or two.

In many newly independent African states, the story has been one of the establishment of one-party dictatorships, of the suppression of justice and freedom of the press, of falling standards of living, health, and education, of collapsing economies.

In one country, the white non-Arab population has dwindled since independence from 1.2 million to 100,000 as a result of shocking and ruthless discrimination.

Not so long ago, a small African island state received its independence in what was termed a classical handover of authority. Only a matter of days later, its government was deposed by armed revolution which resulted in the slaughter of hundreds of Arabs and Asians. A Communist regime took over. A satellite tracking station operated by the United States was forced to close down.

In three independent African countries there were mutinies in the armies. Unable to cope with the situation themselves, their African governments had to invite white troops to come in to restore order.

Serious border clashes took place between several African countries, resulting in many people being killed or wounded.

Tribal warfare in a central African country resulted in the slaughter of an estimated 8,000 men, women, and children.

The recent barbarous atrocities committed by rebel forces in the Congo have made the civilized world shudder with horror. Thousands of people were shot or savagely beaten to death. They included many whose only crime was that they could read and write, and accordingly fell into a class termed the intellectuals, which the rebels wished to exterminate. The loss of life in the Congo revolt is put at 40,000.

REACTION TO AMERICAN-BELGIAN RESCUE OPERATION

You will, I am sure, recall the details of the humanitarian operation undertaken in November 1964, to rescue the American and other white hostages who were held and threatened with death by the rebels.

America and Belgium were roundly condemned for the operation by Communist sources, and particularly by the Red Chinese.

But isn't it most significant that so many African states took a line that so closely followed the Communist one?

For several years we in South Africa have been warning against Communist penetration and subversion in Africa. Our warnings have fallen on ears not so deaf as unwilling to hear.

Every month now brings fresh evidence that we have been right.

In the last 5 years there has been a most marked expansion of Communist influence in Africa. Russia is now represented in about 21 African States, European Communist countries in about the same number. Red China is represented in about 16. Roughly one-third of Peking's total diplomatic missions abroad are in Africa. Communist China is extending its influence with financial aid, with arms, guerrilla training, and direct subversion. Chinese policy is based on color. It is antiwhite.

In recent years we have been accused of being out of step with developments on the rest of the continent. But let me ask this question. With development in so many parts of Africa taking the turn they have, who would want to be in step with them?

of Communist and American troops is another. And the devastation of millions through nuclear war, from which there would be no real victor, is an ever present possibility.

Mr. Speaker, there is no question in my mind that the only reasonable, sane and productive course of action is negotiation. But let us be sure of our grounds. Let us be sure that we have something to negotiate. And let us recall that the history of the world is replete with examples of disaster when negotiations were conducted from weakness. For weakness breeds contempt and the Communists have made clear their contempt for weakness.

Negotiations like the tango, furthermore, take two, and to date the Communists have indicated no desire and no willingness to remove the barriers—the aggression, the subversion and the terror—to meaningful discussions.

If the Communists can be persuaded to leave their neighbors alone, then peace is possible in South Vietnam and all of southeast Asia. For as the Washington Post stated on March 31:

The United States, on its part, wishes only a free and independent South Vietnam and North Vietnam, in the end, surely would have its essential purposes served best by a friendly, viable and productive neighbor from which the United States and all other foreign troops had departed.

The attainment of peace and independence, which are our abiding goals, has not and never will be easy. It requires patients, perseverance and persistence. But it is possible if we, in the words of John Kennedy, never negotiate out of fear, but never fear to negotiate.

Mr. Speaker, I call our colleagues' attention to the thoughtful article in the Washington Post of March 31, which I have already referred to briefly, and urge that it be read by all who are concerned with this most critical of problems:

A TERRIBLE WAR

The shocking terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was hardly needed to demonstrate what a brutal and barbaric struggle is taking place in South Vietnam. That was already well known. Still, we need to note that this barbarous attack upon unarmed men and women, children, civilian employees and bystanders, American and South Vietnamese alike, was made by forces that have been protesting the methods of the South Vietnam troops in battlefield situations.

What is going on in South Vietnam is a war in which every living person is a combatant, in which no man, woman or child has any sanctuary, in which there can be no peace for anyone. It is not surprising that this sort of war can be waged most effectively by those who acknowledge no rules or restraints.

The Government of the United States, as it is frequently advised by many of its own people and by its friends abroad, is in a very disagreeable and difficult situation. Agreement does not extend very far beyond this self-evident conclusion. We know we are in a very difficult predicament. We know how we got there. The numerous advisers who pour their counsel on the Government are not so prolific with suggestions as to how we can alter our situation without incurring risks and inviting dangers as bad or worse.

The Government is advised that it should negotiate—but all the powers with whom it might negotiate have let it be known that

they are unwilling to negotiate until the United States withdraws and leaves the country to the victors. The appeals for negotiation need to be addressed first to Hanoi, to Peiping, and to the Vietcong. There can be negotiation, no doubt, when they wish to negotiate but it is difficult to see how anything can be done as long as the departure of the forces of the United States is made a precondition to settlement.

The United States also is reproached for its failure to delineate its policy to South Vietnam. The reproach might be more aptly stated as a reproach for a policy that is disliked. That policy is to live up to our commitment to the South Vietnamese people, whom we have pledged to support as long as they wish to struggle for their independence and freedom. Those who dislike this policy, and the acknowledged distress and discomfort in which it has involved us, owe the Government, in all candor, an explanation of the alternative policy which they would pursue so that its discomforts may be examined. It is mischievous to simply denounce the situation at which we have arrived, the predicament that we are in and the policy to which we are committed without offering any specific alternative proposals. The essence of policy decision is in having a choice between available courses of action. Let the terms of the alternatives be made known. If there is a better course that this country can pursue with honor surely those in authority would be glad to learn of it.

It ought to be emphasized however that there are no time machines available. The events of the past 10 years cannot be extinguished. The future begins tomorrow and not yesterday or on some yesterday 10 years ago on which we might have elected to stay out of South Vietnam. The critics of the policy of the United States can be most helpful by suggesting what ought to be done next instead of proposing what should have been last year or 10 years ago.

In spite of the accelerating violence of the battle, the primary and legitimate interests of the major powers involved actually do permit a great deal of maneuver. Surely those interests, sooner or later, will assert themselves. The United States, on its part, wishes only a free and independent South Vietnam. North Vietnam, in the end, surely would have its essential purposes served best by a friendly, viable, and productive neighbor after the United States and all other foreign troops had departed. These are not irreconcilable purposes and after more or less destruction of life and property no doubt they will be put upon the negotiating table. It is too bad it could not be sooner rather than later.

April 5, 1965

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY MR. ROGER SAVARY, SECRETARY GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS AT THE 63d ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, CHICAGO, ILL., MARCH 1965

The International Federation of Agricultural Producers had its beginnings some 20 years ago when the decision was taken to broaden the original British concept of a federation of the farmers' unions in commonwealth countries and to set up instead, a world body including at the start the national organizations of farmers in European and North American countries.

There were two major reasons why the response to the call to establish a world farmers' union was received with such favor: The first one was that the experience of the thirties had clearly demonstrated that laissez-faire could no longer be expected to restore even a semblance of balance on agricultural markets but also that no strictly national policy was likely to achieve an acceptable farm situation in a world where recourse to export and import control and to widespread governmental subsidies had become almost universal; the second reason was that the establishment of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) had raised great expectations in two directions. It was widely anticipated that governments through FAO would promptly evolve a network of international agreements designed to achieve an orderly marketing of the major agricultural commodities on a world basis; and it was equally hoped that a successful attack would be made on the problem of under nourishment and malnutrition in underprivileged areas of the world.

IFAP was an immediate success. The most striking feature of its first conferences was a realization of the extent to which farm leaders the world over agreed on a few fundamental principles and willing to try to reconcile their differences in the mutual interest of their members.

In the early years of the federation the major problems of world agriculture were, of course, to reconstitute the production potential of farms in all the areas which had suffered directly or indirectly of war operations. These were the years of the Marshall plan and the European recovery program; the years when European farmers were catching up on technical developments which had taken place while they were starved for information and requisites. The concept of productivity became better understood and great strides made everywhere. At the same time world farm leaders realized clearly that agriculture was the most vitally interested economic sector in a rapid growth of the world economy.

In the long run, expanding markets for food would emerge primarily in those areas where people's diets are grossly inadequate and the only way to transform their existing needs into effective demand was a stepped-up rate of their economic expansion. IFAP was, I believe, the first international nongovernmental organization strongly to endorse the United Nations programs of technical assistance and economic cooperation. It was also instrumental in convincing governments to conclude major commodity agreements under which, in particular, an expanding wheat trade at stable prices became possible.

In the early fifties, however, structural surpluses of a few commodities began to hang over world markets and the problem of their utilization became topical. While controversies among exporting countries were taking an unpleasant turn, farmers'

organizations in IFAP unanimously recommended and promoted the adoption of international principles of surplus disposal and the establishment under FAO auspices of the Washington Consultative Subcommittee which is still being used as a clearinghouse and as a watchdog body. Simultaneously, IFAP was active in promoting multilateral schemes for the utilization of surplus skim milk power to improve the milk supply of large Asian cities.

Meanwhile, the extraordinary advances made in this country's agriculture combined with the unprecedented generosity of the American people to launch the gigantic food aid programs of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. But, IFAP remained convinced that a multilateral approach involving all nations would be preferable and worked assiduously to propagate that idea. After many disappointing attempts, the United Nations in 1961 approved the world food program through which food supplies are used, under international management and supervision, to accelerate the economic development of the less developed countries. This program was an experimental one and it is due for renewal and expansion at end of 1965. IFAP has combined its influence with that of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) to put pressure to bear on governments and insure its continuation as a major tool in the global war against underdevelopment.

The world farming community, which IFAP was established to represent, consists primarily of producers who do not enjoy the benefits of advanced technology and do not as a rule harvest embarrassingly large crops. Although the stage of development reached by many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America is not yet such that active and representative organizations of farmers have emerged, many such organizations have joined IFAP during the last few years. They have IFAP's active support in their endeavors to secure a more satisfactory standing for agriculture in national development plans and technical assistance programs, more substantial incentives to increased production, and more acceptable conditions for the agricultural producers. FAO's Freedom from Hunger Campaign, now in its fifth year, was launched to dramatize the magnitude of this problem and it is significant that the first campaign coordinator was the Secretary General of IFAP who has the honor of addressing you this evening.

I could, as you may well imagine, elaborate at length on these activities of IFAP as well as on many others which have left their mark in the contemporary world: the extraordinarily successful record of our European Regional Committee where the very first proposal for a common agricultural policy originated and where in spite of political developments beyond their control—producers' representatives of all European countries continue to collaborate in harmony; the similar meetings held, on this side, among Canadian, United States and Mexican member organizations; the activities of our Standing Committee on Agricultural Cooperation; those of our newly established commodity committees, and many others. But, I would now like to turn to another aspect of farmers' organizations work through IFAP, which can be described as a continuing search for a better understanding of their mutual interests and common problems.

That phase of IFAP's activities concerns the complex issue of how best to achieve and insure a reasonable level of prosperity for viable family farms in the context of a rapidly industrializing economy.

One of the common beliefs held by farmers' organizations the world over is a conviction

that there can be no substitute for the unique contribution made to civilization, democracy, and a balanced society by the individual farm operator. And their common experience is that that irreplaceable form of free human enterprise is gravely threatened today.

Leaving aside the predicaments of agricultural producers in those countries whose governments have adopted totalitarian systems which are seldom concerned with the welfare of the rural populations, we can see clearly that farmers today are often confronted with the alternative menaces of ruthless liquidation and economic colonization. But, we can also see that they need to watch carefully many other aspects of the present evolution.

To cure all the difficulties confronting agriculture in a rapidly expanding industrial economy (the least of which is not the tendency of nonfarm prices to increase year after year under the combined influence of cost inflation and demand inflation with the nonfarm sector, notwithstanding the latter's loud claims of ever-improving productivity), many economists in this, as well as in other, countries have a panacea to offer: drastically reduce the agricultural population.

Everybody is naturally agreed that there is an unavoidable relationship between the progress of productivity per man inherent on the implementation of new techniques and a decline in agriculture's manpower requirements. But, there can be no such agreement on three crucial points: the pace which is socially desirable and economically profitable for such transformation; the extent to which they should be allowed to proceed—in other words, the minimum acceptable size of the farm population in a given country; and the policies best suited to insure a smooth transition from the ways of farming of yesteryear to those of decades to come.

This is not the time to discuss these issues in depth. But, it is perhaps relevant to note that those who advocate the urgent and radical transformation of farming patterns seem to be less concerned with the extent to which, and the ways in which, this could be achieved without unacceptable hardships for millions of farm families and, indeed, for the local and national communities as a whole, than with the solution of fiscal and political problems. Problems which the increasing prosperity of the Western economies would seem to have reduced to quite manageable proportions.

The threat of liquidation concerns farmers in practically every country and the formulation of positive instead of negative policies to size up rationally and to cope constructively with adjustment in agricultural population numbers is a challenge of our time.

But, the need will remain as these policies are being evolved and implemented—and long after they have alleviated current difficulties—to maintain the safeguard of farm supports. This is precisely what the proponents of a drastic rationalization of farming patterns prefer to ignore. On this vital issue, virtually every farm organization has adopted similar policies and this creates across boundaries one of the strongest links among them.

Adjustment problems in agriculture have, during the last few years, taken a new dimension with the spread of "contract farming." Because centralized management of the various phases of the food productive processes—all the way from the industrial supply of agricultural requisites to the retailing of precooked meals—makes for greater efficiency and higher profitability, hundreds of thousands of farmers in Europe as well as North America have become involved in gigantic economic operations over which they so far exert little or no control.

At the same time, the trend toward larger production units has introduced within the agricultural sector competitors which have little hesitation to jeopardize traditional farmers' markets and to manipulate them to their immediate advantage even at the risk of compounding an already precarious supply-demand position.

Concentration in the supply, processing, and marketing sectors, vertical integration and contract farming are progressive everywhere by leaps and bounds. The farmer when he does not realize in time the dangers of these transformations and does not work almost frantically to establish and strengthen producer-controlled cooperatives or bargaining organizations before nonfarm interests secure an entire control of this sector of activity is bound to become a helpless cog in the new agri-business complex. These spectacular developments have originated in this, the most advanced and capitalized economy in the world. But, they have become a major subject of preoccupation of farm organizations everywhere. Active consultations among them is an important current task in IFAP.

Even where the farmer succeeds—as a majority of them fortunately do—to safeguard his existence, freedom, and independence to become a member of a fair cooperative undertaking or to be associated in dignity with a contractual complex, present trends in agriculture demand a careful reconsideration of a number of traditional concepts.

The field where the farm operator is in a position to exert fully his initiative and freedom of choice tends to narrow year after year. The management adviser and his linear programming virtually select his lines of production for him, the soil specialist tells him how to work and fertilize his land, the crop and livestock specialist tells him how to produce to best advantage, and the manager of the marketing cooperative finds an outlet for his products.

In these new circumstances the farmer can only remain an imaginable and intellectually active entrepreneur when he broadens his horizon and takes an active part in the formulation and implementation of farm organizations policies. This vital function of farmers associations is increasingly recognized and a subject of fruitful consultation among them.

Farmers have to struggle harder than ever to maintain a degree of influence in the management of public affairs. With the reduced influence which is the consequence of their declining numbers, they must learn to live in a society where major politico-economic decisions affecting their well-being will increasingly be taken by representatives of the urban people. Their organizations, therefore, have no more pressing task than that of projecting a true image of today's farmer.

It is not true that public opinion is spontaneously inimical to farmers' interests. On the contrary, there remains a fundamental appreciation in every urban dweller's conscience of the role of the food producer. But, that reserve of good will is being whittled away by unfair descriptions of the true conditions. Farmers are being denounced as responsible for rising costs of living even though their share of the consumer's dollars spent on food is steadily declining and the residual share in the overall expenditure for total private consumption has become almost negligible. They are being accused of pilfering the State treasury through subsidies and grants when these expenditures are only a fraction of huge State budgets and an inadequate redress for the way in which economic factors are stacked against the little man in a system largely controlled by large concentration of interests.

I understand that a congressional inquiry is underway which should throw light on these corners of the food economy where the real profits are made and I trust that it will be of as much interest to all farmers' organizations as was a few years ago the report issued by the Royal Canadian Commission investigating the same subject.

Many people are asking me whether the notion of an international brotherhood of agriculturalists is not deceptive. Are not farmers of the various countries primarily competitors? Conflicts of interests between them would seem to rule out a community of interests.

The little I have been able to say of the major facets of IFAP's work already indicate that there is a substantial community of interests among farmers in a number of the major fields of contemporary economic policy.

But farm leaders in IFAP do not shy away from a frank confrontation of those issues which may tend to divide them. It must be realized in the first place that individual farmers within a nation, still more than farmers of different countries, are competitors. This is the very foundation of a free economy. It has never precluded the successful and beneficial operation of farmers' unions. International competition per se is not therefore a factor which should rule out the possibility of active international cooperation.

International competition, to be sure, differs greatly from competition on a national market. The main difference consists in the fact that producers in different countries are included in very dissimilar economic environments and operating under completely distinct laws and policies. A situation which calls for a substantial degree of government control. But, we have seen that the operation of market forces at national level is universally government-controlled in the agricultural sectors. Similarly, there is an almost unanimous recognition nowadays of the need for a policy of orderly marketing at the international level. To that extent, national and international problems are not, therefore, different in nature and there is room for an international agricultural policy.

What exactly such a policy should be remains, of course, a matter of continuing debate. The important underlying principle, from farmers' standpoint, is that that debate must take fully into account all the factors which are recognized as relevant in the national context. It would obviously be inconsistent to apply a double standard to national and international policies. If a degree of price stability, acceptable farm incomes, smooth adjustment to changes, protection of the farmer against abuses of superior bargaining power by its economic partners, the imperatives of a rational town and country planning, and many other factors are relevant to the formulation of a national farm policy, these same factors cannot be deliberately ignored in evolving an international policy.

This is the crucial point on which all farmers' organizations are agreed. The following excerpt from the policy report of the last IFAP Conference puts it in a minimum number of words:

"It would be wrong to pass judgment on the merits of national farming policies by reference to an oversimplified concept of an international division of labor. But, a constructive approach demands that the validity of the principles on which each country bases its policy decisions must be constantly reassessed. Internationally, it is clear that regular examinations among countries of their national agricultural policies is necessary."

Farmers' organizations in IFAP are ear-

nestly working in that direction. Assiduous and painstaking efforts are made by all to study and to understand the problems of the other national farming communities. As a result of these activities, I can confidently say that there is today a much greater degree of mutual understanding and good will among farm leaders the world over than in any period of history.

During recent months, however, we have witnessed a disquieting tendency, on the part of governments engaged in difficult and protracted trade negotiations, to enlist the support and to appeal to the loyalty and alleged self-interest of farmers' organizations who are pressed to give uncritical endorsement to rigid negotiating positions which often fail to recognize, as does IFAP policy, "the primary aim to seek, nationally and internationally, an improvement on the levels of income for agriculture so that they compare more favourably with those in other economic sectors." I do not believe that such tactics enhance the chances of a successful outcome of trade negotiations which are already reduced by the unfortunate tendency of press reports to describe the progress of these negotiations on terms of which would be more appropriate for a world boxing championship.

In order to whittle away the efficiency of and, if possible, to destroy national farm policies, it is a time-honored practice for those interests which are not particularly amical toward the farming industry to play upon the differing outlook of small and commercial farmers; of crop and livestock producers; of farmers in various States and areas. The same tactics may prove equally detrimental to the future of the world farming community as a whole.

In these circumstances it is all the more encouraging to see that U.S. farmers remain strongly united under the enlightened leadership of such international figures as your universally respected president, James G. Patton, and his successor to the presidency of IFAP, the Grange's national master, Herschel D. Newsom. One of the purposes of my visit to this convention was to bring you the message of good will of the farmers of the world who have learned so much from the pioneering developments achieved by U.S. farmers and who look forward to further progress in the direction of an even closer partnership among all of those who will remain engaged in the most noble calling on earth.

VIETNAM

Mr. MORSE. In today's issue of Newsweek, dated April 12, 1965, the incomparable Walter Lippmann really made my speech for today in opposition to the shocking American war and its continuation in Asia. He says in his article, entitled "Nearing the Brink in Vietnam":

While the American press is free to report and comment on Vietnam, our people are receiving very little official guidance and help in understanding the portentous events which are happening. Officially, we are being told that we are now involved in a war between two separate nations, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, and that our task is to put enough pressure on the North Vietnamese to make them cease and desist from taking part in the war at the other end of the country of Vietnam.

The official interpretation is one of those half-truths which can be grossly misleading. The half of the truth which we are being told is that North Vietnam is sending some men and officers, is helping to supply, and is probably directing the strategy of the civil war in South Vietnam. The half of the truth which is being neglected is that in a

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very large part of South Vietnam the resistance to the Viet Cong has collapsed.

Yet, it is the state of the war in South Vietnam which is of critical importance to the United States. It is on that above all that we need to fix our attention. For it is in South Vietnam that disaster impends, and it is the effort to forestall the disaster that brings us very near to becoming involved in a land war of great proportions. It is there that we are being pressed to engage several hundred thousand American troops and to face the prospect of at least a partial mobilization in this country to support and sustain those troops.

Under the heading, "Official Theory Versus Actual Events," Walter Lippmann continues:

The argument for making South Vietnam a second Korea is growing louder in the lobbies and corridors of Washington. The argument is being made because the official theory of the problem in South Vietnam has been confounded by events. The theory, which was propounded by Gen. Maxwell Taylor when he persuaded President Kennedy to enlarge our intervention, was that with enough arms, more money, and some American military advisers, the South Vietnamese could create an army able to subdue the Viet Cong rebellion. Until a year ago, more or less, this was the theory on which our excellent Secretary of Defense rested his hopes and his plans, and staked his reputation as a political prophet.

The theory has not worked. Our side has been losing steadily the control of the countryside. It has failed to win the allegiance of the peasants, who are not only the majority of the nation, but are the one and only source of military manpower. Today, the principal highways north and south, east and west, have been cut by the Viet Cong, and the cities where our clients are holed up are being supplied by air and by sea. The South Vietnamese Army has not surrendered, but it has so little will to fight and has such a high rate of desertion that we can no longer count on South Vietnamese soldiers even to supply sentries for American air bases and installations.

The basic character of the war has changed radically since President Johnson inherited it from President Kennedy. It used to be a war of the South Vietnamese assisted by the Americans; it is now becoming an American war very inefficiently assisted by the South Vietnamese. In fact, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the South Vietnamese, who have good reason to be war-weary, are tending to sit on the sidelines while we, who have promised to "win" the war, are allowed to show how we can win it.

Under the heading "Numbers Not Enough," Lippmann continues:

For a time the warhawks in this country argued that a certain amount of bombing—a "clean" war in the air rather than a "dirty" war on the ground—would do the trick. But it has not done the trick. All wars, and particularly civil wars, are won or lost on the ground.

It is evident enough now that the South Vietnamese ground forces are unable and unwilling to fight the war effectively. They may have a superiority in numbers over the Vietcong of 5 to 1. That is not nearly enough in guerrilla wars where a ratio of 20 or 50 to 1 is not always enough. And so we are being confronted with two dismal prospects. The first is the landing of American soldiers for an interminable war on the ground against the inexhaustible masses on the Asian continent. The second prospect is the bombing of the populated cities in North Vietnam. This would bring down on us the opprobrium of almost all the world and also the

risk that we would compel Russia and China to join in opposing us.

Having skated our prestige on the outcome of the civil war which is being lost in South Vietnam, we may find ourselves with a choice between the devil of defeat in South Vietnam and the deep blue sea of a much wider war in Eastern Asia. That choice could perhaps be avoided if we remember in time that when there is no military solution to a conflict, there must be negotiation to end it. In such a situation, only fools—

I repeat, only fools—
will go to the brink and over it.

ANTI-U.S. CHILL PERVADES RUSSIA

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article by Drew Pearson which appeared in today's Washington Post, entitled "Anti-U.S. Chill Pervades Russia," be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 5, 1965]

ANTI-U.S. CHILL PERVADES RUSSIA

(By Drew Pearson)

Moscow.—A week in Moscow gives you the definite impression that the United States and the Soviet Union may be on a collision course.

In terms of climate the snow is melting, the sun is out, the huge snow plows are being laid up for the winter, the more daring daffodils are poking their noses out from under the slush.

But politically the climate is the opposite. The freeze is on toward the United States and daily it is getting more frigid. With each bombing of North Vietnam, each statement justifying the use of gas, each photo of Vietnamese children burned by napalm, the situation gets worse.

This is my third trip to the Soviet Union in 4 years, and never before have I found criticism toward the United States so intense.

The first visit was in the summer of 1961 when the Berlin wall had just been built, Russian and American tanks were rumbling on both sides of the wall, President Kennedy had sent 50,000 extra troops to West Germany and Khrushchev had sent about twice this many to East Germany. A false step could have started war.

But the attitude of Soviet officials toward the United States was not as harshly critical as it is now.

SOVIET-UNITED STATES FRIENDSHIP

My second visit was in the summer of 1963 for a second interview with Khrushchev, this time shortly after the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty. The Russian people were then glowing with praise of the United States.

After that interview I took a sheaf of press cables to the Soviet telegraph office in Socchi to wire collect to New York. I expected a long wrestle with the cable officials—almost inevitable in an Eastern country when you haven't cleared your collect press privileges with the foreign office.

The lady in charge read the first cable regarding better relations between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. and remarked: "Anything we can do to help peace I am for." She sent the cables collect, thereby trusting a strange capitalist newsman for about \$300.

When I went to the only radio station in Socchi—Government owned—to make a transcription for use in the United States, the manager was glad to accommodate me. I asked the charge. "Nothing," he replied,

"if you will make a broadcast about your visit to Socchi."

Today this would not and did not happen. Much of the good will built up by the test ban treaty, the friendship so carefully cultivated by exchanges of professors, students, scientists, and officials during the past 10 years, is out the window.

There are several reasons for this resumption of the cold war. The most overriding and important is the fact that the United States has embarrassed the Soviet with the Chinese over North Vietnamese bombing and coexistence.

For approximately 5 years the Chinese have been telling the Russians that coexistence would not work.

Today as a result of our bombing of North Vietnam, the Chinese have been really rubbing it in. With almost every bombing raid, they have been saying, "We told you so."

IS UNITED STATES A PAPER TIGER?

Before I left Washington, officials were arguing that the United States was doing the Russians a big favor by bombing North Vietnam, a policy that demonstrated we were not a paper tiger, that we were a force the Communist world had to reckon with.

It hasn't worked this way at all. There was never any thought in the Russian mind that the United States was a paper tiger. The entire Soviet structure knew—especially after the Cuban missile crisis—that we could not be pushed around when our own defenses were threatened.

But bombing a small country on the opposite side of the globe where American security is not involved, in defense of a nation that in the last year has had an average of one change of government per month, doesn't help the Russians demonstrate to the Chinese that we are no paper tiger.

It helps the Chinese demonstrate that we are aggressive bullies. As one Russian put it: "It's like a big boy at school smashing a small boy in the face. All the sympathy is for the small boy."

In the Kremlin there are powerful forces that never liked Khrushchev's pro-American policy now exerting their influence against the United States. It is this that makes the situation in Moscow so dangerous and could lead to a collision course with the United States.

Mr. MORSE. Drew Pearson has just come back from Russia. He gives an account in this article of the chill that pervades the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the war being conducted by the United States in South Vietnam.

Members of the Senate have heard me say for many months that we are headed for a massive war in Asia. I make the statement that we are galloping toward that massive war in Asia and that thousands upon thousands of American boys are going to be involved in the next 12 months if the course of action of this administration is not changed.

CANADA AND THE ASIAN CRISIS

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, the press reports of Prime Minister Pearson's visit with the President recently left the impression that Mr. Pearson sought to express concern about events in Asia without actually doing anything about them. I regret that Canada has not seen fit to act under the United Nations Charter to bring about an end to the fighting in Vietnam, by bringing the matter to the attention of the Security Council of the General Assembly. Canada signed the charter. But Canada has no boys in South Vietnam. It is one thing for the

Prime Minister of Canada to come to the United States and make certain suggestions to the President, but I most respectfully say to him that I believe that Canada has a clear obligation, as a signatory to the United Nations, to lay before the United Nations an official request that the United Nations take jurisdiction over this threat to the peace in Asia. Mr. Pearson's suggestion for a temporary pause in the air raids in the north seemed to be intended more for Canadian home consumption than for serious consideration in Washington. Nor does he seem to have pressed it seriously. Mr. Pearson has long been closely associated with the United Nations and is known as one of its greatest friends. It is that knowledge which he could now bring to bear on the Vietnamese problem, and I hope that he will find ways to do so.

There is nothing to prevent the Prime Minister of Canada from making a formal request for United Nations intervention in behalf of peace in the Asian crisis. It should be obvious to all that there is not the slightest chance of bilateral negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam.

We have reached the point where a third party force must be brought in to conduct the negotiations. Let me say to the Prime Minister of Canada that we are going to have to count upon others in the world now—not partisans and the parties to the war—to use their good offices to bring to bear upon this crisis the existing procedures of international law for bringing about a conference table meeting whereby, with the nonparticipants sitting at the head of the table, and the partisans on both sides, an attempt will be made to save mankind from a holocaust which can develop quickly into a third world war.

Many people do not realize—although it was brought out by implication in Drew Pearson's column today—that what the United States is doing in North Vietnam is shooting fish in a barrel, killing people in a country which has no air defense and is almost helpless against air attack.

Is it not interesting that we cannot get out of the Pentagon, at the very moment I speak, any statistics on the number of civilians in North Vietnam who have been killed? Is it not interesting that we do not get into the United States the pictures of the killing by American planes in North Vietnam, but we can see them in foreign newspapers.

Of course, the fact is, we are not telling the American people the truth. There is no attempt to give the American people the full story of what is being done in North Vietnam by the United States.

Therefore, Mr. President, once again on the floor of the Senate I plead—as I shall continue to plead, as I pleaded last Friday night at the coliseum in Portland, Oreg., before over 5,000 fellow Americans, and I shall plead next week in a series of speeches across this land—that the American people recognize that only they can change the warmaking policies of this Government.

I say to the American people that they must rise up peacefully, through public opinion, to save the thousands and thousands of Americans who will otherwise die in an unjustifiable and unnecessary war. The American people must stop the administration from its substitution of jungle law and military might, this time practiced not by Russia but by the United States, instead of keeping faith with our ideals of substituting the procedures of international law at the conference table in an attempt to prevent the ever-increasing danger of a third world war starting in Asia.

ADDRESS BY JAMES G. PATTON AT PRESENTATION TO VICE PRESIDENT HUMPHREY OF AWARD FOR OUTSTANDING SERVICE TO AGRICULTURE

Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, not long ago James G. Patton, president of the National Farmers Union, made an excellent speech in which he presented to the Honorable HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Vice President of the United States, the 1965 award for outstanding service to agriculture. It is with pardonable pride that the State of Minnesota claims HUBERT H. HUMPHREY as its own; and, for this reason, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Patton's speech be printed at this point in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY AND FOOD FOR PEACE—THE EMERGENCE OF A MAN AND AN IDEA

(Statement by James G. Patton, president of National Farmers Union, in making 1965 Award for Outstanding Service to Agriculture to the Honorable HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Vice President of the United States, Mar. 15, 1964)

The Biblical admonition to "feed the hungry" is as old as Christianity itself—it has stirred the hearts of countless men and women down through the centuries—among them the tillers of the soil and the keepers of the flock.

Food for peace is one of the great advances of human history, not because this generation of Americans created a new idea, but because this was the first generation which had the capacity as well as the desire to abolish want and hunger.

Tonight, we are honoring a man who has helped the Nation and the world understand its unique opportunity.

Year by year and session by session since he first came to the Senate, this man has pleaded with the Nation to understand how it could use food to help establish the climate for peace.

He has expounded—he has proposed—he has needed our conscience—he has chided us for our lack of Christian perception—but ever and always, he has pleaded with a complacent America to open up its heart.

We are sure that there are a hundred reasons why National Farmers Union should wish to honor Vice President HUBERT H. HUMPHREY.

American farmers will remember many things about HUBERT HUMPHREY.

They know him as a great friend and exponent of the family farm system.

They know him as an apostle of cooperation; as a defender of the farmer committee system; as a tower of strength for the REA program; as the originator and sponsor of

scores and scores of significant farm bills in his 16 years in the Senate; as a foremost strategist and floor leader in the fight for many farm bills; as a tireless and persistent worker for better public understanding of agriculture.

Yes, farmers know very well how HUBERT HUMPHREY has responded to the needs of agriculture.

We hold him close to our hearts in Farmers Union—because of what he has done and what he has stood for.

Today, because National Farmers Union has always been motivated by the quest for peace and justice in the world—not only during and after World War I—not only during and after World War II—but during all the tense years of hot and cold wars since that time—we wish to honor him for his leadership in the evolution of the food-for-peace program.

"Without food and nourishment for the children of Asia, there can be no real peace in the world," HUBERT HUMPHREY said early in 1949.

In the great drama of world history, China had slipped into the Communist orbit. A new young Senator from Minnesota steps onto the stage, and within a few weeks of having arrived in Washington, is warning that India needs food.

India was in fact desperately seeking food. It was seeking to barter mica, manganese and other raw materials for a million tons of wheat. The negotiations broke down.

The leaders of India proposed the purchase of wheat on long-term credits. Again no agreement was reached.

Early in 1950, Senator HUMPHREY appealed on the Senate floor: "What is the most important problem of the Government of India today? It is food. Who has the food? We ought to get down on our hands and knees and pray to God to forgive us our sins—for here on the eastern coast of our land are Liberty ships—10,000-ton freighters loaded with wheat which the Commodity Credit Corporation has purchased.

"The wheat is stored up while over there you have people who are dying of hunger, with the Communists on top of them, with their government almost tottering. What are we doing? We are sitting around saying we cannot get along with Pakistan, or with this country or with some other country."

By August 1950, conditions had grown worse in India and HUMPHREY proposed an immediate opening of negotiations to make 60 million bushels of wheat available for famine relief.

"Here would be a grand gesture of goodwill and basic humanitarianism, a firm cementing tie between our nations, and one of the most significant steps we could take for the preservation of world peace and democracy," HUMPHREY said. He conferred with the Secretary of State and his staff to try to pave the way for an agreement.

"This would be good foreign policy, it would be a good neighbor policy, it would be sound and prudent policy to make available to this great country some of the foodstuffs which we have in our warehouses at the present moment."

Later in the same year, Senator HUMPHREY sought to rally support for the Javits resolution to extend food assistance to India. But, the effort was destined to continue well into 1951 and reach a conclusion only after Soviet Russia had delivered 50,000 tons of wheat to India and China had offered rice.

Senator Smith of New Jersey sponsored an emergency food aid bill for India, and in speaking for the bill, Senator HUMPHREY said:

"I am appealing today that the great American Nation answer those basic needs before it is too late. What India is asking is not 300 tanks. She is not asking for arms aid. She is not asking for money to develop

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do not get a wilderness system started, the outdoor recreation job partly done, and then find that this interest has subsided.

We have—as a nation—paid attention to resource problems on a crisis basis. We are alerted to the water crisis, the timber crisis, the pesticide crisis, the strip mine crisis. I have no question that it is the squeaking crisis which gets the oil. But is it the wisest way for a nation to develop and manage its resources for 190 million today and 330 million by the year 2000? I think not.

A Council of Resource and Conservation Advisers might help to avoid the potential wastefulness of reaction only in the face of crisis. It might enable decisionmakers to take more initiative in advance of a severe resource problem rather than after it has ballooned to massive proportions.

The Council would be an arm of the executive branch, but it would serve all of Government in much the same fashion as the Council of Economic Advisers. The Council of Economic Advisers does not create national economic policy, but it gathers the information and does the advance thinking essential to the shaping of enlightened policy. It is still up to political leaders to create and implement tax and fiscal policy. By the same token, Members of Congress and Cabinet officers would still be left with the responsibility to make sound conservation policy.

But the Council of Resource and Conservation Advisers would help chart the way toward appropriate conservation measures. It would let us know where we stand and where we should be heading.

The need for such a continuing high-level examination of natural resource matters was in the mind of the National Academy of Sciences when it recently said:

"It is evident that optimization of natural resources for human use and welfare cannot be achieved by fragmentary and sporadic attention given to isolated parts of the problem, but that the issues involved must be made the subject of a permanent, systematic process of investigation, recording and evaluation, carried on continuously in reference to the total perspective."

This kind of evaluation should be applied to all decisions affecting natural resources—particularly when they are irretrievably lost, once used or altered by man. The proposed high dams on the Lower Colorado River are a case in point. Before more dams are authorized, some of us want to know if the power to be produced is really economic and necessary or whether it is included as a way which has worked elsewhere and may now be the only way to finance the central Arizona project.

The most desperately needed resource in the Colorado River basin is water itself. Some experts are advising storage in aquifers in that area to avoid losses to wind and sun.

The economics of further storage of surface water for power—even in relatively narrow reservoirs—is open to serious question, even without a charge for evaporation and recognizing that water has certain peaking capacity values over other sources of power.

The closest kind of study should be devoted to a detailed comparison of alternative energy sources for generating electricity. The Four Corners region of New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado and Utah is underlaid with large deposits of coal. Some of that mineral abundance is now being used to generate electricity at quite favorable costs. There are other proposals in the talking stage for additional coal-fired plants at the mineheads of the Southwest.

While conservationists may look upon coal as a bulwark against encroachment on the Grand Canyon, they rebel against its use to produce kilowatts at certain other places. The banks of the St. Croix River are echoing to the sounds of battle between those who

want the economic advantages of a large coal-burning electric plant and those who fear the blighting of our loveliest spring-fed rivers.

Jobs and a bigger tax base are tangible—a community can measure and feel that income. But what of the so-called intangibles—a clear stream for fishing or boating or just for looking at. They become less intangible when measured against the cost of restoration—if restoration is even possible. And, of course, recreation makes jobs and produces taxes.

If coal barges, slag piles and warm water from the plant will despoil the river, is there an alternative that will give the area electricity and payrolls without scenic and recreation damage? An atomic reactor offers a possible answer. It would avoid ugly slag heaps, high stacks and barge traffic. It would not pollute the atmosphere and it might be possible to avoid heating the river water. I think you are going to find that atoms for conservation make sense in many situations.

I was interested to read in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists the account of the fight over the Bodega Head power reactor. Your club had something to do with the withdrawal of the reactor project. Un-equipped with all the details of that dispute, I would not attempt to plead the case for either side.

But I would counsel you not to reject nuclear reactors in all cases out of a fear that these powerplants can behave like bombs or that they will spew radioactive wastes into the atmosphere. Rather I would hope that the Sierra Club and other conservation groups will view the atom as an ally in the cause of intelligent resource development.

"Not blind opposition to progress but opposition to blind progress" is a principle that may serve us well in this matter.

While I have been close to the conservation movement for many years, I have long had a continuing involvement with atomic energy. I am optimistic about the alliance of the atom and conservation. Linked with desalination plants, atomic energy will help provide additional water. In some areas, atomic power may lessen the need to lay bare hillsides to get at coal seams. Reactors will firm up hydropower so that large volumes of water do not waste into the sea without being productive. Atomic fuel will lessen airpolluting smog. And atomic energy can extend the fossil-fuel resources of the country.

Albert Schweitzer has said, "Man can hardly even recognize the devils of his own creation." But I believe that we are coming to recognize the problems posed by rapidly advancing technology. Like the genie in the lamp, technology can be used to enhance the quality of life or leave it barren. We will seek its blessings.

I foresee an intensification of the conflicts between what some label progress with a capital P and others call progress with a question mark. We are going to hear more and more "payrolls or picknickers." In the cities and suburbs the roadbuilders who want to pave over woodlands and level neighborhoods are racing with those who ask: "Is there a better way to move people in metropolises?"

As I suggested in Santa Fe last fall, "All the angels are not on the side of the conservationists." But these problems demand our concern; how they are resolved will determine to a large extent the character and atmosphere of American life for generations.

Although the battle must be waged wilderness by wilderness, river by river, park by park, we must see conservation in its total dimensions. We must master technology for the broadest common good. We must improve the system of decisionmaking as regards resources.

"Those who will not remember the past," said Santayana, "are condemned to relive it."

But we do remember; how one landscape has been torn and defaced in the name of industry while another has been preserved for posterity almost as the Lord left it ages ago. We remember the struggles to bring beauty to our cities, to save beauty along our shores, and to find beauty in the depths of a quiet forest where not tree has fallen save as the Master has decreed. Surely in this conference we can agree that no great problem is settled until it is settled right, and holding that belief, can dedicate ourselves "To the cause that needs assistance and the good that we can do."

WALTER LIPPMANN CONTINUES TO SPEAK CLEARLY ON VIETNAM

Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the clearest and most persistent commentator on the deepening Vietnamese crisis is Walter Lippmann. He has clearly exposed the fallacies of our Vietnam policy and the dangers in our present course.

The current issue of Newsweek magazine includes another of Mr. Lippmann's lucid analyses, entitled "Nearing the Brink in Vietnam." I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed at this point in the Record; and I trust that Members of Congress and others will carefully read and ponder the article.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From Newsweek magazine, Apr. 12, 1965]

NEARING THE BRINK IN VIETNAM

(By Walter Lippmann)

While the American press is free to report and comment on Vietnam, our people are receiving very little official guidance and help in understanding the portentous events which are happening. Officially, we are being told that we are now involved in a war between two separate nations, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, and that our task is to put enough pressure on the North Vietnamese to make them cease and desist from taking part in the war at the other end of the country of Vietnam.

The official interpretation is one of those half-truths which can be grossly misleading. The half of the truth which we are being told is that North Vietnam is sending some men and officers, is helping to supply, and is probably directing the strategy of the civil war in South Vietnam. The half of the truth which is being neglected is that in a very large part of South Vietnam the resistance to the Vietcong has collapsed.

Yet, it is the state of the war in South Vietnam which is of critical importance to the United States. It is on that above all that we need to fix our attention. For it is in South Vietnam that disaster impends, and it is the effort to forestall the disaster that brings us very near to becoming involved in a land war of great proportions. It is there that we are being pressed to engage several hundred thousand American troops and to face the prospect of at least a partial mobilization in this country to support and sustain those troops.

OFFICIAL THEORY VERSUS ACTUAL EVENTS

The argument for making South Vietnam a second Korea is growing louder in the lobbies and corridors of Washington. The argument is being made because the official theory of the problem in South Vietnam has been confounded by events. The theory, which was propounded by Gen. Maxwell Taylor when he persuaded President Kennedy to enlarge our intervention, was that with enough arms, more money, and some American mili-

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tary advisers, the South Vietnamese could create an army able to subdue the Vietcong rebellion. Until a year ago, more or less, this was the theory on which our excellent Secretary of Defense rested his hopes and his plans, and staked his reputation as a political prophet.

The theory has not worked. Our side has been losing steadily the control of the countryside. It has failed to win the allegiance of the peasants, who are not only the majority of the nation, but are the one and only source of military manpower. Today, the principal highways north and south, east and west, have been cut by the Vietcong, and the cities where our clients are holed up are being supplied by air and by sea. The South Vietnamese Army has not surrendered, but it has so little will to fight and has such a high rate of desertion that we can no longer count on South Vietnamese soldiers even to supply sentries for American airbases and installations.

The basic character of the war has changed radically since President Johnson inherited it from President Kennedy. It used to be a war of the South Vietnamese assisted by the Americans; it is now becoming an American war very inefficiently assisted by the South Vietnamese. In fact, it would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the South Vietnamese, who have good reason to be war weary, are tending to sit on the sidelines while we, who have promised to "win" the war, are allowed to show how we can win it.

NUMBERS NOT ENOUGH

For a time the warhawks in this country argued that a certain amount of bombing—a "clean" war in the air rather than a "dirty" war on the ground—would do the trick. But it has not done the trick. All wars, and particularly civil wars, are won or lost on the ground.

It is evident enough now that the South Vietnamese ground forces are unable and unwilling to fight the war effectively. They may have a superiority in numbers over the Vietcong of 5 to 1. That is not nearly enough in guerrilla wars where a ratio of 20 or 50 to 1 is not always enough. And so we are being confronted with two dismal prospects. The first is the landing of American soldiers for an interminable war on the ground against the inexhaustible masses on the Asian continent. The second prospect is the bombing of the populated cities in North Vietnam. This would bring down on us the opprobrium of almost all the world and also the risk that we would compel Russia and China to join in opposing us.

Having staked our prestige on the outcome of the civil war which is being lost in South Vietnam, we may find ourselves with a choice between the devil of defeat in South Vietnam and the deep blue sea of a much wider war in eastern Asia. That choice could perhaps be avoided if we remember in time that when there is no military solution to a conflict, there must be negotiation to end it. In such a situation, only fools will go to the brink and over it.

EFFECT OF NATIONALISTIC POLICIES ON EUROPEAN UNITY AND RELATIONS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in recent statements I have expressed my concern about the effects nationalistic policies were having on European unity and the relations of the Western World.

A firsthand report from the European capitals brings disturbing fresh evidence that this spirit of nationalism, damaging to the paramount hope for world peace, is nevertheless permeating the countries of the Atlantic alliance.

For 2½ months, Mr. Thomas W. Ottenad, of the St. Louis Post Dispatch, surveyed the political attitudes of Western European countries.

In Paris, London, Rome, Bonn, Geneva and Brussels, Mr. Ottenad talked with more than 150 diplomats, government officials and military leaders, European and American, to assess the major difficulties of the Western alliance.

I believe that every thinking American should be concerned about the drift and division in the policies of the West. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Ottenad's seven articles appearing in the St. Louis Post Dispatch commencing the week of March 21 be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Mar. 21, 1965]

CRISIS OF CHANGE IN EUROPE: DIVISIVE INFLUENCES THREATEN ATLANTIC ALLIANCE—HOPES FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY AND FOR CLOSER RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES FADE AS NATIONALISTIC RIVALRIES AND BALANCE-OF-POWER POLITICS INCREASE

(By Thomas W. Ottenad)

PARIS, MARCH 20.—The divisive crisis of change has spread a pall of uncertainty over the Western alliance. On both sides of the Atlantic powerful forces are at work, tugging at the United States and Europe, threatening to wrench them apart and raising fears for the future.

At stake are such vital issues as the existence of the Atlantic community, the stability of Europe, the control of nuclear weapons and the precariously peaceful balance of terror that now exists between the West and the Soviet Union.

Torn by what may well be its most severe strain since World War II, the Western alliance faces a disturbing challenge: Can America and Europe maintain some kind of effective relationship for their mutual good or are they going to drift apart into increasingly independent courses regardless of the consequences?

For the past 9 weeks the Post-Dispatch has been discussing this and related questions with government officials, diplomats, military leaders, businessmen, academicians and others throughout Western Europe. The picture that emerges from these conversations, most of them off the record, is not an encouraging one.

It is plain that hopes for unifying Western Europe politically and allying it more closely with the United States have been weakened in the past few years. Europe appears to be turning once again in the direction of nationalistic rivalries and balance-of-power politics, which have proved to be disastrous in the past.

Best guesses are that the Western alliance will not collapse. In time, however, it could become badly fragmented. Its defense mechanism, too, may be seriously weakened, especially if the threat of French withdrawal from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization materializes.

Conversations with officials in Paris, London, Rome, Bonn, Geneva and Brussels lead to some rather unflattering observations about current European attitudes. For example, there is a preoccupation among some statesmen with scoring personal triumphs rather than with solving world problems.

Repeatedly one hears, "If such-and-such a policy prevails, it will be a victory for Prime Minister X, but if so-and-so happens, it will be a triumph for Prime Minister Y." Which course is the better one seems of less interest.

All too often there appears little understanding of the maturity and restraints required of those who would be world leaders. Remarkable an exasperated diplomat at the Kennedy round tariff negotiations in Geneva, "Everyone wants power but few want responsibility." Policies frequently seem based on narrow self-interest rather than broad common interest.

Europe clings to patterns of the past despite their failures and despite the needs of a new age. The only break with tradition has been the successful Common Market. It has brought an important measure of integration to European economic life. Its promise of political unity, however, appears to have been stifled, at least for many years.

One of the most deadly dangers facing the western alliance is the appearance of a neo-nationalism in Europe and a neo-isolationism in America.

Officials in Europe agree almost unanimously that a tendency toward nationalistic rivalries has stirred to life again after having laid dormant for many years. The principal blame is placed on French President Charles de Gaulle. His rejection of Great Britain's application for membership in the European Economic Community in January 1963 badly damaged the fragile spirit of cooperation that was beginning to develop. His action has led to nationalistic retaliation by others.

The apparent awakening of a new isolationist sentiment in the United States is equally worrisome. Mounting frustration over heavy responsibilities abroad could lead to demands that America sever its ties with Europe. Some experienced observers believe that De Gaulle's repeated attacks on the United States are deliberately designed to fan this flame.

Differences over Vietnam and America's financial problem are causing serious friction in the Western camp.

America's escalation of the war in Vietnam has been received coolly in Europe. The United States is charged with failing to consult its allies about its action. At the same time, Europe has shown little interest in providing greater assistance to the United States in South Vietnam.

In the financial field, concern over America's balance-of-payments deficit and gold outflow has been aggravated by French actions that could affect the dollar. France has begun to convert an increasing percentage of its foreign currency reserves, together with all new dollar earnings, into gold. While there is little short-run danger, the action comes at an awkward time. The U.S. stockpile of gold has dropped below \$15 billion, and any large-scale demand for gold could be embarrassing.

A related source of disagreement is increased investment in Europe by American business firms. Some European businessmen and others, fearful of American competition, want the practice curbed.

The Europe that is taking shape today is a curious blend of the old and the new.

The pattern of the past shows most clearly in the political sphere. Throughout Western Europe there is general agreement that any hope for forming a United States of Europe has been put off, perhaps indefinitely, by De Gaulle's hostility. The French leader opposes political integration and clings to Europe's tradition of independent states linked loosely by treaties providing only for consultation and coordination. This opposition has brought a sharp change in European attitudes.

A few years ago many thought Europe might at last be ready for political federation. Now the prevailing belief, even among the most deeply committed federalists, is that if there is to be any movement it must be first in the direction advocated by De Gaulle.

In the field of defense policy, there is the same argument for a return to the past.

De Gaulle opposes integration of military forces. He wants to revise and loosen the NATO alliance. Instead of a unified allied defense, he favors individual military forces under national control. His argument is this sphere has not been as widely accepted as his view on political unity.

Agricultural policy is another major area in which Europe appears to be following the path of yesterday. The Common Market is erecting high, protective tariff walls around its farming community.

In contrast to these hangovers from the past, the most dynamic thrust toward the future is provided by the Common Market itself. Except in agricultural matters, the six-nation European Economic Community has followed progressive, forward-looking economic and trade policies. Since its establishment in 1958 it has become the most powerful force working toward economic and eventually political integration in Europe.

The treaty of cooperation adopted by France and Germany in January 1963 represents a break with the past in one sense, but also constitutes a potential hazard. Many officials believe that Europe and the world will benefit if these two ancient enemies can end their hostilities.

On the other hand, if the agreement leads to a combined Franco-German effort to dominate the Common Market, the EEC's goal of a broader, integrated community may be jeopardized. So far, the treaty, which calls for efforts to reach common agreement on foreign and defense policies and other matters, has produced few tangible results.

Twenty years after World War II, Europe remains a continent in transition. Its final destination is far from clear. Some experienced diplomats fear that if it reverts to the pattern of loose national alliances it will never reach the goal of political union. Others, however, are confident that it will move on eventually.

One who remains optimistic about the ultimate outcome is Dr. Walter Hallstein, the respected president of the Commission or executive agency of the Common Market. In his office in Brussels, the cheerful Hallsteins sounded like the university professor he once was as he told the Post-Dispatch:

"We need patience, determination and the willingness to advance in small steps. We integrationists always have felt that a small step, even a very small one, is better than none."

He raised a warning finger and his face became grave. "There is only one thing that is out of the question," he said emphatically. "That is that we should fail to reach decisions and take action of some kind."

It is this pragmatic approach that is being followed by those who hope to see Europe move ahead. Under consideration by the Common Market are separate but similar plans by Germany, Italy, and Belgium. All call for expanded consultation among the six EEC members and for the drafting of plans for increased political union. The proposals are expected to be discussed later this year. Any action, however, is likely to be extremely limited.

Perhaps the most explosive of all the immediate issues facing the free world is a bitter controversy over how to handle its nuclear defenses. The dispute has far-reaching ramifications, for it threatens not only to split the Atlantic alliance but also to endanger relations between the West and the Soviet Union.

At the core of the argument is the multilateral nuclear force proposed by the United States. The plan contemplates creation of an allied fleet of up to 25 surface ships armed with Polaris nuclear missiles and manned by mixed crews from participating nations. It has been coolly received. Principal supporters are Germany and Italy. Principal opponents are France and Great Britain.

Underlying the dispute is a serious dilemma that the West has not yet solved. On the one side, some experts believe that Germany and other non-nuclear members of the alliance may be tempted to break away and seek atomic weapons of their own if they are not given a larger voice in nuclear affairs. On the other, creation of the MLF or something like it may well antagonize the Soviet Union, intensify the cold war and jeopardize hope for reaching agreements on disarmament and the control of nuclear weapons.

The problem is aggravated by the highly independent course followed by France, which is developing its own nuclear striking force. Critics assail the French policy as both cynical and dangerous.

They point out that the principal purpose of the small French force de frappe or striking force is to trigger American nuclear power if the United States appears hesitant to act. In conversation with the Post-Dispatch a French official conceded that this was the purpose of the French force. He thought it unlikely, however, that the actual firing stage would ever be reached.

Those who fear the dangers of nuclear proliferation are horrified by the French attitude on this question. France argues that, except for Germany, any nation that wants nuclear weapons and can produce them should have them. In a bland dissent from most opinion, a French official said his government saw little danger in expanding the "nuclear club." He predicted that Japan, India, Italy, and perhaps two or three other nations would eventually develop nuclear weapons.

EUROPE'S BIGGEST PROBLEMS

The difficulties confronting the United States and Western Europe cover a wide range. The major issues, their causes and possible solutions will be discussed in subsequent articles in this series. In summary, the principal problems are:

Atlantic Alliance: Jeopardized by serious disagreements, many of them stemming from the intransigent attitudes of French President Charles de Gaulle.

Political union: Western Europe may never achieve it; if it does, it may not be for 25 to 50 years.

Nuclear defense: No decision is likely this year on the controversial multilateral nuclear force (MLF) proposed by the United States.

Future of NATO: Serious trouble if France withdraws, as expected, some time after 1969.

French policies: De Gaulle's concept of loose national alliance appears to be politically unstable and militarily dangerous.

Britain's role: No interest in uniting with the continent despite continuing economic difficulties.

Germany: Many fear it may again become a threat to peace if it is not kept tightly tied within the Western alliance.

Agriculture: The Common Market's highly protectionist policy promises difficulty for the United States and others.

Kennedy Round Table negotiations: Moving slowly; sizable reductions are likely in industrial tariffs, but agricultural levies are a stumbling block.

The divisive tendencies in the Western alliance make little sense to those who favor continued close relations between the United States and Europe. Viewed objectively, they say, a separation would mean more losses than gains for both partners.

For Europe it would mean the loss of American military power, on which it relies for its ultimate security. The extent of Europe's dependence was underscored by an allied military leader who told the Post-Dispatch:

"There is no group of nations in Europe that can provide adequate nuclear protection for themselves without American par-

ticipation and resources. Even if Britain is included, there is no combination that can mount the deterrent needed to hold the Soviet Union in check."

For America the hazard of separation lies in the possibility that an estranged Europe might seek to play the United States against the Soviet Union. Those who believe such a development is possible point to De Gaulle's long-standing determination to make Europe a "third force" in world affairs. Shortly before he returned to power in 1958, the French leader wrote that his objective was:

"To bring together the states along the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees into a political, economic and strategic group—to make of this organization one of the three world powers and if necessary one day the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps."

In fairness to De Gaulle, it should be said that even his critics believe he would not desert the rest of the free world if a major crisis developed between East and West.

The air of unease that envelops the Western alliance is the outgrowth of a variety of changes in world affairs in recent years. The nations of Western Europe, nearly prostrate after World War II, have regained economic and military strength. Understandably, they want a greater voice in international councils. They seek to end their dependence on the United States.

At the same time, tensions between the East and West have relaxed. The turning point may well have been the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962. Since then the Communist offensive against the West has eased appreciably. The Soviet Union has been preoccupied with problems of its own—at home, among the Communist satellites in Eastern Europe and with Red China.

The military picture has changed drastically, too. Russia's formation of a powerful nuclear force ended America's monopoly. The development of long-range missiles has made it possible for both the United States and the Soviet Union to strike directly at each other, reducing the value of bases in Europe.

The prospect of devastating retaliation, however, has created a balance of terror. The result is that fear of nuclear war has subsided. Repeatedly a visitor in Western Europe hears this confident appraisal, "No one is going to start a nuclear war unless it is through accident or miscalculation."

These changes have thrown the Western alliance, completely unprepared for it, into a new era. Differences that were temporarily submerged in the face of common danger and common need have come to the surface again. Maneuvering for individual advantage has resumed.

Since the end of World War II America has sought to build a united and prosperous Europe and to link it closely with the United States to form a powerful combination in world affairs. Now with Europe in transition this basic policy is being tested.

Questioning voices are being raised, suggesting that Europe need not unite. The need for close relations with the United States also is being reexamined. In some quarters the concept is under sharp attack.

There are two major factors that may tend to push Europe in the direction of greater internal unity and continued cooperation with the United States. One is the unifying force of the Common Market. Its integrated economic policies are exerting a powerful, although indirect, influence toward eventual political union.

The other factor is America's nuclear power. Europe's clear realization that its safety depends on U.S. military strength is a strong deterrent to severing its ties with America.

American and European diplomats with whom the Post-Dispatch talked agree that

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the current, trying period calls for patience and persistent effort if the Western alliance is to be preserved. It also calls for exceptional American delicacy. For while American leadership is resented in many quarters of Europe, informed officials say it is badly needed. Without it, they warn, Europe still seems incapable of making important decisions.

In their search for the future, the Western allies are enjoying the luxury of dissent. Divergent views, conflicting interests, rival schemes create a babel.

The mood recalls the theme of the final volume of Sir Winston Churchill's history of the Second World War: "How the great democracies triumphed and so were able to resume the follies which had so nearly cost them their life."

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Mar. 22, 1965]

VISION OF UNITED EUROPE DIMS—DE GAULLE THINKS CHANGE WILL TAKE AT LEAST 50 YEARS—MANY EXPERTS BELIEVED PRESENT SETUP IS UNSTABLE, MILITARILY DANGEROUS—CALL IT THREAT TO PEACE

(By Thomas W. Ottenad)

PARIS, March 22.—Europe has turned its face against the future.

The vision that has gleamed fitfully since the end of the war, of a United States of Europe, is growing dimmer. In its place there shines again the old image of a Europe that is a loosely knit alliance of independent and jealous nations.

This is regarded by some European leaders as an extremely disquieting development, fraught with grave risks. It may endanger world peace, for many experts believe that the kind of Europe which appears to be emerging will be politically unstable and militarily dangerous. Compounding the hazard is the prospect that it may take half a century before Europe can move on to a more stable and rational order.

The fundamental question of how Europe is to organize itself is one in a series of troublesome issues facing the Western alliance. Others include:

Difficulties in relations between the United States and Europe; a revival of the spirit of nationalism; the divisive effect of France's independent actions; sharp differences over nuclear defense policy, and a threat by France to withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Taken together, these problems constitute one of the most severe internal strains the Western allies have experienced. Some diplomats in Europe think it is even worse than the Suez crisis in 1956 when Britain and France split openly with the United States. Said one gloomily:

"The issues are more fundamental this time. There are basic disagreements over how the Western Alliance should be organized and how it should function. If the nations of Europe fail to integrate their political and defense policies, the alliance may begin to break up. Europe may be split from the United States and from the rest of the world."

At the heart of the current controversy is the question of whether the countries of Europe, after centuries of bickering and fighting, are at last ready to move toward a political union in which individual differences are subordinated to the common good. Or are they going to continue the traditional practices of patchwork alliances and power politics?

In American terms the choice lies between the federalists and the States righters. In European terms it is between the Eurocrats, who have been working energetically for a United States of Europe, and the Gaullists, or followers of Gen. Charles de Gaulle. The French President is the chief exponent of a policy of loose alliances.

The fight between these forces has swung in favor of the Gaullists. A visitor who travels through Western Europe talking to diplomats, politicians, and others repeatedly hears:

"Any hope for unifying Europe politically has been put off for many years. If we are to progress at all, the first step will have to be nothing more than an alliance between existing states. A true federation, if it ever comes, can only develop later."

This attitude has been created chiefly by De Gaulle. His uncompromising opposition to unification in either the political or military field has convinced even the Eurocrats that federation is out of the question at present.

This represents a fundamental change in mood. After World War II there were many who believed that a new and unified Europe not only must, but could be created. One of the first was the late Sir Winston Churchill. In 1946 in a famous speech in Zurich he said "we must build a kind of united states of Europe."

Under the leadership of Churchill, Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, and others, a number of moves were made toward unifying Europe. In 1952 the European Coal and Steel Community was established, creating a common market for coal, iron ore, and scrap among France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.

In 1958 the same six nations joined in forming the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. These three organizations provided a measure of supranational integration, chiefly in the economic field. In the defense field, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, set up in 1949, provided limited unification in military policies and operations.

The Eurocrats had won the first round in the fight for Europe's future. There were many who thought that Europe might soon be able to move directly into political federation.

De Gaulle smashed that hope in January 1963 when he vetoed Britain's application for membership in the Common Market. Since then he has shown that he is willing to go to almost any length to block the formation of a political union.

"The second round in the battle has been won by the Gaullists," a French official remarked accurately.

There is general agreement now that prospects for achieving political unity in Western Europe have been postponed for many years. One of the best-informed sources in Europe, a man who has been in the center of the movement for unity since its start but who asked that his name not be used, gave this view:

"Back at the very beginning some of us made a private prediction. We thought it would take about 40 years to complete the drive for unification, to produce a true United States of Europe with a federated government and a popularly elected European Parliament.

"That was 15 years ago. So we have 25 years to go." He paused reflectively for a moment. "Yes," he said decisively, "I still think we can do it in another 25 years."

Other forecasts are less optimistic. De Gaulle reportedly believes that it will be 50 years before Europe can begin even to consider a federal union. He thinks it will take that long to develop a feeling of "Europeans" which he regards as a prerequisite to close political cooperation.

Despite this discouraging outlook, those who believe that Europe should unite are trying to keep the spark alive. Plans aimed at achieving a greater measure of political integration have been put forward by Germany, Italy, and Belgium. In essence, they call for the six members of the Common Market to consult regularly on foreign policy and other problems and to try to develop a plan for some kind of political union.

These are timid schemes. No one expects them to lead to political federation. They are, in fact, not much more than warmed-over versions of the old Fouchet plan. This proposal, which was advanced by De Gaulle and was considered in 1961, was dropped after other members of the Common Market objected that it did not go far enough toward political union.

The argument over European political organization is important to the Atlantic Alliance because, in the judgment of some competent students, it involves Western security. They believe that the Gaullist approach has such serious shortcomings that it is extremely hazardous.

"National alliance and balance of power politics failed to preserve the peace in the past," remarked one worried official. "In a nuclear age they are even more hazardous."

Another critic warned that the De Gaulle concept might encourage a revival of German militarism. "The French approach," he said, "is almost sure to weaken NATO or even dissolve it. If that happens the German Army, which is the most powerful in Western Europe, might be set free from direct Western control. The consequences of such an event could be extremely dangerous for world peace."

Of all the strains facing the Western Alliance, one of the most severe stems from the increasingly difficult problem of maintaining close relations between the United States and Europe. Differences have developed over a variety of issues.

The United States, for example, has sought to have the prospering countries of Western Europe take on a larger share of the burden of foreign aid. It would welcome greater European help, too, in critical trouble spots like Vietnam. Although there has been some response from Europe, it has fallen far short of American hopes.

For their part, many Europeans want a larger voice in Western defense councils. They think that the Atlantic Alliance needs revision. They feel also that the United States is losing interest in Europe.

Other disagreements have arisen over tariffs in negotiations at the Kennedy round in Geneva and over the agricultural policy of the Common Market.

These and other developments have raised serious doubt as to whether the long-sought objective of closer transatlantic ties is any longer a realistic goal. Some officials in Europe believe that a contemplated partnership between the United States on the one side and a cohesive Europe on the other cannot be expected for many years. Even more remote, in their view, is a tighter, integrated Atlantic union of the kind advocated by the United States from time to time.

A well-informed American official in Paris said, "I don't think we can expect to achieve any partnership arrangement while De Gaulle is in power. There has to be more European unity before we can move in this direction. Yet France blocks nuclear integration and political union, the two developments that would help to make a partnership possible."

Even Great Britain appears to have reservations about an intimate Atlantic union, despite its longstanding "special relationship" with the United States. In London a high-ranking foreign official made it plain that this country regards as impractical and unwise the kind of Atlantic "interdependence" that the late President John F. Kennedy advocated in a speech on July 4, 1962.

Furthermore, there is a widespread belief among Europeans that the United States is not ready for a truly integrated Atlantic union. The day for an Atlantic community has not come," observed a French diplomat. "The United States in particular is not ready to accept a system in which it would have to relinquish some of its sovereignty."

Germany and Italy, the major proponents of European political union, also are the

strongest advocates of closer ties between Europe and the United States.

A potentially grave problem for the Western alliance lies in the apparent reemergence of a spirit of nationalism among European nations. Government officials and others agree that this feeling, which created tension in the 19th and early 20th centuries, is on the rise again.

Of particular significance, sources in Bonn concede that nationalistic sentiment in Germany has increased in the last few years. They offer some reassurance, however, to those who wonder if this powerful, energetic nation may again endanger world peace. They say the sentiment has not taken the aggressive form of the earlier German nationalism that played an important part in bringing on World Wars I and II.

Informed officials differ as to the importance of the nationalistic feeling they see in Europe. "I think it has become quite serious," remarked one student of European affairs. "It has become increasingly evident in fields like defense and foreign policy. De Gaulle's constant harping on France's national prerogatives has led others to demand equal national rights."

A French official offered a contradictory view. He said, "The feeling of national existence and national awareness has increased in recent years. But there hasn't been any growth of the dangerous kind of nationalism that all of us worry about." He disputed the general view that De Gaulle's veto of Britain's application for membership in the Common Market caused the revival of national feeling. Perhaps the best appraisal was given by an expert in Brussels. "It really is too early to tell how deeply this feeling runs," he observed. "We don't know yet whether it is just a passing phase or the beginning of a new nationalistic era in Europe."

The strains that afflict the Western alliance have been sharply intensified by the highly independent course pursued by France.

The overall effect of these policies, say De Gaulle's critics, has been highly divisive. He has encouraged disunity among the Western allies. His repeated attempts to reduce American influence in Europe jeopardize the basic concept of Atlantic cooperation. His only concern, say his detractors, is to increase France's power and prestige regardless of the cost to the alliance.

In the final analysis, the varied problems pressing on the Western allies pose the serious question of whether they can find an effective way to provide for the security of the world and the well-being of their peoples.

From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post Dispatch, Mar. 23, 1965]

ATLANTIC ALLIES STAY ON SIDELINES DESPITE THREAT TO NATO POSED BY DE GAULLE'S INTRANSIGENCE—SENSE OF URGENCY FOUND LACKING—NUCLEAR FORCE DISPUTE PERSISTS AS STRONG U.S. LEADERSHIP IS AWAITED

(By Thomas W. Ottenad)

PARIS, March 23.—In Bonn a German official seemed remarkably unconcerned about the danger that France might withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "We should not worry too soon about that," he remarked, with a wave of the hand. "It's probably just a threat. Besides, nothing is likely to happen for several years."

In Rome an Italian diplomat was equally casual about the deep split in the Western alliance over nuclear defenses. "It's up to Britain and the United States to solve the problem," he said.

But neither Britain nor the United States is moving forcefully.

In London a British official observed, "We might be just as happy if nothing at all were done about nuclear defenses." And in Paris an American representative at NATO head-

quarters said, "We're maintaining our interest, but the next move is up to our allies."

A visitor who travels through Western Europe talking with government leaders, military officials, and others comes away with a clear impression that the Western alliance appears to be drifting idly while major defense problems pile up.

Although both the alliance itself and the balance in East-West relations may be affected, there is no discernible sense of urgency in either the United States or Western Europe about common military difficulties. On both sides of the Atlantic it is almost as if everyone was waiting for someone else to make the first move.

There is disagreement as to whether this lack of action is wise. Some informed officials think a cooling-off period is needed because of sharp differences of view. Others fear that the pause will provide an opening for France to push forward with its anti-American, anti-NATO campaign.

The military issues facing the Western Allies are difficult ones: a controversy over the organization of nuclear armaments; the danger that France may get out of NATO; demands for an overhaul of the NATO structure; the need for nuclear missiles to replace manned bombers that are becoming obsolete, and friction between Greece and Turkey, the guardians of NATO's southeastern flank.

By far the most troublesome are the French attack on NATO and the nuclear dispute. Each has caused heavy strain. Unless skillfully dealt with, either could wreck the Western alliance.

European officials agree that no decisive action is likely soon on either issue. There is a belief that the problem of organizing the West's nuclear defenses will not be taken up again in any serious fashion before the end of 1965 or early in 1966. As for the NATO question, no steps are likely until France actually moves to leave the alliance, a development that may come 4 years from now.

The French threat to withdraw is the climax of a continuing attack on NATO that goes back at least to 1958. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, who was then premier, resented not being consulted when Britain and the United States dispatched troops to Jordan and Lebanon. In September of that year he proposed a drastic reorganization of NATO.

His plan called for additional French representation in the NATO command structure. It contemplated also a three-power directorate composed of France, Britain, and the United States to consider far-reaching political questions. When his scheme failed to make any headway, he announced that France would oppose the system of NATO financing under which each country makes contributions to the Organization in proportion to its wealth.

Since then, De Gaulle's record of anti-NATO actions has grown rapidly. He refused to allow American missile bases and stockpiles of U.S. nuclear weapons for NATO forces to be placed in France. He declined to put the French Mediterranean fleet under NATO control. In 1963 he withdrew from NATO 19 French vessels assigned to defend the English Channel. Today France has only two army divisions in NATO, the smallest active contribution of any major member of the alliance.

The French attack now includes a demand for reorganization of NATO, together with a veiled but not very subtle threat to withdraw from the military organization. The general belief among European experts is that if France does decide to get out, the move will come in 1969, when the NATO treaty becomes open to renunciation.

Although De Gaulle has not specified how he wants NATO reorganized, the outlines of the French position are clear. A knowledge-

able French diplomat told the Post-Dispatch:

"Basically, we object to the military integration that NATO provides. We think the system should be revised so that each nation is responsible for its own defense. Of course, there would be consultation and coordination, perhaps even a commander in chief and a skeleton staff for emergencies."

This official insisted that France would maintain a defense alliance with the West even if France withdrew from the operating structure of NATO. Many military experts believe, however, that the loose military arrangement advocated by the French is inadequate for the needs of a nuclear age.

The nuclear controversy confronting the Western alliance centers largely on the multinational force proposed by the United States. This plan, which calls for a new allied fleet of 25 nuclear-armed surface ships manned by mixed crews from participating nations, has not been received enthusiastically.

Its principal supporters are Germany and Italy. France opposes it. Britain has proposed an alternative Atlantic Nuclear Force. Broader in scope, the British plan would include manned bombers and land-based missiles and would eliminate or downgrade the multinational concept.

The nuclear issue appears stalled at present. The principal reason is that the Germans are reluctant to act until after their national elections next September.

Other major factors in the delay are coolness in Britain, together with the possibility of an election there this year, and a sharp switch in the American attitude. The United States, which last year was pushing strongly for early approval of the multinational force, is following a new tack. It started last December when President Johnson ordered an end to American pressure, in effect putting the next step up to Britain and Germany.

Conversations with European representatives indicate that they are reluctant to move without strong American leadership. The views of many Europeans were expressed by a German official who told the Post-Dispatch:

"It is absolutely essential that the United States enter the process more actively very soon. It is impossible for Europe to make a decision by itself when this is such an American project and the United States plays such an important role in it."

Mr. Johnson has not indicated whether he intends to reassert American leadership. There are hints, however, from American officials in Europe that the United States is maintaining a discreet but active interest in the project.

They deny emphatically that America has abandoned the multinational concept. Although there is a widespread belief in Europe that "MLF is dead," many well-informed sources are convinced that a compromise will be reached eventually.

They think a solution can be found by adopting a modification of the border British scheme and including in it the multinational surface fleet advocated by the United States.

"I know the British say they will not participate in the MLF," observed a diplomat with long experience in European affairs. "But I think they would join if they were offered the opportunity to get in without any cost other than contributing, say, 500 sailors to the multinational crews."

There are strong indications that an arrangement of this type might be acceptable to Germany. Officials in Bonn said repeatedly that they see "room for a compromise" in the British position.

The basic U.S. objective of integrating its military forces with those of Europe for the common defense of the West is under question today.

With De Gaulle as the leading spokesman, a divisive doctrine is being pushed. It would

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rely on America for ultimate support but would place immediate responsibility for European security in European hands.

De Gaulle would like to see Western Europe organize its defenses around the French nuclear deterrent, the force de frappe. So far, however his neighbors have shown little interest in this idea.

"Why should we?" asked one German official rather caustically. "De Gaulle intends to retain full control of his force without giving anyone else a voice in it. We would be completely dependent on him."

Some skeptics question whether the other nations of Western Europe could rely on France to come to their defense in all circumstances. They point out that De Gaulle's record is one of intransigent independence that shows little concern for others. "What assurance is there that he would use his nuclear weapons to defend the rest of us?" asked one European critic.

The puny size of the French force, compared with American might, makes the idea even more unattractive to many Europeans. Informed sources say the force de frappe now consists of fewer than 20 bombers, each carrying a relatively small 80-kiloton bomb. Later, it is expected to reach a total of 50 planes or more. American experts say that most of the French fleet could be destroyed before reaching its targets by the Soviet SAM-3 missile, designed especially to bring down low-flying planes.

In time the French bombers are to be replaced with missiles and nuclear-armed submarines. The French hope to have by 1970 a nuclear arsenal equalling 2,000 times the power of the first atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. But this total amounts to no more than 40 percent of the nuclear stockpile the United States has in Germany alone. To practical Europeans, the American figures are impressive.

European officials repeatedly indicated that they preferred to rely on the United States for their ultimate defense. Many would like a stronger voice in joint defense matters, leading eventually perhaps to a veto over the use of American nuclear weapons. An arrangement of this type has been suggested by some American officials as a desirable goal. Generally, however, they have recommended that a greater degree of European political unity must be achieved first.

Germany occupies a key position as the West wrestles with military problems. Under the Paris agreements of 1954 making it a member of NATO, Germany renounced the right to manufacture nuclear weapons although not the right to employ them.

German officials as well as other competent observers in Bonn say the nation has no interest in obtaining control of nuclear weapons. They warn, however, that this sentiment, could change. The best way to forestall such a possibility, in their judgment, is to give Germany a larger voice in nuclear affairs in the Western alliance. This is the principal purpose of the proposed multinational force.

France is exerting heavy pressure in an effort to kill German support for the multinational force. It has warned that participation in the multinational fleet would jeopardize chances for German reunification. The French have also threatened that any hope of European political unification, which Germany strongly supports, would be weakened if the multinational force is set up.

These are potent threats, but the Germans say they will not be frightened off. "We will not change our position despite France's opposition," an official in Bonn said firmly. "We have a right to demand a voice in nuclear affairs."

"We believe in an integrated, supranational defense organization. And we are ready to fight for our beliefs."

Like the Germans, officials in Italy indicated that they, too, will remain firm in de-

manding that the multinational force be included in any nuclear defense scheme that may be worked out by the allies.

Under the pressure of conflicting military policies, the NATO organization today faces one of the gravest tests it has endured since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington April 4, 1949. Unless the differences are resolved, the alliance could be fragmented, perhaps even broken up.

The results would be both serious and far-reaching. Warned one high-ranking allied military officer, "If NATO collapses, there will be a mad scramble by many nations to establish their own independent nuclear forces. The nuclear race will be on in deadly earnest."

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Mar. 24, 1965]

DE GAULLE TRIES TO MAKE FRANCE LEADER OF EUROPE BY CREATING FALSE IMAGE OF IT AS GREAT POWER—HE ANTAGONIZES FRIENDS AS WELL AS ENEMIES, CAUSES SERIOUS DISSENSION IN WESTERN ALLIANCE

(By Thomas W. Ottenad)

PARIS, FRANCE.—Gen. Charles de Gaulle is the powerful magnifying glass through which France sees itself and its role in world affairs.

The image that the imperious French leader holds up is one in which France glitters grandly as a mighty world power, but the reality behind the reflection is far less impressive.

On any scale of power, France is not all that De Gaulle would make it seem to be. Big by European standards, it is nonetheless smaller than Texas. Its nuclear arsenal—sarcastically dubbed the force de frappe by its critics—is small and of doubtful effectiveness. There is no longer an overseas empire. Both the economy and army are small. And there are big domestic needs such as substandard schools and housing.

Yet none of these shortcomings prevents De Gaulle from acting as if France were the equal of the Soviet Union and the United States. A master of the iron-nerved bluff, he has used his considerable intelligence, experience and Gallic shrewdness to try to push his nation into a dominant position in world affairs.

Apparently as heedless of friends as of enemies, he has followed an increasingly independent, intransigent and sometimes capricious course. French policies frequently have been tangential, or even in direct opposition, to those of other Western nations.

The 74-year-old French leader has clashed sharply with the United States, antagonized other friendly countries and caused serious dissension in the Western alliance. His actions have blocked hopes for political union in Western Europe and, say some critics, may even jeopardize world peace.

His objective is clear. It is to make France the leader of Western Europe and to make Europe a "third force" between the United States and the Soviet Union.

To do so he seeks, first of all, to reduce American influence in Europe. Thus he wants U.S. troops and weapons removed. He opposes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Multilateral Nuclear Force proposed by the United States. He is hostile to American investment in Europe. He has adopted financial policies that might seriously affect the dollar.

The second hallmark of French policy is insistence on the sovereignty and primacy of the individual European state. France favors a scheme of loose political alliances, providing for consultation and co-ordination, but leaving each nation free to do as it pleases. It opposes any effort at present toward political federation in Europe.

Although De Gaulle frequently is given credit for special preworld affairs, critics believe that his philosophy of national alliances is anachronistic and dangerous. They

are convinced that it is not the best way to protect peace. They see it as nothing more than a revival of the nineteenth century pattern of unstable power pacts.

"We mistook this approach for statesmanship once before," remarked one skeptic. "All it proved to be was a path to near-suicide."

Critics see much to worry about in actions taken by De Gaulle in the six years he has been in power. Their dossier begins with his veto in January 1963 of Great Britain's application for membership in the Common Market. This action, many Europeans agree, has had incalculable effects in slowing a movement toward political union and in reviving a dangerous spirit of nationalism.

France frequently has exerted a divisive influence by following policies contrary to those of its allies. Thus it is the only major nation besides Communist China that refused to sign the limited nuclear test ban treaty in 1963. In addition to Red China, it is the only principal country not participating in disarmament negotiations in Geneva. Like Russia, it has refused to pay its share of the cost of United Nations peace-keeping operations in the Congo.

France is the only Western nation to extend diplomatic recognition to Red China since the Korean War. It has made the American position in the Far East more difficult by opposing the war in Vietnam. Like Russia, France has proposed neutralization of Southeast Asia.

The French have shown marked cordiality to the Communist bloc. A five-year trade agreement recently concluded with the Soviet Union will provide long-term credits for the Russians. Similar agreements have been made or are in the offing with other Soviet satellites. France has a trade pact with North Viet Nam also.

De Gaulle's insistence that France and Europe must be completely independent of the United States has a rather hollow ring in military terms, for it is clear that he is relying on United States power to protect France.

This was made plain in a debate in the French National Assembly last December. Arguing the need for France's independent nuclear deterrent, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou nonetheless conceded the limitations of the small force de frappe. It would be "quite insufficient for achieving ultimate victory," he remarked, and therefore "the alliance remains a necessity." In blunter language, this means that from a military standpoint French independence is a myth.

Relations between France and the United States are, in the view of many experts interviewed by a Post-Dispatch reporter in a 9-week trip through western Europe, at one of their lowest points. There are wide differences on fundamental issues ranging from Vietnam and the Congo to defense policy and the future of Europe and the Western alliance.

A French official conceded that there was a deep cleavage between France and America, but suggested that perhaps the low point had been passed. Other observers are encouraged by a sharp decline in anti-American sentiment among the French public.

If France has its way, Europe's relations with the United States will be made as distant as possible short of an actual break. One of the clearest expositions of De Gaulle's views came in a television address to the nation last New Year's eve.

Pronouncing a "declaration of independence" from the United States, he asserted that "we intend to be our own masters." France, he said, would reject any supranational, multilateral or Atlantic system. He has argued repeatedly that anything but the most distant relationship will inevitably bring Europe under domination by the United States.

"The most disturbing factor about De Gaulle's attitude," remarked one American

iplomat, "is that he misinterprets our policies. This is particularly true when he argues that the United States seeks to dominate Europe and when he questions the integrity of our promises to defend the nations of Europe."

Another American official questioned the sincerity of De Gaulle's argument that America might fail to respond to a threat to Europe. "This is just a rationalization to support his claim that France must have its own independent nuclear force," this source remarked.

In its relations with its neighbors, France is out of step on the question of European political union. Of the six members of the Common Market, experts say, only France opposes political federation. De Gaulle refuses to accept any movement toward political integration through the Common Market. He insists that its method of integrating national policies into a larger, common framework works only in the economic field.

As a pattern for the looser arrangements they favor in the political field, the French point to the treaty of cooperation they negotiated with Germany in January 1963. Significantly, even French officials concede that the pact has not worked well. Yet they argue that the same consultative approach could be used successfully on a broader, more difficult scale involving much of western Europe.

France's relations with Germany have cooled noticeably in the year and a half since Konrad Adenauer, De Gaulle's close friend, bowed out as Chancellor. The two countries have been at odds over the proposed MLF, the level of grain prices in the Common Market and tariff policy.

The atmosphere improved somewhat last December when Germany agreed to a schedule of grain prices for the Common Market. A month later De Gaulle and Chancellor Ludwig Erhard held an amiable meeting. De Gaulle agreed to Erhard's request for new discussions concerning German reunification and European political union. So far as could be learned, however, the agreement did not involve the substance of either difficult issue; it was only a decision for further discussions.

Among the few who have the opportunity to talk to De Gaulle, there is general agreement as to how he views East-West relations. These sources say the French leader believes that both the Eastern and Western blocs have lost some of their cohesiveness with the easing of world tensions in recent years. As the troubled waters recede, De Gaulle is casting about with every device, including bluffs and threats, in an effort to enhance France's position.

He is convinced that the Communist bloc is slowly changing, moving gradually toward a more peaceful posture externally and toward greater freedom internally. Through this kind of development, he is said to believe, an overall European settlement may eventually be achieved. The reunification of Germany in turn depends on a solution to broader European problems. In the Gaullist view, neither will be attained for many years to come.

The French people pride themselves on their realism and logic, yet to American ears some of their arguments on international issues have an incredible ring.

One of the most illogical sounding is their thesis that America seeks to dominate Europe. If the United States wanted to subjugate Europe, it could easily have done so after World War II, when Europe was nearly prostrate, say critics of the French view.

Equally difficult to follow is their rationale on the dangers of nuclear proliferation. They profess to see little hazard in the development of additional nuclear forces. But at the same time they complain that the proposed MLF would involve dissemination

of nuclear weapons and is therefore dangerous.

Most astonishing of all was the argument against NATO advanced by one highly intelligent French diplomat. He said that French officers lose their sense of national identity when thrown into NATO's integrated command structure. Yet, he said, the same thing does not seem to happen to American or British military men.

Difficult ally though he is, De Gaulle has made immense contributions to his country's well-being. In the 1940's as leader of the Free French forces he helped his people regain their self-respect after their country had been overrun and occupied by Germany. In the 1950's he brought the bloody and disastrous Algerian war to a close.

Since his election as President in 1958, France has enjoyed a period of political stability far different from the governmental chaos that had prevailed for so long. A nation that seemed on the verge of civil war only a few years ago now appears remarkably tranquil. France has also enjoyed rising prosperity marred only by inflation.

De Gaulle is expected to seek his second consecutive term as President in elections late this year, probably in December. Political observers agree that he is almost certain to be elected, for there is no effective political opposition. The outcome of the election could be influenced by a recession that appears to be developing.

Most experts in Paris doubt that De Gaulle will serve out another full 7-year term. They believe that he will resign, perhaps after calling for a constitutional amendment to create the new position of Vice President. Prime Minister Pompidou is regarded as the most likely heir-apparent.

De Gaulle underwent a prostate operation last spring. Since then he has shown little difficulty in carrying the burdens of his office despite his advanced age. Last September he made a 20,000-mile trip through Latin America, visiting 10 countries and making about 50 speeches.

Even if De Gaulle should die in office, most experts doubt that there will be a political upheaval of the type that might have occurred a few years ago. They regard as entirely unlikely any move by the military to seize power, or development of a dictatorship of either the right or left. The selection of a successor will be made in orderly fashion, they say. They warn, however, that this rosy outlook could change if a severe economic collapse should occur.

Qualified observers here are convinced that De Gaulle's international policies have broad support, or at least acceptance, among the French people. They doubt that there will be any sudden or dramatic change in French programs after he leaves the presidency. The tone may become more moderate, but the basic philosophy is likely to remain much the same, said one expert.

"De Gaulle has more political stature than any French leader since Napoleon. The legacy of his political thinking is likely to remain for a long time," he said.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Mar. 25, 1965]

AGRICULTURAL TARIFFS POSING PRINCIPAL STUMBLING BLOCK IN TRADE TALKS AT GENEVA—EUROPEANS HOPE MAJOR CUTS IN INDUSTRIAL DUTIES WILL OFFSET LACK OF PROGRESS ON FARM GOODS

(By Thomas W. Ottenad)

PARIS, March 25.—In an 18th century Swiss villa looking out on the snow-covered Alps a European trade expert leaned forward in his chair.

"Progress in the Kennedy round is slow," he remarked. "The big stumbling block is agricultural tariffs. They probably will not

be cut by very much. Industrial duties, however, are likely to be reduced substantially."

This hopeful but cautious view of the complicated trade negotiations underway in Geneva is widely shared in Europe. As the Kennedy round moves into a critical stage, two other basic facts also have become clear:

The United States apparently has written off most hope of winning major concessions on agricultural trade from the European Economic Community, or Common Market. Its hopes now rest with other nations.

A highly protective trade policy that is developing in the Common Market will enable it virtually to exclude foreign farm goods at will.

The discussions at Geneva, the largest, most ambitious trade negotiations ever undertaken, are named for the late President John F. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy sponsored the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 that made the Kennedy round possible.

More than 40 countries are participating in the negotiations that seek to liberalize and expand trade among the 64 nations that are members of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Negotiators are trying to make reciprocal cuts of up to 50 percent in tariffs and to lower other barriers to world trade. Thousands of industrial and agricultural products are involved.

The Kennedy round has been underway since May 1963. So far, no final, major results have been achieved. Most of the time has been spent in discussing how to negotiate, rather than in actual bargaining. Prospects are that it will be at least another year before the job is completed.

The present atmosphere in Geneva is disturbed and uneasy. European nations are unhappy about a number of American policies, including a 100-percent increase in tariffs on glass and carpets.

The United States is worried about European barriers to agricultural trade. Great Britain's 15-percent surcharge on most imports caused widespread ill will, although this condition should be remedied somewhat later this month when the levy is to drop by one-third. Uncertainty over political relations between the United States and Europe also affects the negotiations.

Despite hazards, knowledgeable officials such as W. Michael Blumenthal believe the Kennedy round can be carried through to a successful conclusion. The 39-year-old economist who heads the American negotiators at Geneva, told the Post-Dispatch:

"We already have offers of industrial tariff cuts that are better than anything ever achieved before." While Blumenthal gave no figures, most experts expect the Kennedy round to produce reductions in industrial tariffs averaging 30 to 35 percent.

This would be far short of the original goal of a 50-percent cut across the board. Nonetheless, it would undoubtedly be the most important international tariff reduction ever made. By way of comparison, the "Dillon round" completed in 1962 produced a cut variously estimated at 4 to 8 percent in American tariffs and covered only one-fifth of the Nation's trade.

The agricultural half of the Geneva negotiations is far less promising.

"It is the toughest part of the negotiations," remarked Blumenthal. "We will just have to wait and see what the EEC offers."

Any cuts that may be achieved are likely to be smaller than those on industrial goods. Some experts fear that the agricultural controversy might even wreck the conference. The more general belief, however, is that a solution will be found that will avoid a breakup.

Although the Kennedy round is concerned immediately with commercial trade policy,

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it has other far-reaching implications. It is a challenge with important potential benefits. It is, in essence, a test of the ability of Western Europe and the United States to cooperate. If they can succeed at Geneva, they may have a better chance for reaching common decisions on broader and more difficult questions like trade with the Communist bloc and relations with the less developed nations of the world.

Failure would be another serious blow to the concept of transatlantic partnership, already undergoing severe buffeting in the fields of defense policy and political relations. It might also put in jeopardy the continued existence of GATT, the major international organization dealing with tariffs and trade problems.

The final outcome of the Kennedy round will turn largely on whether a solution can be found in the next few critical months to the serious agricultural problem now facing negotiators at Geneva.

The task is a difficult one, compounded by domestic political and sociological considerations which are involved in the farm problem on both sides of the Atlantic. There are deep and fundamental differences between the United States and the Common Market, the largest traders in the negotiations.

As the world's leading exporter of agricultural products, the United States wants freer access to the markets of the EEC and other big importers of farm goods. It wants protective trade barriers lowered and would even like a guaranteed share of foreign markets.

In contrast, the EEC has an extremely backward and inefficient farm industry. Although it has only 46 million acres of land under cultivation, or one-tenth the American total, it has twice as many farmworkers. Leaders of the EEC believe protection is needed to encourage modernization of agricultural methods and to cope with political pressure exerted by the European farm bloc.

These considerations underlie a controversial agricultural trade formula which the Common Market has advanced at Geneva. Known as the "Montant de Soutien," (MDS) or "amount of support," the proposal is highly technical. In simplest terms its essence is this:

The margin of support provided for farm products by each country would be computed and then frozen at its present level. This amount, plus a variable surcharge when necessary, would be added to the price of cheaper farm imports. In the case of commodities entering the EEC from the United States, this would increase the lower import prices at least to the level of the Common Market's relatively high-priced domestic farm products or perhaps a little higher.

American criticism of the MDS was summed up succinctly by one negotiator in Geneva, who said, "It is highly protective. It creates an autarchial system. It aims at producing as much as possible inside the EEC under a system of complete price protection."

"It prohibits price competition because no matter how cheaply an importer can produce, the import levy would make it impossible for him to underbid European producers."

American negotiators are disturbed particularly by the possibility that the MDS concept might replace more favorable tariff arrangements now in effect. At present GATT guarantees enable a number of American agricultural commodities to enter the Common Market either duty free or subject to fixed tariffs ranging up to 28 percent. Under fixed rates, low-cost foreign producers can compete with domestic goods, a possibility that would be virtually foreclosed under a system of variable duties.

At present, fixed tariffs or duty-free guarantees cover about 45 percent of all American farm exports to the EEC. In the year ended

June 30, 1962, U.S. sales under these provisions amounted to \$470 million.

The EEC plan calls also for world commodity agreements to stabilize prices on grains, beef, and some other products. The United States is amenable to this idea. It has, in fact, proposed a world grains agreement, but wants it to include guarantees for sharing markets.

In defense of the MDS officials of the Common Market say that a new concept is needed in dealing with agricultural trade. They say subsidies and other elements of support must be considered, as well as tariffs. They believe that binding all these components under a GATT agreement would be a progressive step because it would prohibit any country from making unilateral changes in its support levels. They argue also that freezing farm supports at their present rates would, in effect, amount to a reduction because it would halt the increases that have occurred in recent years.

Under questioning, however, EEC spokesmen concede that the MDS and a related variable levy system already being used on some farm imports into the Common Market will not improve access to EEC markets for other nations. They acknowledge also that their plans will make price competition difficult for outsiders, will boost farm production within the Common Market, and may reduce their purchases of American commodities.

Although the United States so far has refused to accept the MDS, some officials in Geneva think its position is softening. Informed sources suggest that America may eventually agree to a variation of the MDS as the basis for an accord on grains and related products.

Those in a position to know believe that the United States is ready to give up its original hopes of gaining a larger portion of the EEC farm market through the Geneva negotiations. Instead, its principal objective now is said to be to hold its present share, amounting to annual sales of about \$1.1 billion.

This development would force the United States to look elsewhere for increased farm sales to meet its often-stated objective of achieving improvement in both agricultural and industrial trade in the Kennedy round. It appears likely that this will be the strategy of American negotiators at Geneva.

It has been learned that in their efforts to boost U.S. farm trade, American negotiators are counting on gaining tariff concessions from such countries as Japan, Canada, and the United Kingdom. These three nations are important markets for American farm commodities. In 1963 they purchased \$1.7 billion worth of agricultural products from the United States, or about half a billion more than was bought by the Common Market.

The Post-Dispatch learned that at least one of the three, the United Kingdom, expects to offer substantial concessions on agricultural trade to the United States at Geneva.

Although industrial negotiations in the Kennedy round have moved far more rapidly than those affecting agriculture, they, too, remain far from completion. Negotiators now are at work on the crucial job of reducing the size of so-called exceptions lists presented last November 16 by the United States, the EEC, Japan, and members of the European Free Trade Association. The lists consist of items that would be excluded wholly or in part from the general, 50 percent tariff cut that forms the working hypothesis for the Geneva negotiations.

Of all major trading nations, the United Kingdom presented the shortest list of exceptions—amounting to about 5 percent of its dutiable industrial imports. The United States estimates its proposed exceptions at

8 percent of dutiable industrial imports, with an additional 11 percent excluded from the current negotiations. The EEC puts its total at 19 percent.

Negotiation on the exceptions list will involve tough bargaining. Final agreement which will, in effect, determine the size of the average reduction in industrial tariffs, is not expected for some time.

A long list of other problems remains to be dealt with in the negotiations, but none is regarded as insuperable. The most important include:

Providing tariff concessions to less-developed countries without demanding full reciprocity; handling "disparities," or cases in which there are wide differences between tariffs levied by two countries on the same product; reducing nontariff barriers to trade, and dealing with an effort by some Western European nations to have duties on steel and iron exempted from the general 50-percent cut.

Heartening progress has been made within the last week on several issues. An agreement has been worked out to admit two Soviet satellites, Poland and Czechoslovakia, to the Geneva negotiations. A plan has also been developed under which poorer nations of the world will be asked merely to offer some "contribution to the objectives of the trade negotiations" in exchange for tariff concessions from wealthier countries.

And on the difficult agricultural issue, agreement has been reached for submitting initial offers affecting farm trade by April 26. The first proposals are to deal with grains. At the request of the EEC, plans affecting other agricultural products will not be outlined until next fall.

The next few months will be crucial in determining whether the Kennedy round can move on to a successful conclusion. There may be trouble if the Common Market's farm offers, expected to be based on MDS, do not contain some liberalizing element.

The United States appears firm in insisting that any agricultural plan must meet the basic objective agreed to by all participants in the Kennedy round last May. This calls for providing "acceptable conditions of access to world markets for agricultural products in furtherance of a significant development and expansion of world trade." American negotiators have said that the original MDS plan did not meet this goal.

The agricultural problem is one of two major hazards that could cause the Kennedy round to fail.

The other is the possibility that French President Charles de Gaulle might blow up the negotiations. Many observers doubt that France wants a major success at Geneva. They believe that De Gaulle might try to torpedo the conference if he thinks that such a move would aid his campaign to increase French influence in world affairs.

"I don't really think he will do it," said one informed expert who reflected the views of many. "But nobody except De Gaulle ever knows what he may do."

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post-Dispatch, Mar. 26, 1965]

LABOR'S PROGRAM FOR BRITAIN IS HOBLED BY TENUOUS HOLD IN PARLIAMENT AND TRADITION—DRASTIC MODERNIZATION SAID TO BE NEEDED IF COUNTRY IS TO MAINTAIN STATUS IN NUCLEAR AGE

(By Thomas W. Ottenad)

PARIS, March 26.—In London's Trafalgar Square an astute student of British affairs glanced at the statue of Lord Nelson, hero of the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 and a symbol of the lost age when Great Britain dominated much of the world.

"The British," he said, "still claim the privileges of the mighty, but they are no longer mighty. They have lost much of their power, and I doubt they will ever regain it."

"This country's problem comes down to habits and traditions. In many ways it is an uncompetitive culture. In many ways it isn't interested in progress. It hasn't moved fast enough to keep up with the modern world."

This unhappy judgment is shared by many, including friends, enemies, and even some British.

Britain, they say, is no longer a first-rate world power. Indeed, they believe it may not be able to maintain a second-class position unless it is willing to modernize its economy, its society, and its entire structure.

There is a new battle of Britain to be fought and a new government to lead it. How is the Labor government elected last October 15, and headed by Prime Minister Harold Wilson, likely to go about it?

Clearly the Laborites hope to turn the country in a number of new directions. Informed sources both in London and on the Continent believe the party's program will follow these major guidelines:

On foreign affairs—continued intimate relations with the United States; new efforts to relax East-West tensions; little interest in any form of European unity or Atlantic partnership that would submerge British identity; no new attempt to join the Common Market.

On Western nuclear defenses—would not really mind if no new steps were taken for quite a while.

On economic matters—Labor is determined to put more growth, technology, and government—into the British economy.

On social welfare—wants broad reforms in education, housing, and other fields, coupled with greater social security benefits, but on the whole no revolutionary change.

It is extremely doubtful whether the Labor government can act effectively on any meaningful program. With its precarious majority in Parliament whittled to three seats, it dares little more than caretaker functions.

The problem facing the British is compounded by the continuing difficulties of the pound sterling. Although not so dramatic as last year's spectacular run on the pound, pressure continues, raising the possibility that additional financial measures may be required.

Sharpest differences between the Laborites and the Conservatives who had ruled Britain for 13 years are expected in the role of the Government and in the Laborites' attitude on social and economic questions.

Wilson and his colleagues intend to play an active, influential role in many areas of society. In matters ranging from land speculation to the price of butter and the nation's whole economic future, the Government plans to take a forceful part, leading, cajoling, pushing, and persuading although probably not directly compelling.

To achieve social change the Laborites are ready to use powerful economic tools. This attitude shows plainly in revisions being made in tax policy. At one end of the ladder, a new capital gains tax is intended to redistribute part of the nation's wealth.

Many think this move is long overdue, for the gap is still enormously wide between the privileged few and the working classes. Nearly three-fourths of all personal wealth is owned by 7 percent of the population; half the amount is concentrated in the hands of less than 2 percent of the people.

At the lower end of the scale, new tax increases are designed to pay for what the Laborites call the largest expansion of social security benefits since the system began in 1948. Old-age pensions will rise by about 18 percent this year, giving typical elderly married couples payments of about \$18 a week.

Changes by the Laborites probably will not revolutionize society overnight. This is precluded by a broad national consensus in Britain on many basic goals. There are large

areas of practical agreement between the Tories and the Laborites.

Most experts doubt that there will be any really radical changes in fundamental British purpose. Thus the Labor Party is not going to try to get rid of private business any more than the Conservatives tried to get rid of socialized medicine.

Similarity between the two parties shows up most strongly in foreign policy. Basic ideas are much the same, although Labor is regarded generally as more anti-European. This may be true, but it also is true that the Conservatives were highly ambivalent on the question of Britain's relation to the rest of Europe.

Conversations with high Government officials as well as with experts outside the Labor Party indicate clearly that the Laborites have no enthusiasm for the idea of a federated Europe. "Why should we want to join Europe?" a Cabinet member asked in surprise. "We're not Europeans."

Some leaders of the party would find much more acceptable French President Charles de Gaulle's idea of a loose alliance of national European states, each still clutching tightly its cherished, if antiquated, national sovereignty.

Similarly the Laborites favor a three-cornered Atlantic partnership among the United States, Europe, and Britain. They have no liking for a two-way partnership between the United States and an integrated Europe that would include Britain.

In both these areas the Labor Party is at odds with the United States. America has favored true integration for Europe over De Gaulle's looser concept, and it has looked toward a two-member Atlantic partnership.

A third area of disagreement concerns Western nuclear defense policy. The Labor government has firmly opposed the American proposal for a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) for the Western alliance. Although Wilson has suggested as a substitute a broader Atlantic nuclear force (ANF), informed sources believe he really would not mind if his plan died just as, in the British view, the MLF already has.

Differences between the United States and Britain have been sharpened by mounting British concern over American policies in southeast Asia. The leftwing of the Labor Party has become increasingly restive at the U.S. expansion of the war in Vietnam. Disclosure this week that various forms of non-lethal gas have been used in South Vietnam has generated new controversy in Britain. There are increasing demands that Britain disassociate itself from American policy in Vietnam.

Britain's concern over Vietnam is intensified by its own problems in the Far East. It is heavily committed to support Malaysia in its struggle against guerrilla attacks by Indonesia. Producing about one-third of the world's rubber and tin, Malaysia is an important economic prize where there are heavy British investments.

Labor Party foreign policy places heavy emphasis on efforts toward disarmament and against the spread of nuclear weapons. Unlike the Conservatives, the Laborites are ready to give up Britain's own independent nuclear deterrent and depend on American military power. Their effort is complicated, however, by the MLF-ANF controversy.

Diplomats who have watched Wilson closely say he has two major objectives in foreign policy: one is to seek new ways of reducing East-West tensions; the other is to direct Western attention increasingly to the Middle and Far East, where he believes the problems are more pressing than they are in Europe.

By all odds the most imperative challenge facing the Labor Party is the herculean task of revitalizing and modernizing Britain's antiquated and sluggish economy.

One of Wilson's first moves in this area has been to try to cut Government spending on defense. This is mirrored in his effort to avoid the expensive MLF and to junk new, high-priced weapons such as the TSR-2 bomber.

This could be extremely significant if he is willing and able to go far enough. If he could shift the country's concentration of money, scientists, and technologists away from defense and into badly needed civilian export industries, the effects would be far reaching. But the job is both difficult and politically dangerous.

To deal with immediate crises in the balance of payments and pound sterling, the Government has been forced into a variety of short-term measures. These have included unprecedented international borrowing of \$3 billion, a temporary 15 percent surcharge on most imports, and a hike in the basic bank rate from 5 to 7 percent.

The basic need is to increase exports and boost the rate of economic growth. Labor has pinned its hopes chiefly on Government-led efforts to plan the national economy, check the rising spiral of prices and wages, and prod both business and unions into better performance.

In the field of economic planning, top British officials talk privately of a scheme similar to the one used successfully in France since 1946. Such a program would set targets for economic growth, together with production goals for major industries. It would not be compulsory, but might offer financial incentives to encourage cooperation. This concept is considerably more ambitious than the limited approach to planning that was made by the Tories.

A new Ministry of Technology has been established to encourage industrial modernization. A new Ministry of Economic Affairs is to do long-range planning and find ways of strengthening industries that are most inefficient. A new agency to review price and wage increases may be given some indirect regulatory authority in an effort to hold the inflation line. And a variety of incentives are being considered to stimulate exports.

These are difficult measures to carry out. More important, there is a serious question as to whether they are adequate for the size and complexity of Britain's staggering economic ailment.

A few figures tell the story. There have been recurrent financial crises—three in 7 years; repeated balance-of-payments deficits—seven in the past 12 years—with one of the worst last year; persistent trade deficits—six in 7 years.

Economic growth has been slow and uncertain. The Labor Party estimates that if British growth had just kept pace with that of the rest of Europe since 1951, national income last year would have been a third higher, an extra \$2.2 billion.

Exports are vitally needed, but in 1963 only 29 percent of British manufactured goods were sent abroad, the lowest level in 10 years. Britain's share of total world exports of manufactures has dropped steadily since 1953.

The causes for this economic malaise have their roots deep in a maze of sociological and economic factors that are not easy to change. One astute observer expressed the views of many when he remarked:

"The British are slow to change, probably too slow. Many of their methods are not modern. They are hampered by restrictive labor practices and inefficient management. Some factories, schools, and public facilities are hopelessly out of date.

"Furthermore, the economy rests on a precariously narrow base. There are few raw materials aside from minerals. Britain must import, manufacture, and export in order to live. To do so profitably, it must compete. But it has lost markets and become less competitive."

What is needed, say many, is nothing less than a national will to make drastic, fundamental changes. What is needed, as Prime Minister Wilson said recently, is "the spirit of Dunkirk."

No doubt there will always be an England. The question is—whst kind.

[From the St. Louis (Mo.) Post Dispatch, Mar. 28, 1965]

COMMON MARKET HELD BEST HOPE OF ENDING EUROPE'S NATIONALISM—ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, NOW 7 YEARS OLD AND APPARENTLY IN SOUND CONDITION, EXERTS INDIRECT POLITICAL FORCE THAT MAY EFFECT GREAT CHANGES

(By Thomas W. Ottenad)

PARIS, March 27.—The European Common Market is becoming an increasingly powerful force in world affairs. Through its concept of integrating national policies into a broader, supranational framework, it is exerting a significant influence on both economic and political life in Europe and the world.

It already has pulled the economies of its six-member nations into a close and cohesive relationship. In time they may merge into one economic entity in which a common European policy will replace individual, national goals.

The power of the European Economic Community is making itself felt far beyond its boundaries. It is exerting heavy influence on world trade, international monetary policy, tariffs, economic relations and agricultural and industrial life.

It also has become a major although indirect political force that may greatly affect the future shape of Western Europe. The "Eurocrats" at the head of the Common Market are among the strongest advocates of European unity and close partnership with the United States. Although both of these undertakings appear to be stalled, leaders of the EEC are fighting to keep them alive and to protect the limited progress that has been made.

They are working for the day when the Common Market can be expanded into a true political federation, leading the way toward a United States of Europe. Until that distant dawn, they are pushing ahead, confident that through greater economic integration they also are slowly but surely tying the knot of political union.

In this effort is the bright promise of the EEC. By all odds the most imaginative, forward-looking political development in Europe since World War II, it offers the best hopes for some day ending the national rivalries of this ancient continent and moving to a more rational and stable pattern of cooperation and unity.

After 7 years of troubled existence, the EEC appears today to be in sound condition. It seems to have recovered from the shock and paralysis that gripped it 2 years ago after France vetoed Britain's application to join the Common Market.

At EEC headquarters in Brussels there is an air of confidence and assurance that was lacking after the French action. Top officials believe there is no longer any danger that the organization can be destroyed.

The Common Market now is moving toward its goals of creating first a customs union, then a full economic union and eventually a political union of its six members—France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

Outstripping its original timetable in a number of fields, it is far ahead of schedule in its drive toward formation of a customs union. The job is nearly three-quarters complete. It looks as though it will be finished by July 1, 1967.

By that time, 2½ years ahead of schedule, there is a good chance that the Common Market will have achieved the two traditional hallmarks of a customs union—free internal

movement of trade and a common tariff policy in dealing with the rest of the world.

Progress toward both these objectives has been impressive. All quota restrictions on industrial goods moving from country to country inside the EEC have been eliminated. Original internal tariffs prevailing when the Common Market came into existence in 1958 have been cut by 70 percent. This means that articles traveling between any two countries within the Common Market now are subject only to 30 percent of the national duties in force before the EEC was formed. The task of eliminating internal tariffs is now 40 percent ahead of the schedule outlined in the Treaty of Rome, which created the Common Market.

This freer climate has contributed to a phenomenal increase in business among the six members of the EEC. Intramarket trade leaped by nearly 130 percent between 1958 and 1963, climbing to 15.7 billion. Of course, not all of this gain is due merely to reduction of trade barriers. Much of it is the result of rising prosperity and the emergence of a mass consumer's market, which Europe previously lacked.

The task of creating a single schedule of external tariffs is moving forward rapidly. Each nation in the Common Market has its own duties, but they are being moved gradually toward a common set of levies that will apply to all. The job is now 60 percent complete.

For most goods the common external tariffs will be based on the arithmetical average of the national duties that were in force one year before the EEC came into being. The change will result in lower trade barriers in France and Italy, both high-tariff countries. It will mean higher walls in Germany and the Benelux nations, traditional free traders.

The movement toward a common external tariff has been accompanied by substantial increases in trade with the rest of the world. Between 1958 and 1963, imports by Common Market countries from the rest of the world rose by 53 percent, reaching a total of \$24.6 billion. By comparison American imports in 1963 amounted to \$17 billion. The EEC is the world's biggest customer.

By mid-1967 it is possible that the Common Market will have completed measures allowing the free movement of labor, capital, and business within the EEC. A common agricultural policy, which already covers 86 percent of the community's farm output, may be fully operative by that time, too.

Beyond the stage of a customs union lies the broader, more difficult goal of unifying the entire economies of the members of the Common Market. This will require a variety of actions, including steps to prevent price-fixing or other restrictive business practices and to harmonize manufacturers' taxes.

Also needed are common policies to replace national programs in transportation and foreign trade, together with coordination in labor matters and financial affairs.

Initial steps have been taken in many of these areas. Experts in Brussels attach special importance to progress that is being made toward dealing with economic and financial matters on a community-wide basis. Last April in what constituted the first act of community economic policy, the six nations agreed on a common approach in combating inflation. They also made a start on economic planning and on strengthening the structure of their financial and monetary cooperation.

Some European officials think the eventual result may be the formation of an EEC monetary union. A powerful but indirect impetus in this direction stems from the common grains price set last December by the community. The fixed price makes it extremely difficult for individual members of the community to revalue their currencies unilaterally.

If a monetary union should evolve, making it possible for the EEC to act as a single powerful unit, it would have far-reaching significance in international financial matters. What form the union might take is open to speculation. It might set fixed rates of exchange among the six, provide for pooling of national monetary reserves and take other steps.

It might, say some enthusiasts, even lead to creation of a common EEC currency to replace the present national systems. Remarked one EEC official, "A few years ago it would have been impossible to talk of a common currency. Now no one even seems upset when the idea is mentioned."

Beyond the economic sphere there gleams dimly the greatest of all the promises offered by the EEC: the prospect of political union for Western Europe. Only limited progress has been made in this field. Further advances may be stymied for many years because of French President Charles de Gaulle's opposition to political integration.

Even though direct political action may be impossible, leaders of the EEC believe that progress in the economic field is serving to push Europe toward greater unity. They insist that important economic decisions are, by their very nature, political.

Emphasizing this theory, Dr. Walter Hallstein, president of the Common Market, told the Post-Dispatch, "The community is half political. We are not in business. We are in politics."

"We are pooling national policies concerning the economic field. We are already an economic and social policy union. What is in the air now is the second half of the work of the big book of European unification in this century—the union of foreign and defense policies."

There is a dispute over whether direct political activity is a legitimate function of the Common Market. The French are inclined to argue that it is not. They point out that the Treaty of Rome makes no specific provision for political integration.

While this is true, it is also true that there has been one underlying objective ever since the current movement to unify Europe began in 1950 with the "Schuman declaration" that led to establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. The continuing goal of leaders of this effort has been eventual political federation. At times even the French have appeared to accept this premise.

Perhaps the greatest political value of the EEC lies in the strength and dedication of its leaders. They are determined to prevent the permanent creation of the kind of Europe that many of De Gaulle's critics believe he favors: a limited alliance cut off from intimate connections with the United States.

"We may have to move in the direction of De Gaulle's concept of loose alliances," said one high-ranking official of the EEC. "But if we do, the move will be temporary in nature and it will not be anti-American in character." He paused a moment, then added forcefully:

"There is no chance that the other five members of the EEC would join a Europe that is closed, inward-looking and anti-American. The choice that must be made is between a new Europe—one that is united but open, outward-looking and intimately associated with the United States—and the old Europe—one that continues to be divided and disunited."

A number of recent actions have contributed to the new strength of the Common Market. Chief among them was establishment of a common grains price last December. The decision ended a dangerous internal battle between France and Germany. It also opened the way for broader economic and political cooperation.

Earlier this month initial agreement was reached on a plan for merging the EEC and its two sister organizations, the European

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Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. The first step, due at the beginning of 1966, will be the formation of a single executive branch. This is to be followed eventually by complete merger.

Another step forward is expected next January 1 when the present right of veto will expire on most major questions except treaty revisions and admission of new members. A new system of voting by qualified, weighed majorities will come into effect.

Under the new procedure, it will be possible for any one of the three large members of the EEC to be outvoted. As a result, France's ability to block action desired by the other five members of the community will be sharply reduced. Those who favor greater political integration hope that the change will make faster action possible.

There appears little likelihood that the question of British membership in the EEC will be taken up again in the near future. Government leaders in London made it plain that the Labor Party has no intention of renewing the nation's application for membership.

Relations between the Common Market and the United States have been marred by a fight over agricultural policy. American officials believe the EEC approach is a highly protective one that threatens to eliminate outside competition. The pessimistic fear that eventually the Common Market will be able to cut off imports of many items almost at will.

American interests aside, some informed sources question the effectiveness of the EEC's approach. They believe it may stimulate production, creating troublesome surpluses. They note that the European plan provides no direct physical controls to curb production.

There has been concern in some business circles in the United States that formation of the Common Market may damage American exports of manufactured goods. With internal levies removed but with external tariffs remaining around the EEC, there is fear that American firms will be placed at a disadvantage. The desire to get inside the EEC tariff wall explains in part the increasing tendency of American firms to establish European subsidiaries.

EEC officials believe American fears are groundless. They assert that the EEC's position on industrial trade has been generally liberal. It has cut industrial tariffs and can show that its average levy is lower than those of either the United States or the United Kingdom. Trading experience so far has been highly favorable to the United States.

The EEC is compiling an impressive record in many fields of economic and social policy. Among major actions, it has:

Established the principle of equal pay for men and women; created a social fund to finance the retraining of displaced workers; established antitrust laws; moved toward free movement for capital, labor, and business within the EEC; taken steps to assure equal rights for migrant workers; made loans to underdeveloped areas of the Common Market; laid the groundwork for a regional development policy; given financial aid to nations, largely in Africa, that are associated with the EEC; banned national discrimination in the transportation of goods and started work on a common energy policy.

Economic progress has been impressive, whether the EEC is cause or corollary. Wages and salaries of individual workers rose by 56 percent in 5 years after establishment of the EEC in 1958. Consumer prices in the same period rose only 16 percent. The community has become the fastest growing major economic area in the Western World. Between 1958 and 1963 its growth in both

industrial production and gross national product outstripped that of the United States.

The linkage of six nations has created a powerful economic base. The EEC's population of 179 million is only slightly less than that of the United States. Its working population of 72 million is actually somewhat higher than that of America. Gross national product in 1963 was \$249 billion, nearly half that of the United States. It is the world's largest trader, standing first in imports and second in exports.

A controversy is expected later this year within the EEC over a proposal to change the method of financing the community's agricultural support system. There are disagreements over the size of export subsidies, which principally benefit France, and over the distribution of revenues from import levies.

The outlook for the Common Market for the future appears to be for further advances toward economic unification but continued controversy and perhaps stalemate in the field of political union.

A top official of the EEC told the Post-Dispatch, "I think the situation that has prevailed for the past 2 years will continue for some time. On one side, the six nations are working together in the field of economic integration, making good progress.

"On the other, they are quarreling over political union, nuclear defense, foreign policy, enlarging the EEC, and over relations with the United States. We believe Europe must unite and be independent, but that its independence must be built in conjunction with, not against, the United States.

"We could move a lot faster if there were not so much anti-American feeling at the top in France."

ADDRESS BY WADE B. FLEETWOOD TO MINNESOTA STATE JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

Mr. McCARTHY. Mr. President, I have been informed that the Minnesota State Junior Chamber of Commerce convention held in Moorhead, Minn., on February 12 and 13, 1965, was a productive and well-attended one.

One of the highlights of the work of the convention was the presentation of the partners of the alliance program as a statewide project. This project was initiated by the Minneapolis Jaycees, and was unanimously adopted by the board of directors; a partners resolution was adopted during a business session attended by 500 delegates; and the program was detailed at a luncheon meeting, and was discussed further at a forum.

The luncheon speaker was Wade B. Fleetwood, special assistant in the partners of the alliance programs, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C. Nearly 650 junior chamber members attended the luncheon, and heard how they can lead Minnesota in the organization of a statewide program in partnership with Uruguay.

The President of the United States mentioned the partners of the alliance programs as one of the accomplishments of the Alliance for Progress in his foreign aid message of January 14, 1965; and I ask unanimous consent that the address by Mr. Fleetwood be printed in the RECORD, so that Minnesotans and others throughout the country will have a better understanding of the partners programs.

I also ask that a report from the February 19 issue of Time magazine be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the address and the article were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ADDRESS BY WADE B. FLEETWOOD, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, PARTNERS OF THE ALLIANCE PROGRAMS, ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS, ON THE OCCASION OF THE MINNESOTA STATE JUNIOR CHAMBER OF COMMERCE LUNCHEON MEETING, HELD IN THE CIVIC AUDITORIUM, FARGO, N. DAK., FEBRUARY 13, 1965

Mr. Toastmaster, distinguished guests, Jaycees of Minnesota, ladies and gentlemen, your international director of the Minnesota Jaycees, Mr. John Kotula, reminded me last night that Abraham Lincoln once noted that it was possible for him to prepare a 1-hour speech in 5 minutes, but that to prepare a 5-minute speech it took him 1 hour. As to my talk today, I will speak a little more than 5 minutes and a lot less than 1 hour. As most of you know, it will be my pleasure to participate in a special forum later in the afternoon at which time I will put myself in the bull's eye and do my best to answer your questions in detail in regard to the partners of the alliance program.

I feel that I would be remiss in my duty as a guest in your State if I did not pause to salute an outstanding Minnesotan and American, a great Senator and Vice President, your own HUBERT H. HUMPHREY. It is my understanding that the Vice President and the mayor of Minneapolis, Honorable Arthur Naftalin, participated in a TV show in St. Paul last week in which both indicated their interest and strong support of the partners program. It is certainly a pleasure to welcome the support of the mayor and the Vice President of the United States.

I am also advised that Gov. Karl F. Rolvaag has expressed in a like manner his interest and support of this newly developing program under the Alliance for Progress. Yesterday, at the airport in Minneapolis, where I participated in a press conference upon my arrival from Washington, D.C., I had an opportunity to meet with Mr. Robert Goff, an administrative assistant to the Governor. He reaffirmed the Governor's intention to follow the program closely and lend the support of his office to enhance its development in Minnesota.

Also, your Minnesota congressional delegation is taking a leading role in making the partners program known among the citizens of this State. We are indebted for the assistance given by Senator EUGENE McCARTHY, whose initial letters regarding the partners program directed to certain of your State leaders, started the chain of events culminating in the presentation of the program today at this convention. Just this week, I had a visit with Senator MONDALE who was very enthusiastic about the prospect of Minnesota participating in the "grass-roots" program. Further, I had a meeting in the office of Congressman ALEC ORSON prior to coming to Minnesota. The Congressman has a deep interest in the on-going program between Montevideo, Minnesota, and Montevideo, Uruguay, and welcomes the complement to this program that a statewide Minnesota Partners of the Alliance Program would offer to the rural areas of Uruguay. Congressman CLARK MACGREGOR of the 3d District and I traveled on the same plane yesterday from Minneapolis to Fargo and earlier, had a brief discussion of the partners program. Others of the congressional delegation are also looking forward to the report regarding the partners program and its presentation at this Convention.

It is a pleasure to say a special word on behalf of the Minneapolis Junior Chamber of Commerce for the initiative and action-mindedness of their leadership that have

brought the partners program as a project for the consideration of this convention. These young men have done much ground-work prior to the submission of their report to the International Relations Committee.

Another word of special thanks should be extended to the Moorhead Jaycees for staging this great Jaycee convention. They are to be commended for the outstanding arrangements they have attended to in making the delegates welcome and comfortable. Let's hear it for the Moorhead Jaycees. I feel right at home among Jaycees. Last May I flew directly to Moscow, Idaho, from Ecuador. There I joined your last year's national Jaycee president, Mr. Richard Headlee on the program at the Idaho State Convention of the Junior Chamber of Commerce. He, too, reflecting the drive and vigor of all Jaycees, was very much interested in the new partners of the alliance program and my first hand report from Latin America.

I feel that I must warn you that I became rather used to an old tradition in the Senate during my days on Capitol Hill. It was my pleasure to have served as executive secretary to Senator FRANK CHURCH for 7 years. Since coming to AID, and especially since working with this partners program, I find that I tend to filibuster. Please forgive me. Senator CHURCH and I grew up in the same block in Boise, Idaho. We enjoyed a friendship stretching back over 30 years. When we first came to Washington, D.C., an acquaintance of mine said, "Is it true that you and Senator CHURCH grew up in the same block?" I said that it was. "And is it true that you went all through school together?" I affirmed this. "Then why is it," he said, "that he looks so young and you look so darn old?"

Another young man, John Kennedy, of whose words we were reminded last November 22, said, "To other peoples in the huts and villages across the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required * * * because it is right."

President Johnson, in his state of the Union address on January 4, 1965 twice referred to the Alliance for Progress, noting that we had "joined in an Alliance for Progress toward economic growth and political democracy," and, he affirmed, "I will steadily enlarge our commitment to the Alliance for Progress as the instrument of our war against poverty and injustice in the hemisphere."

In looking at our hemisphere, many have said that we face with the Alliance for Progress an even greater task than was undertaken by the Marshall plan in Europe. There, we sought to repair the ravages of 5 years of war while here we face the problems of five centuries. The Alliance for Progress has been the catalyst to commence the needed changes that will help build the economic institutions demanded for the growth and full development of the great potential of this hemisphere. The problems requiring attention are many and include land and tax reform and pressing problems regarding education, health and agriculture.

Last year a valuable conference was held in Washington, D.C., for the purpose of discerning the progress of the Alliance program. Mr. Bill Rogers, the Deputy Coordinator of the Alliance for Progress, chaired the conference. All of the U.S. AID mission directors in Latin America participated and sat side by side around the conference table, affording them an opportunity to come together and compare notes as to the workings of the economic programs underway in a great common effort in all of Latin America. The consensus was that much progress has been made toward attaining the goals of the Alliance for Progress.

By the end of fiscal year 1965, under the Alliance, U.S. AID will have helped provide over 36,000 classrooms; over 11 million textbooks; will have constructed over 2,100 water systems benefiting 24 million people; will have built 735 hospitals and health centers extending medical service to nearly 9 million people; will be feeding over 22 million people under Public Law 480; will have built 3,000 miles of road and trained nearly 75,000 teachers. This is achievement. Our share in this undertaking is \$1 billion a year. Though this amount is very great, it is less by one-third than the \$1½ billion we spend on our lawns and crab grass; it represents one-third of 100th of our income; it contrasts with the yearly increase in our wealth which is 15 times what we invest in Latin America. The countries of Latin America are heavily committed to the financial support of the Alliance also and, in fact, put in a great deal more than do we.

Under the Alliance for Progress, the government to government programs that have been launched are designed to help the countries of Latin America build their own institutional capabilities and to resolve their own problems. But it takes time to build institutions. Look at our own history. It takes time to develop an agricultural extension service. It takes time to build a savings and loan system. It takes time to establish cooperatives. It takes time to build a solid educational base and to train technicians. It takes time to build institutions to the point where they have impact on the people. In this institution-building process, the skeleton is the Alliance for Progress. It is people like you who contribute the flesh and blood to make the Alliance a living reality. We are reminded that in the charter of Punta del Este, it says "It is the purpose of the Alliance for Progress to enlist the full energies of the peoples and governments of the American Republics."

Last May 6, 1964, President Johnson, in a White House news conference said, "While the efforts of governments are vitally important in the struggle for hemispheric progress, the efforts of private persons and groups can also have great impact." He was speaking of the partners of the alliance program.

This, then, is in answer to the question, why was this program begun? The partners program is an effort to get the needed items right into the hands of the people in the slum and rural areas of Latin America who are trying to help themselves. The program dates from the assignment of my colleague and director of the partners of the Alliance programs, James H. Boren, as the deputy mission director in Peru. Among other duties, Mr. Boren was the leg man for the mission and traveled throughout the country to meet the people and see what they were doing to help themselves. He found that they were engaged in many small projects in the villages and communities throughout Peru to better their lives. They often approached him with requests for mission assistance to implement the projects in which they were engaged. But funds could not be dissipated from the institution-building efforts underway in the country. In an attempt to get to those people with the small amount of financial assistance needed to make the difference between a project completed or abandoned, Mr. Boren saw the need to join the private sector forces in the United States with these efforts taken by small groups in Peru. He sought to bring together the needs he saw with the resources of United States organizations and groups that were willing and anxious to lend a hand. This was the formation of an alliance of peoples in a meaningful partnership for progress. Here was an attempt to buy a little time until the in-

stitution-building efforts made themselves felt on the people in the countryside.

The help that Mr. Boren was able to get to implement the numerous small projects was not in the form of gifts, but rather tools to finish a job. To us, in this program, a project is a blackboard for a school, a pump to lift water from a well, a generator to provide a little light, some toolkits with which to learn a trade. These are the items that help give a vital sense of movement to the Alliance for Progress in the rural areas of Latin America where the help is needed most. It is a program that complements the Alliance for Progress, seeking as it does to meet immediate needs of people.

Last May I had the opportunity to go to Colombia and Ecuador and meet with mission officials looking toward further implementation of the partners program in those countries. I was interested in seeing the people and learning of their problems so that I would have a first-hand grasp of the battle being waged against those forces that would keep men in poverty and want. I saw a town that had been rebuilt. Pelileo was destroyed in a great earthquake in 1949 and 7,000 of her citizens lost their lives. As the Ecuadorans said, not a stone was left on a stone. But those people have rebuilt their town a couple of miles away from the old site. I saw their wide streets and neat buildings and the pride on their faces. I visited the small hospital with its one doctor. The operating table is what you and I would call an examination table and the light for that room was a goosenecked lamp. There were no anesthetics. Since that visit, Idaho has become the partner of Ecuador and has assisted the people of Pelileo in their efforts.

Senator CHURCH recently told me that as he walks down the streets of Boise or Pocatello, people stop him and say, "Sure Senator, I know what the Alliance for Progress is and what its principles are. But what can I do to help the Alliance?" Senator CHURCH tells them now that they can help through their Lions, Kiwanis, Business and Professional Womens' clubs, Rotary groups, Junior Chamber of Commerce chapters, League of Women Voters and other local civic organizations through the Idaho Partners of the Alliance.

This partner program is a real challenge, a real test for the private sector. The opportunities to directly participate are unlimited. There is enough for all. And Minnesota has a target. Your partner is Uruguay.

Uruguay is south of Brazil and east of Argentina. Small in comparison with its neighbors, it is larger than Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland combined. Nearly 82 percent of its land area is devoted to livestock raising, while 16 percent is utilized with the raising of crops. Over one-half of its boundary is water—the ocean, rivers or lakes. The beautiful coasta city of Punta del Este gave its name to the charter that established the Alliance for Progress. Uruguay is a social democracy and does not contain the extremes of wealth and poverty common to the majority of Latin America.

The partners program offers the opportunity for Minnesota to develop a substantive program involving all the citizens of your State with the rural areas of Uruguay. It could be a meaningful augmentation to your on-going Montevideo program with the capital city of Uruguay. But to be really effective, it is imperative that you reach the people in this State—every group and organization within your borders can participate in the Minnesota partners of the alliance program. It is a channel through which civic clubs, unions, business, and professional groups, schools and even private

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The Postmaster General must notify the sender to stop sending unsolicited mail to an addressee who makes such a request, he is authorized rather than directed to pursue violations of the notification. The Attorney General is provided similar authority. In both cases, therefore, enforcement would not be blind and automatic, but would undoubtedly be tempered by recognition of the realities of particular situations. Those who violate the law intentionally could be treated differently than those who did so by mistake.

In summary, Mr. Speaker, this bill attacks a serious problem—the matter of the multi-million-dollar traffic in obscene materials through the mails—in a way that effectively harmonizes the rights of the individual with those of society in general. I hope the bill will be approved.

Mr. MORRISON. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Louisiana that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill H.R. 980.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that two-thirds had voted in favor of the passage of the bill.

Mr. MORRISON. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Louisiana makes the point of order that a quorum is not present. Evidently a quorum is not present. The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 360, nays 21, not voting 52, as follows:

[Roll No. 62]

YEAS—360

Abblitt	Carey	Edmondson
Abernethy	Carter	Ellsworth
Adair	Casey	Erlenborn
Adams	Cederberg	Evans, Colo.
Addabbo	Chamberlain	Everett
Albert	Chelf	Evins, Tenn.
Anderson, Ill.	Clancy	Fallon
Anderson, Tenn.	Clark	Farnley
Andrews	Clausen	Farnum
George W.	Don H.	Fascell
Andrews, N. Dak.	Clawson, Del.	Feighan
Annunzio	Cleveland	Findley
Ashbrook	Clevenger	Fisher
Ashmore	Colmer	Flood
Aspinall	Colmer	Flynt
Ayres	Conable	Fogarty
Bandstra	Conte	Foley
Barling	Cooley	Ford, Gerald R.
Barrett	Corbett	Ford
Bates	Corman	William D.
Battin	Craley	Fountain
Beckworth	Cramer	Frelinghuysen
Belcher	Culver	Friedel
Bell	Cunningham	Fulton, Pa.
Bennett	Curtin	Fulton, Tenn.
Berry	Curtis	Fuqua
Betts	Daddario	Gallagher
Bingham	Dague	Garmatz
Blatnik	Daniels	Gathings
Boland	Davis, Ga.	Gettys
Bolling	Davis, Wis.	Gialmo
Bolton	Dawson	Gilligan
Bow	de la Garza	Gonzalez
Brook	Delaney	Goodell
Brooks	Dent	Gray
Broomfield	Denton	Green, Oreg.
Brown, Ohio	Derwinski	Green, Pa.
Broyhill, N.C.	Devine	Greigg
Broyhill, Va.	Dickinson	Grieger
Buchanan	Dingell	Griffin
Burke	Dole	Griffiths
Burlison	Donohue	Gross
Burton, Utah	Dorn	Grover
Byrne, Pa.	Dowdy	Gubser
Cabell	Downing	Gurney
Cahill	Dujski	Hagan, Ga.
Callan	Duncan, Oreg.	Hagen, Calif.
	Duncan, Tenn.	Haley
	Dwyer	Hall

Halleck	Mackie	Roncalio
Halpern	Madden	Rooney, N.Y.
Hamilton	Mahon	Rooney, Pa.
Hanley	Marsh	Roudebush
Hanna	Martin, Ala.	Roush
Hansen, Idaho	Martin, Mass.	Rumsfeld
Hansen, Iowa	Martin, Nebr.	Satterfield
Hansen, Wash.	Matthews	St. Onge
Hardy	May	Saylor
Harris	Meeds	Schisler
Harsha	Michel	Schmidhauser
Harvey, Ind.	Miller	Schneebell
Harvey, Mich.	Mills	Schweiker
Hathaway	Minish	Scott
Hays	Minshall	Secret
Hébert	Mize	Selden
Hechler	Moeller	Senner
Henderson	Monagan	Shipley
Herlong	Moore	Shriver
Hicks	Morgan	Sikes
Holland	Morris	Sisk
Horton	Morrison	Skubitz
Hosmer	Morse	Slack
Howard	Morton	Smith, Calif.
Hull	Mosher	Smith, Iowa
Hungate	Moss	Smith, Va.
Huot	Murphy, Ill.	Stafford
Hutchinson	Murphy, N.Y.	Staibbaum
Ichord	Murray	Stanton
Jacobs	Natcher	Steed
Jarman	Nedzi	Stephens
Joelson	Neisen	Stratton
Johnson, Calif.	O'Brien	Stubblefield
Johnson, Okla.	O'Hara, Ill.	Sullivan
Johnson, Pa.	O'Hara, Mich.	Talcott
Jonas	O'Konski	Taylor
Jones, Mo.	Olsen, Mont.	Teague, Calif.
Karsten	Olson, Minn.	Thomas
Karth	O'Neal, Ga.	Thompson, La.
Kastenmeyer	O'Neill, Mass.	Thompson, Tex.
Kee	Ottenger	Thomson, Wis.
Keith	Patman	Todd
Kelly	Patten	Trimble
King, Calif.	Pelly	Tuck
King, N.Y.	Pepper	Tupper
King, Utah	Perkins	Tuten
Kirwan	Philbin	Udall
Kornegay	Pike	Ullman
Krebs	Pirnie	Utt
Kunkel	Poage	Van Deerlin
Laird	Poff	Vanik
Landrum	Pool	Vigorito
Langen	Price	Waggonner
Latta	Fucinski	Walker, N. Mex.
Leggett	Quie	Watkins
Lennon	Quillen	Watts
Lipscomb	Race	Weltner
Long, La.	Randall	White, Idaho
Long, Md.	Redlin	White, Tex.
Love	Reid, Ill.	Whitener
McCarthy	Reifel	Whitten
McClary	Reinecke	Widnall
McCulloch	Reuss	Williams
McDade	Rhodes, Ariz.	Willis
McDowell	Rhodes, Pa.	Wilson, Bob
McEwen	Rivers, Alaska	Wright
McFall	Roberts	Wyatt
McGrath	Robison	Wylder
McMillan	Rodino	Yates
McVicker	Rogers, Colo.	Young
Macdonald	Rogers, Fla.	Younger
Machen	Rogers, Tex.	Zablocki
Mackay	Ronan	

NAYS—21

Brown, Calif.	Gilbert
Burton, Calif.	Hawkins
Cameron	Holifield
Conyers	Lindsay
Edwards, Calif.	Matsunaga
Farbstein	Mink
Fraser	Multer

NOT VOTING—52

Andrews	Gibbons	Roosevelt
Glenn	Grabowski	Rostenkowski
Arends	Helstoski	St Germain
Ashley	Irwin	Smith, N.Y.
Baldwin	Jennings	Springer
Boggs	Jones, Ala.	Staggers
Bonner	Keogh	Sweeney
Brademas	Kluczynski	Teague, Tex.
Brent	MacGregor	Tenzer
Byrnes, Wis.	Mailliard	Thompson, N.J.
Callaway	Mathias	Toll
Celler	Moorhead	Tunney
Cohelan	Nix	Vivian
Diggs	Passman	Walker, Miss.
Dole	Pickle	Whalley
Dow	Purcell	Wilson
Dyal	Resnick	Charles H.
Edwards, Ala.	Rivers, S.C.	Wolff
Fino		

So (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Keogh with Mr. Fino.
Mr. Rivers of South Carolina with Mr. Glenn Andrews.
Mr. Wolff with Mr. Mathias.
Mr. Toll with Mr. Whalley.
Mr. Tenzer with Mr. Bray.
Mr. Boggs with Mr. Arends.
Mr. Kluczynski with Mr. Byrnes of Wisconsin.
Mr. Helstoski with Mr. Springer.
Mr. Jennings with Mr. MacGregor.
Mr. Cohelan with Mr. Mailliard.
Mr. Staggers with Mr. Smith of New York.
Mr. Rostenkowski with Mr. Edwards of Alabama.
Mr. St Germain with Mr. Walker of Mississippi.
Mr. Charles H. Wilson with Mr. Callaway.
Mr. Moorhead with Mr. Roosevelt.
Mr. Bonner with Mr. Celler.
Mr. Brademas with Mr. Ashley.
Mr. Grabowski with Mr. Resnick.
Mr. Purcell with Mr. Dow.
Mr. Pickle with Mr. Dyal.
Mr. Thompson of New Jersey with Mr. Diggs.
Mr. Sweeney with Mr. Nix.
Mr. Jones of Alabama with Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Vivian with Mr. Tunney.
Mr. Passman with Mr. Irwin.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The doors were opened.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. CUNNINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on H.R. 980.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Nebraska?

There was no objection.

SAIGON CHANCERY

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 7064) to amend the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, as amended.

The Clerk read as follows:

H.R. 7064

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That section 4 of the Foreign Service Buildings Act of 1926, as amended (22 U.S.C. 295), is further amended by adding the following new subsection:

"(e) For the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act in South Vietnam, there is hereby authorized to be appropriated, in addition to amounts previously authorized prior to the enactment of this amendment, \$1,000,000, to remain available until expended."

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is a second demanded?

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, I demand a second.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, a second will be considered as ordered.

There was no objection.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, this is a bill to authorize \$1 million to build a chancery building for our Embassy staff in Saigon. As the membership is aware, the building occupied there was bombed

a few days ago. Several people were killed and many were injured.

The present quarters in Saigon are in two buildings which are leased, comprising a total area of about 25,000 square feet. The main building is on a busy intersection. The way the place was blown up the other day was that a car drove up, full of explosives, parked outside the building, and they touched off the bomb.

We own a piece of ground of a little more than 3 acres in Saigon, on which we can build a building with a wall around it, and we can set it back from the street so that this kind of bombing cannot take place again.

The White House has told me that the President would order, and I believe has ordered, the Army to cooperate in every way.

The State Department people have plans for a building and can use these plans for a stripped-down version. They tell me they can have a building in operation within 6 months.

I believe it important that we grant this authorization not only to get a building but also as a symbol of our determination to stay in South Vietnam until this matter is brought to a reasonable and satisfactory conclusion.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

(Mr. ADAIR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, I rise to urge unanimous and immediate adoption of this bill. It was reported unanimously by the subcommittee which heard testimony and studied it. It was reported unanimously by the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The evidence is overwhelming for its speedy enactment.

It seems to me there are two issues here.

First. The matter of providing necessary, adequate, and secure work space for our staff in Saigon.

Second. The matter of letting it be known to the people not only of Vietnam, not only of southeast Asia, but of the world, that we are in South Vietnam and we intend to stay there until a satisfactory conclusion of the tragic situation in that country is reached.

Upon the first point the gentleman from Ohio has pointed out that plans now in being will permit an increased amount of space available for office use by our people in Saigon. This is necessary and desirable. In the light of our increased staff there, we do need more space. Many Members of this House who have had occasion to visit Saigon are aware that our staff there is badly crowded and cramped for space. It is worth while to point out that on the 3-acre site where the new building is to be built it will be possible to institute greater security measures.

It is not likely that we shall see a repetition of the kind of bombing of a few days ago, because there is enough ground space so that the actual structure can be recessed from the street. Thus a truck of explosives could not be driven

close enough to it to cause damage of any great consequence. The site is in a much less congested district in Saigon. That is one reason that I urge the adoption of this bill.

There is a second point. We must make it unmistakably clear to the peoples of the world that we are going to remain in Vietnam until the Communist enemy has been conquered there. We cannot permit the feeling to be abroad that the Vietcong or any other Communist influences are going to drive the United States out of that war-torn country until peace has been restored, until the Vietnamese people can live in dignity under a government of their own choosing. If for no other reason, Mr. Speaker, than to establish this psychological factor, I would urge the adoption of this bill. I think it is highly desirable that this vote be made unanimous and that by this showing of unanimity we demonstrate again, if that be necessary, the absolute certainty that our presence in Vietnam will continue so long as it may be necessary.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. ADAIR. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. The question arises as to what is going to happen to these premises that we have been using and were damaged. Are they going to be repaired and are we going to use them in the meantime? Of course, I strongly favor the building of the new building as well.

Mr. ADAIR. The gentleman has asked a question the answer to which depends to a large degree on the attitude of the lessor. These are leased premises. We were informed in the committee that our employees in Saigon have taken some necessary preliminary steps to clear the area and to make it somewhat useful. Since the premises are leased, the rehabilitation would be a matter up to the lessor of the premises. I understand that the premises are owned by a citizen of Vietnam and it will be up to that person to make the corrections or improvements.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. If the gentleman will yield further, my other point is what will the U.S. personnel and the chancery functions do? Where will they be in the meantime until this new building is constructed in 6 months? How do we carry on from here permanently in Saigon? Before the gentleman answers my question, I want to state that I approve wholeheartedly his expression of our determination that we cannot and will not leave Vietnam despite this tragic occurrence. To do so will only confirm the impression that we are a "paper tiger." This characterization I cannot and will not accept for my country.

Mr. ADAIR. The answer to the gentleman's question is that our staff in Saigon will have to make do with what they have for the time being. My understanding is that the upper floors of these two buildings were not damaged to the point where they could not be used. They will be used. It will not be convenient and it will not be a satisfactory

arrangement, but the two buildings there, of course, can be used until a new building is constructed.

In that connection I would underscore what the gentleman from Ohio said; namely, that it is proposed to use plans which were drawn up several years ago to construct a building on a site which we already own.

If the Congress acts expeditiously, this whole matter can move forward very promptly and very smoothly and we will be in the new building in the shortest possible time.

Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio [Mrs. BOLTON].

Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. Speaker, I want to associate myself with everything that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR] has said. We went into this matter very thoroughly. Incidentally, I have always felt that the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HAYS] was a most excellent chairman. He gives everyone a chance to speak his mind and ask all the questions he desires. It has been a very satisfactory experience to find ourselves ready to take immediate action. I think the strength of this whole matter is in immediate action so that we may tell the world that we are there and we are not getting out at the moment.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DERWINSKI].

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Speaker, I wish to join the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HAYS] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ADAIR] in urging support of this measure. Even though there is a limitation on the construction of the new chancery, for practical purposes it gives the House an opportunity to dramatize our determination to support the President in Vietnam, especially at a time when the President is receiving much unsolicited advice to compromise and retreat. The House has a chance to declare in a very affirmative and effective fashion support of the President.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ZABLOCKI].

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Speaker, as the Chairman of a Study Commission that has visited Saigon on several occasions, the most recent in 1963, I can attest that a new chancery building is long overdue. I want to assure you, Mr. Speaker, that this chancery building, which will be built about a mile away from the present building which has been destroyed will not only have a good psychological effect on those who are trying to destroy the United States image in that area and in the world, but will also have a salutary effect on the morale of our U.S. Embassy personnel.

Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the chairman of the subcommittee who so expeditiously brought this legislation providing for a new chancery building to the House for its consideration. I, too, hope that the legislation will be passed by a unanimous vote.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I want to say in conclusion that it is a matter of some pride to the Committee on Foreign Affairs that this matter has been handled so expeditiously. The message came up after noon on last Thursday. The

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committee met Thursday afternoon, had hearing and reported it out. The full committee reported it out on Friday and is before the House on Monday. I think this is another example of our determination to act and act expeditiously, to show the world that we will not be pushed out of Vietnam.

The SPEAKER. The question is, Will the House suspend the rules and pass the bill H.R. 7064?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, on that I ask for the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 378, nays 0, not voting 55, as follows:

[Roll No. 63]

YEAS—378

Abbltt	Davis, Wis.	Hansen, Iowa
Abernethy	Dawson	Hansen, Wash.
Adair	de la Garza	Hardy
Adams	Delaney	Harris
Addabbo	Dent	Harsha
Albert	Denton	Harvey, Ind.
Anderson, Ill.	Derwinski	Harvey, Mich.
Anderson, Tenn.	Devine	Hathaway
Andrews, George W.	Dickinson	Hawkins
Andrews, N. Dak.	Dingell	Hays
Annunzio	Dole	Hébert
Ashbrook	Donohue	Hechler
Ashmore	Dorn	Henderson
Aspinall	Dowdy	Herlong
Ayres	Downing	Hicks
Bandstra	Dulski	Hollifield
Baring	Duncan, Oreg.	Holland
Barrett	Duncan, Tenn.	Horton
Bates	Dwyer	Hosmer
Battin	Dyal	Howard
Beckworth	Edmondson	Hull
Belcher	Edwards, Calif.	Hungate
Bell	Ellsworth	Huot
Bennett	Erlenborn	Hutchinson
Berry	Evans, Colo.	Ichord
Bingham	Everett	Jacobs
Blatnik	Evins, Tenn.	Jarman
Bolling	Fallon	Joelson
Bolton	Farbstein	Johnson, Calif.
Bow	Farnsley	Johnson, Okla.
Brock	Farnum	Johnson, Pa.
Brooks	Fascell	Jonas
Broomfield	Feighan	Jones, Mo.
Brown, Calif.	Findley	Karsten
Brown, Ohio	Flood	Karth
Broyhill, N.C.	Flynt	Kastenmeier
Broyhill, Va.	Fogarty	Kee
Buchanan	Foley	Keith
Burke	Ford, Gerald R.	Kelly
Burleson	Ford	King, Calif.
Burton, Calif.	William D.	King, N.Y.
Burton, Utah	Fountain	King, Utah
Byrne, Pa.	Fraser	Kirwan
Cabell	Frelinghuysen	Krebs
Cahill	Friedel	Kunkel
Callan	Fulton, Pa.	Laird
Cameron	Fulton, Tenn.	Landrum
Carey	Fuqua	Langen
Carter	Gallagher	Latta
Casey	Garmatz	Leggett
Cederberg	Gathings	Lennon
Chamberlain	Gettys	Lipscomb
Chelf	Gialmo	Long, La.
Clancy	Gilbert	Long, Md.
Clark	Gilligan	Love
Clausen, Don H.	Gonzalez	McCarthy
Cleveland	Goodell	McClary
Clevenger	Gray	McCulloch
Collier	Green, Oreg.	McDade
Colmer	Green, Pa.	McDowell
Conable	Greigg	McEwen
Conte	Griener	McFall
Conyers	Griffin	McGrath
Cooley	Griffiths	McMillan
Corbett	Gross	McVicker
Corman	Grover	Macdonald
Cotley	Gubser	Machen
Cramer	Gurney	Mackay
Culver	Hagan, Ga.	Madden
Cunningham	Hagen, Calif.	Mahon
Curtin	Haley	Marsh
Curtis	Hall	Martin, Ala.
Dague	Halleck	Martin, Mass.
Daniels	Halpern	Martin, Nebr.
Davis, Ga.	Hamilton	Matsunaga
	Hanley	Matthews
	Hanna	May
	Hansen, Idaho	Meeds

Michel	Quillen	Smith, Va.
Miller	Race	Stafford
Mills	Randall	Stalbaum
Minish	Redlin	Stanton
Mink	Reid, Ill.	Steed
Minshall	Reid, N.Y.	Stephens
Mize	Reifel	Stratton
Moeller	Reinecke	Stubblefield
Monagan	Reuss	Sullivan
Moore	Rhodes, Ariz.	Talcott
Morgan	Rhodes, Pa.	Taylor
Morris	Rivers, Alaska	Teague, Calif.
Morrison	Roberts	Thomas
Morse	Robison	Thompson, La.
Morton	Rodino	Thompson, Tex.
Mosher	Rogers, Colo.	Thomson, Wis.
Moss	Rogers, Fla.	Todd
Multer	Rogers, Tex.	Trimble
Murphy, Ill.	Ronan	Tuck
Murphy, N.Y.	Roncalio	Tupper
Murray	Rooney, N.Y.	Tuten
Natcher	Rooney, Pa.	Udall
Nedzi	Rosenthal	Ullman
Nelsen	Roudebush	Utt
O'Brien	Roush	Van Deerlin
O'Hara, Ill.	Roybal	Vanik
O'Hara, Mich.	Rumsfeld	Vigorito
O'Konski	Ryan	Waggonner
Olsen, Mont.	Satterfield	Walker, N. Mex.
Olson, Minn.	St. Onge	Watkins
O'Neal, Ga.	Saylor	Watts
O'Neill, Mass.	Scheuer	Weitner
Ottinger	Schisler	Whalley
Patman	Schmidhauser	White, Idaho
Patten	Schneebell	White, Tex.
Pelly	Schweiker	Whitener
Pepper	Scott	Whitten
Perkins	Secrest	Widnall
Philbin	Selden	Williams
Pike	Senner	Willis
Pirnie	Shipley	Wilson, Bob
Poage	Shriver	Wright
Poff	Sickles	Wyatt
Pool	Sikes	Wylder
Powell	Sisk	Yates
Price	Skubitz	Young
Pucinski	Slack	Younger
Purcell	Smith, Calif.	Zablocki
Quile	Smith, Iowa	

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—55

Andrews, Glenn	Edwards, Ala.	Resnick
Arends	Fino	Rivers, S.C.
Ashley	Gibbons	Roosevelt
Baldwin	Grabowski	Rostenkowski
Betts	Helstoski	St Germain
Boggs	Irwin	Smith, N.Y.
Boland	Jennings	Springer
Bonner	Jones, Ala.	Staggers
Brademas	Keogh	Sweeney
Bray	Kluczynski	Teague, Tex.
Byrnes, Wis.	Kornegay	Tenzer
Callaway	MacGregor	Thompson, N.J.
Celler	Mackie	Toll
Clawson, Del	Mailliard	Tunney
Cohelan	Mathias	Vivian
Daddario	Moorhead	Walker, Miss.
Diggs	Nix	Wilson
Dow	Passman	Charles H.
	Pickle	Wolf

So (two-thirds having voted in favor thereof) the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Keogh with Mr. Byrnes of Wisconsin.
 Mr. Boggs with Mr. Arends.
 Mr. Thompson of New Jersey with Mr. Mailliard.
 Mr. Jennings with Mr. Betts.
 Mr. Kluczynski with Mr. Del Clawson.
 Mr. Wolf with Mr. Springer.
 Mr. Bonner with Mr. Mathias.
 Mr. Tenzer with Mr. Fino.
 Mr. Helstoski with Mr. Bray.
 Mr. Roosevelt with Mr. MacGregor.
 Mr. Daddario with Mr. Smith of New York.
 Mr. Gibbons with Mr. Callaway.
 Mr. Rivers of South Carolina with Mr. Glenn Andrews of Alabama.
 Mr. Charles H. Wilson with Mr. Walker of Mississippi.
 Mr. Staggers with Mr. Edwards of Alabama.
 Mr. Brademas with Mr. Ashley.
 Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Grabowski.
 Mr. Celler with Mr. Nix.
 Mr. Irwin with Mr. Diggs.

Mr. Moorhead with Mr. Dow.
 Mr. Toll with Mr. Tunney.
 Mr. Jones of Alabama with Mr. Vivian.
 Mr. St Germain with Mr. Resnick.
 Mr. Pickle with Mr. Boland.
 Mr. Cohelan with Mr. Sweeney.
 Mr. Rostenkowski with Mr. Mackie.
 Mr. Kornegay with Mr. Passman.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Mr. KORNEGAY. Mr. Speaker, when the roll was called on H.R. 7064, I was on my way from the office, having been unavoidably detained.

Had I been present, I would have voted "yea."

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Speaker, on roll-calls 62 and 63 I was necessarily detained on business in the Senate. If I had been present, I would have voted "no" on H.R. 980, a bill to provide for the return of obscene mail, and "yes" on H.R. 7064, a bill to amend the Foreign Service Building Act.

Mr. Speaker, I would particularly like to explain my position on H.R. 980.

I agree that a man should be able to protect his family from "morally offensive" mail matter; from mail that is "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy, or vile."

But I disagree and disagree strongly with the bill which was before us today; just as I disagreed with its predecessor in the previous Congress.

Mr. Speaker, the plain and admitted purpose of this bill is prior censorship. As such it poses serious constitutional doubts, for prior restraint on publications has always been condemned by the courts.

The Supreme Court, as a matter of fact, in several decisions, including *Roth v. United States*, 364 U.S. 476, and *Jacobellis v. Ohio*, 378 U.S. 184, has ruled that material which is not obscene enjoys the freedom of the press. But the committee itself has stated that the legislation is intended to suppress material which under court decisions is not per se obscene.

In addition to jeopardizing materials which enjoy constitutional protection of freedom of the press, this bill could seriously restrict the flow of otherwise legitimate information.

To a segregationist, literature of the NAACP or of CORE might indeed be considered "obscene" or "lewd" or "lascivious" or "indecent" or "filthy" or "vile." As such, he could effectively demand the Post Office to stop its delivery, even though it is clearly protected by the 1st amendment to the Constitution.

Conversely, the same constitutional denial would exist if those who favor full civil rights for all Americans were to judge, as they might very likely, material from the Klu Klux Klan or the White Citizens Councils as "obscene" and demand its censorship.

These and other points have been carefully considered by the Department of Justice and the Post Office Department.

Both have strongly recommended against the passage of this bill.

Mr. Speaker, considering these reservations and the constitutional denials contained in this bill, and considering the limiting conditions which suspension of the rules imposes, I believe that this bill should not have been passed today. I am very hopeful that the other body will give it the same consideration they gave it a year ago which was to very wisely let this unconstitutional, unwise, and unnecessary bill die a natural death.

TREASURY, POST OFFICE, AND EXECUTIVE OFFICE APPROPRIATION BILL, 1966

Mr. STEED. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7060) making appropriations for the Treasury and Post Office Departments, the Executive Office of the President, and certain independent agencies for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and for other purposes; and pending that motion, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that general debate continue not to exceed 3 hours, the time to be equally divided and controlled by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Conte] and myself.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Oklahoma.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 7060, with Mr. BLATNIK in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill. By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was dispensed with.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the unanimous consent agreement, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. STEED] will be recognized for 1½ hours, and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Conte] will be recognized for 1½ hours.

Mr. STEED. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may require.

Mr. Chairman, I come here today in charge of this bill for the first time, having been chosen to succeed the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Gary, who so ably produced and presented this bill each year for such a long time. I realize I have a very heavy responsibility and a very large pair of shoes to fill. In addition to the fact that I am new as chairman of this subcommittee, we also have a new ranking minority member and four new members of the subcommittee. Because of the newness of so many of us to these new responsibilities, I would ask the House to indulge me for just a moment while I express my personal appreciation to the members of my subcommittee for the wonderful cooperation and assistance they have given me in this heavy job of preparing this bill and bringing it here today. They have

worked hard and shown interest beyond the call of duty and have given me such fine cooperation and help that I feel I should publicly express my appreciation to them.

Mr. Chairman, the bill which we bring here today is characterized by two major factors. It represents an increase over the appropriation for the same departments of the Government for last year of \$366,061,000. We have, of course, allowed the \$255 million that was added to the cost of these departments by the pay raise voted by the Congress last year. This is an automatic cost. Then, in addition to that, we have allowed \$111,061,000, which is our best estimate of the normal workload increases that these departments are mandated to carry out. Most of the agencies financed in this bill are susceptible to workload increases beyond their control. However, since most of them are old and experienced agencies of the Government, it is not too difficult to measure the additional cost factors that these workload increases impose upon them.

In total, in the bill this year, we recommend \$6,604,404,000. That compares with appropriations for the same agencies, to date, of \$6,238,343,000. We considered a budget estimate this year totaling \$6,708,510,000, an increase of \$470 million over the current year. We reduced this request by \$104,106,000. Reduced to percentages, this means that we have actually reduced the request by 1.55 percent, which, on its face, is a very modest reduction. However, we call the attention of the House to the fact that these agencies traditionally bring in tight budgets, and it is not easy to make substantial cuts. Because they are old and experienced agencies, their functions are well spelled out and, with due deference and credit to those who are in charge of these agencies, they are very careful in the requests they make of the Congress for funds. We are very proud to have the opportunity to work with these people and to observe firsthand the wonderful job which we feel they are doing and the candor and manner in which they have presented their requests.

We have allowed an increase over the current year for the two major reasons I cited, which amounts to a net growth of 5.87 percent in the next fiscal year over the current fiscal year.

Allowing for the pay increase costs I think you will find that the rest of this increase is well accounted for in the natural growth factors that these agencies experience. For instance, in the Post Office Department, they are having almost a 4-percent increase in mail volume at this time over last year. They estimate that there will be a continuing increase during the next fiscal year of some 3 percent. In the case of the Post Office Department their cost accounting system tells them that when there is a 1-percent increase in mail volume it will add between \$12 and \$13 million to the cost of operating the Department.

There are two other major items of increase. In the section dealing with the Treasury Department we have increased the acquisition, construction, and improvements fund for the Coast Guard

by \$16 million over the previous year. The House, of course, is aware that the Coast Guard has a very serious replacement problem in capital ships, aircraft and shore installations. This fund will gradually increase for the next several years; it must increase if they are even to get the kind of replacement they must have to carry on the farflung function of this great and important agency.

In addition, we have added \$28 million to the Internal Revenue Service. We hope that will pretty well finish the task of equipping this great agency with the automatic data processing equipment they need to automate their activities in order to cope with the very substantial increase in workload.

Most of this increased workload is the result that a growing Nation and a growing economy automatically create and I think they are a good, healthy sign.

In summary, in the Treasury Department, there is a total increase over the current fiscal year of \$52,852,000. Of this amount \$30 million is allowed for pay increases. The other \$22,852,000 is for increased workload.

For the entire bill there was a request for a total of 25,578 additional jobs. We allowed 9,413 or 37 percent of the request. We disallowed some 16,000 job requests.

In the case of the Treasury Department, they requested 5,025 jobs. We allowed them 2,762 or 55 percent.

In the case of the Post Office Department, where most of the additional job requests are contained, they asked for a total of 20,520 jobs and we have allowed 6,625.

Mr. Chairman, I want to take just a minute to make a comment about this item. Of this request for 20,520 jobs by the Post Office Department, some 5,000 are needed for the natural increase in mail volume, which the committee has approved. The remainder were asked for in order to convert temporary positions to permanent positions. We know that the overtime and the temporary employee problem of the Post Office Department has been growing for years.

Mr. Chairman, we have encouraged the Department to try to do something about this. This year they wanted to convert 15,000 temporary jobs into permanent jobs. However, after going into the matter with them, the committee felt they had not developed the program far enough for us to grant that entire request this year. We have provided funds to convert 1,300 of these temporary positions to permanent status in order to give them an opportunity to take care of the most urgent overtime and temporary employment problems. In addition, of course, we have allowed funds to continue the employment of the remaining temporary employees.

Mr. Chairman, at our request, the Department has developed a considerable amount of statistical information with reference to this job situation since the hearings. However, I feel that considerably more study is going to have to be done before the problem can be fully resolved. There will always be need for overtime and temporary employment in the Post Office Department.